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Ever since Brown v. Board of Education,' scholars, researchers, and
commentators have both bemoaned and celebrated judicial intervention
in educational policy-making and schooling.' Nowhere is the thumbprint
of the judiciary more evident than in the arena of educational finance
policy. Between 1970 and 2000, state supreme courts in some thirty-six
states reviewed their states' school funding schemes pursuant to charges
that state policy-makers had failed to provide an equitable or adequate
distribution of educational resources to children in the state.3 In nineteen
cases during that same time period, the courts struck down their states'
school finance policies and ordered their legislatures and governors to try
again.4 Although nominally focusing on the mechanisms by which states
choose to finance schools, these litigations and judicial decisions have
frequently addressed the substantive aspects of education and,
increasingly, the systems of accountability and oversight designed to
ensure equitable and adequate educational opportunities.5
To date, there has been much scholarly discussion of the legal bases
for these state supreme court decisions and there exists a growing body
of literature studying the effects of such judicial intervention. Legal
scholarship has focused on a description and critique of the evolving
jurisprudence in school finance reform cases and has frequently argued
that educational finance reform litigation has, in the past decade, shifted
from a wave of "equity" litigation aimed at equalizing resources among
school districts to a wave of "adequacy" litigation that seeks to define
1. 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995)
(questioning the efficacy of judicial remedies in desegregation cases); LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY
DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 13 (1976) (claiming that court-
ordered busing to achieve racial balance in public schools "may well have a potential for social
disruption and dissolution unequaled by the Vietnam war at its height"). But see, e.g., JENNIFER L.
HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY & SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 134
(1984) ("[W]ere it not for [the] courts, there would be little reduction in racial isolation [in public
schooling]."); Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity Litigation and the Democratic Imperative, J. EDUC.
FIN., Summer 1998, at 23, 24 (arguing that a "democratic imperative" has been driving courts to
intervene in educational finance policies to ensure a more equitable and adequate distribution of
resources).
3. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of
the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I s85,
1189 n.9, 1191 n.14 (2003) (cataloguing final decisions of state supreme courts in educational finance
reform litigations).
4. Id. at 1189 n.io, 1193 n.26.
5. For this reason, such "educational finance" litigation may more appropriately be deemed
"educational policy" litigation. To be consistent with prior scholarship on the subject, however, this
Article will refer to such litigation as "educational finance" or "school finance" litigation.
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some minimally adequate level of education to which all children are
entitled.6 Much of that scholarship puzzles over the question of how to
develop a workable and effective constitutional standard for what
constitutes equitable and adequate educational opportunities. For their
part, social researchers-through the use of statistical modeling and
qualitative description-have studied the process of implementing school
finance decrees and the effects of those decrees on a range of variables
including equity in per-pupil spending, overall educational spending, and,
recently, educational achievement.7 Despite the vast legal literature and
growing judicial impact research regarding school finance litigation, little
is known about why state supreme courts choose to intervene in
educational finance policy in the first instance.
This Article addresses the question of why some state supreme
courts overturn their states' educational finance systems, while others
uphold their finance systems. Specifically, the Article provides a
comparative political analysis of the DeRolph v. State8 litigation in Ohio
6. See William H. Clune, The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC. POLY
376 (I994) [hereinafter Clune, Equity to Adequacy]; William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard
Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by
Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721 (1992) [hereinafter Clune, New
Answers to Hard Questions]; Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation,
and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (i995): William E. Thro,
Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a
Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (994); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219 (I99O) [hereinafter Thro, Public School Finance Litigation]; Julie K. Underwood, School
Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (1995); Julie K. Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
517 (i99i); Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial
School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507 (I99I); William E. Thro. Note, To Render Them
Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Litigation, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1639 (1989) [hereinafter Thro, To Render Them Safe]. In Koski, supra note 3, at 1227-98, the
author critiques the legal scholarship that attempts to categorize too starkly the various "waves" of
educational finance reform litigation and argues that state supreme courts have long relied on fuzzy
standards of educational equity and adequacy to permit flexibility in the face of such complex issues as
educational policy reform.
7. See, e.g., DOUGLASS REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (200i); John Dayton, Examining the Efficacy of Judicial Involvement in Public School
Funding Reform, 22 J. EDuc. FIN., Summer 1996, at i; William N. Evans et al., Schoolhouses,
Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. to (1997); Michael Heise,
The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on Education Finance: More Preliminary Analyses and
Modeling, 21 J. EDUC. FIN., Fall 1995, at 195; G. Alan Hickrod et al., The Effect of Constitutional
Litigation on Education Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, i8 J. EDUC. FIN., Fall 1992, at 18o; Sheila E.
Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 789 (1998).
8. 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph 1); 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (DeRolph 11); 754
N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001) (DeRolph III); 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) (DeRolph IV); State v. Lewis,
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and the Vincent v. Voight9 litigation in Wisconsin; an analysis designed to
identify the factors influencing judicial decision-making in educational
policy reform litigation. The Article argues that the judicial decisions in
these cases are affected by the policy preferences of state supreme court
justices and the institutional constraints on a judiciary venturing into the
complex thicket of educational policy.
Part I of the Article first reviews the legal literature that considers
judicial decision-making in educational finance reform litigation and
concludes that the literature fails to provide an adequate explanation of
judicial behavior in such litigations for two reasons: (i) it does not
provide a legal-analytic framework of sufficient rigor to meaningfully
guide judicial decision-making and (2) for the most part, it provides little
empirical data controlling for variables influencing judicial decision-
making outside of the official legal reporters. Part I then briefly considers
a large political science literature on judicial decision-making in
appellate courts of last resort. Rather than viewing law as determining
case outcomes, this literature suggests that judicial attitudes, institutional
structures, and the political environment all influence judicial decision-
making. Part I concludes by setting forth a theoretical framework for the
qualitative inquiry into the politics of the DeRolph and Vincent
litigations.
The framework posits that judicial ideologies, i.e., the preference for
"liberal" as opposed to "conservative" policy, and attitudes toward the
role of the judiciary, i.e., an "activist" as opposed to a "restraintist" role
orientation, play an enhanced role in judicial decision-making in the
context of education finance litigation. In these courts-of-last-resort,
judges understand that their decisions are not reviewable by a higher
court and are therefore freer to act on their own policy preferences.
Despite this relative flexibility, courts in school finance cases are
constrained by their inability to implement their policy decisions and the
risk that their legitimacy may be compromised both by a legislative and
executive branch unwilling to comply with the court's mandate. On the
other hand, if a consensus among the political elite in the state is seeking
meaningful school reform, but the policy-makers require the "cover" of a
court order to act, a state supreme court may cooperate with the political
branches by striking down the educational finance policy. Accordingly,
this Article argues that these inter-institutional constraints shape courts
decisions in educational finance cases.
789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003) (DeRolph V).
9. 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000).
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Part II provides a descriptive analysis of Ohio's DeRolph litigation
and the political environment surrounding the state supreme court's
decision, while Part III does the same for Wisconsin's Vincent litigation.
Notably, the Article constructs an attitudinal profile of each of the
supreme courts and their justices by exploring the backgrounds of the
justices, their decision-making in significant cases, and their systematic
behavior in certain garden-variety cases.
A cursory glance suggests that these two school finance cases should
have reached similar outcomes. In both Ohio and Wisconsin, the
supreme courts had rejected a plaintiff challenge to the school-finance
regime in prior cases. Both Midwestern states have modestly diverse
populations, diversified economies, and citizens who distribute
themselves among urban centers, bedroom suburbs, and rural
agricultural areas. And in both states a strong Republican governor
opposed judicial intervention in the state's educational finance scheme.
But the results in the two states' cases were quite different, as the Ohio
Supreme Court struck down its state's school finance scheme, while the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld its scheme. The comparative case
studies explore the differences in the judicial attitudes and political
environments that may have resulted in these differing outcomes.
This study of the two cases supports the hypothesis that a more
liberal and activist judiciary is more likely to find unconstitutional the
state's educational finance policy. In Ohio, a liberal four-person majority
on the supreme court struck down the state's educational finance
scheme. That "working majority" consistently took liberal positions in
workers' compensation, products liability, and open government cases.
Despite opposition from a powerful governor and the legislative
leadership, the court struck down the finance system and mandated that
the legislature try again. That decision was supported by virtually the
entire Education Establishment including the vast majority of the school
districts in the state. Since the initial decision, however, the court has
been forced to back pedal in the face of legislative resistance and may be
facing a crisis of legitimacy brought forth by strong opposition and the
inability to effectuate its decisions.
In Wisconsin, a 4-3 majority of conservative jurists upheld the state's
educational finance policy. In a decision in line with the court's tradition
of upholding the social policies developed by the political branches, a
majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a seemingly high
standard for a constitutional education. A different majority nevertheless
found that the state had met its constitutional burden. The rejection of
the plaintiffs' challenge was further bolstered by the lack of strong
May 2004]
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support for the plaintiffs from the state's educational establishment and
school districts.
The Article concludes in Part IV with a synthetic analysis of the
factors influencing decision-making in the two litigations and provides
some initial thoughts as to how courts decide complex educational policy
matters and the role of courts in state educational policy.
I. FRAMING THE INQUIRY: TOWARD A THEORY OF STATE SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY REFORM LITIGATION
A. THE SCHOLARSHIP EXAMINING DECISION-MAKING IN SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM CASES
Much has been written about school finance litigation.'" This section
reviews and critiques the two types of school finance literature that
attempt to explain the recent state supreme court activity in school
finance policy: the jurisprudential-constitutional law arguments and the
school finance politics arguments grounded in institutional roles, school
finance politics, and educational reform movements. While the
jurisprudential literature falls short because it merely describes the
doctrinal bases of courts' decisions without considering extra-legal
influences, the political literature holds promise, but must be further
developed and subjected to the crucible of empirical data.
i. The Legal Doctrine and Strategy Explanation: The Three
"Waves" of Reform
The most widely known account of the development of school
finance cases-the wave explanation-was first articulated by William
Thro" and has since been reiterated by others.'2 Simply put, Thro and
others argue that judicial decision-making in school finance cases can be
explained by shifts in legal strategies and judicial interpretations of
constitutional language. From a descriptive standpoint, these scholars
have identified patterns in judicial decision-making and categorized these
patterns into three distinct waves. From an explanatory standpoint, one
io. See supra note 6; see also EQUrn AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES (Helen R. Ladd et al. eds., 1999); Symposium, Adequacy Litigation in School Finance, 28
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 481 (995); Symposium, Investing in Our Children's Future: School Finance
Reform in the '90s, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 293 (1991); Symposium, Issues in Educational Law and
Policy, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543 (I994).
I I. Thro, Public School Finance Litigation, supra note 6, at 222-32, 239-46; Thro, To Render
Them Safe, supra note 6, at 1641-44. It should be noted that Thro's work found its intellectual roots in
a 1985 article by Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education
in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1985).
12. See Enrich, supra note 6; Heise, supra note 6; Levine, supra note 6; Molly McUsic, The Use of
Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (991).
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might suggest that the judicial decisions in each wave are best explained
by the legal strategies employed and the jurisprudential bases of the
decisions.
The initial wave (1971-1973) of school finance litigation relied
primarily on the federal Equal Protection Clause and argued that equal
protection guaranteed a right to substantially equal funding among
school districts. 3 This argument was premised on the theoretical claim
that the revenues of a school district should not be based on the wealth
of the people or property within the district. 4 After enjoying initial
success in at least two federal district courts'5 and the California Supreme
Court in Serrano v. Priest,6 however, the federal equal protection theory
came to a screeching halt in the San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez case.'7
The New Jersey Supreme Court ushered in the second wave (1973-
1989) of school finance cases by its discovery of educational rights in
state constitutions. Although the Robinson v. Cahill court based its
decision solely on the state's education article, which imposed on the
state legislature a duty to provide a "thorough and efficient" education
to the state's children, the critical aspect of the case, according to some
was the newfound reliance on state constitutional arguments."
Thereafter, most state high courts relied heavily on the state education
article and at times employed it in conjunction with the state's
constitutional equality provision to find the state's school spending
scheme unconstitutional." The essence of the claim in the second wave
cases, according to the wave explanation, was the equity of school
funding schemes.
The third wave (1989-present) was launched by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in 1989 when that court both turned to the education
article of its state constitution and considered the substantive education
13. See Heise, supra note 6, at 1153-57.
14. See JOHN E. COONS El AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 2 (1970).
15. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411
U.S. 1 (1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 597i).
16. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 197), affd after remand, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
17. 411 U.S. I, 19, 33-35 (1973) (holding that "poverty" is not a suspect classification and that
there is no "fundamental interest" in education under the U.S. Constitution).
18. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973).
19. See Heise, supra note 6, at 1157-62; Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 6, at 1653-56.
20. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 3o , 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (finding that an
analysis of the education article reinforces the holding that the funding system was unconstitutional
under the equality provision); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. i v. Herschler, 6o6 P.2d 310 (Wyo.




that article mandates." Third wave cases are typified by their reliance on
state education articles and their subtle shift toward theories of
educational adequacy, not equity. William Clune defines "'[e]quity' in
school finance" as "equal resources across a state; for example, equal
spending per pupil or equal taxable resources ..... .Adequacy' refers to
resources that are sufficient (or adequate) to achieve some educational
result, such as a minimum passing grade on a state achievement test.,
23
With the refinement of the wave explanation in his 199o article, Thro
identified the importance of the 1989 Kentucky case as the bellwether for
the shift from equity to adequacy.'
The wave typology has provided school finance commentators a
common language to discuss the development of school finance
litigation, but the explanatory value of the waves is questionable.
Although Thro describes the doctrinal bases underlying each wave, he
does not explain why the courts ruled as they did, unless one believes
that constitutional text is entirely determinative of legal outcomes. Thro
himself offered that explanation when he argued in the wake of the third
wave that "if the education clauses are useful tools for school finance
reform... [,] then the differences between the education provisions,
which previously have been meaningless, will take on greater
significance,, 25  and further, "[a]lthough the[] differences between
education clauses were of little consequence during the second wave of
cases, the distinctions could be, and probably should be, the determining
factor during a third wave. '26
Analysis of the jurisprudential history of educational finance cases
makes clear that constitutional language and analytic constructs such as
"equity," "equality of educational opportunity," and "adequacy"-even
21. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d i86, 205-13 (Ky. 1989).
22. William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U. MicH. J.L.
REFORM 481, 481 (1995).
23. Id.
24. Thro, To Render them Safe, supra note 6, at i644.
25. Thro, Public School Finance Litigation, supra note 6, at 243.
26. Id. at 245-46. Thro then employed a four-category typology that relied heavily on Ratner's
four category typology of education clauses that sorted the constitutions based upon the states' level of
duty to educate their children. See Ratner, supra note I I, at 781-858. Thro's argument was later
refined by McUsic, supra note 12, who categorized education articles based on their strength for
potential equity or adequacy claims. Id. at 309. McUsic argued that, based on their language,
education articles can be parsed into the level of educational equity they provide and the level of
minimum educational standards they provide. Id. McUsic found four levels of educational equity
offered by state constitutions and four levels of educational standards offered by those constitutions.
Id. at n.4. She then argued that minimum standards arguments would be a more fruitful path for
school finance reformers because they incite less political tension, won't spill over into other areas of
policy, don't conflict with federal law, and won't threaten local control. Id. at 326-39.
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as embellished by some state supreme courts -are insufficiently rigorous
to provide any meaningful guidance to courts as to the constitutionality
of the complex educational system provided to children." Rather, as this
Author argues elsewhere, such "fuzzy" concepts have been employed by
state supreme courts in a fashion that permits them to intervene in state
educational policy, yet recognizes the constraints courts face and the
limited role they play in such policy development and implementation."'
Thro and other commentators who have adopted the descriptive
wave typology of school finance litigation have not systematically
demonstrated that legal-doctrinal theories have affected case outcomes,
nor have they ruled out alternative explanations for judicial behavior
such as policy preferences and political pressures. 9 Indeed, Thro himself
has recognized that constitutional language seems to have had little
effect on certain case outcomes." That said, Thro and others who have
discussed the wave explanation probably should not be viewed as
advancing theories of judicial behavior and judicial decision-making in
school finance cases, because the wave explanation is more likely
intended as a normative statement of how courts should decide school
finance cases in a properly restrained fashion.
27. Koski, supra note 3, at II87-88.
28. Id. at 1i88.
29. Although largely adopting Thro's wave theory, Julie K. Underwood modified it slightly.
Constitutional language aside, what was the nature of the right asserted by finance reform plaintiffs?
This is the question that drove Underwood's categorization of school finance cases. Julie K.
Underwood, School Finance Litigation: Legal Theories, Judicial Activism, and Social Neglect, 20 J.
EDuc. FIN., Fall 1994, at 143. In her words:
Generally, there are three approaches to litigating finance equity cases. The first two
theories involve the constitutional doctrine of equal protection. As encompassed by the
federal or state constitution, this doctrine prohibits the government from treating similarly
situated individuals differently without a strong justification. According to this theory,
litigants argue that the state practice of inequitable funding unjustifiably treats students who
reside in poorer districts differently from those students who reside in more affluent
districts by allowing a disparity to exist in the funding of the educational programs. The
second argument based on the equal protection clause is that the lower funding level in
poorer districts results in a deprivation of education to students who reside in these districts.
Based exclusively on the state's education clause, the third theory contends that the state
legislature has failed to live up to its state constitutional obligation to provide an education
to the children in its state.
Id. at 144. Underwood categorized each significant school finance case up through 1994 based upon
her legal strategy categories, the case's outcome, and the nature of the legal right established by the
court. Interestingly, she found that the legal strategy employed was not systematically related to the
outcome of the case. Id. at 150.
30. William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance
Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 540 (1998) ("To date, courts often have ignored the meaning of the text
[of their own constitutions] and/or the decisions from other states.").
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2. The School Finance Politics Explanations
Beyond the shortcomings of the wave typology, other recent school
finance litigation literature suggests five general types of political
arguments that may help explain recent judicial activity: (i) attitudinal-
role identity theory; (2) racial politics; (3) interest group politics; (4)
educational reform theory; and (5) institutional cooperation and social
networks.
a. Judicial Activism
This theory is straightforward and is basically a "strong" or "activist"
court explanation. Because state supreme courts are institutionally,
economically, and politically independent of the state governors,
legislatures, and the populace, the argument goes, the recent judicial
attention to school finance policy can be explained by the judiciary's
increased willingness to step in and reform educational policy when the
political branches are unable or unwilling to remedy apparent inequity or
inadequacy in educational resources. Michael Rebell and Julie
Underwood have provided the clearest articulations of this explanation.3
The problem, however, is that Rebell and Underwood treat "activism"
not as an attitudinal characteristic of a court or judge, but rather as a
description of any court that chooses to overturn an educational finance
policy. A court is "activist" merely because it strikes down a school
finance scheme, irrespective of whether it has a propensity to do so in
other areas. Thus, "activism" does not provide an explanation of judicial
behavior as much as it provides a description of the particular decision.
Moreover, even accepting the reasoning that courts become activist when
there is a refusal of the political branches to act, the explanation still
must falter without systematic evidence demonstrating that legislatures
have in fact failed to provide meaningful school reform and that courts
have stepped in to fill the breach. To better understand the potential
effects of "activism" the term must be clearly defined, the mechanism by
which it operates must be specified, and specific evidence that it affects
judicial outcomes in school finance cases must be supplied.
b. Racial Politics and the Identities of the Litigants
Who participates, who stands to win, who stands to lose in school
finance litigation, and how do these individuals and groups affect judicial
decision-making? These are the questions addressed by a handful of
scholars. Michael Heise, for instance, has considered the interests and
identities of those pursuing school finance litigation and argues that,
large urban school districts, the traditional drivers of school finance
litigation, are pursuing adequacy litigation because they continue to
31. Rebell. supra note 2, at 32-45; Underwood, supra note 29, at 143.
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experience educational failure, because they already receive as much
money as their suburban and rural counterparts, and because they would
therefore not benefit from equity litigation. 2 Heise interprets recent data
to suggest "that some urban school systems might actually lose
financially in an effort to equalize per-pupil spending."33 The only way to
get additional resources is to get it through the courts by submitting that
their current level of educational resources is "inadequate."34 Although
Heise's theory may help explain the recent utilization of the adequacy
theory by litigants, it does little to explain why courts have more
frequently accepted that theory-nor does he claim so much.
Nevertheless, to the extent that courts are more willing to entertain
claims on behalf of large, urban, and predominantly minority school
districts, Heise's theory helps explain why the shift to adequacy not only
makes sense, but is necessary for courts who favor the causes of political
minorities.
A second theory of judicial-decision-making and litigant identity in
school finance cases tends to contradict Heise's argument. Three recent
studies have advanced the thesis that racial minority status can be a
burden in both the liability stage and the implementation stage of
litigation. Douglas Reed demonstrated that in New Jersey, the fact that
the plaintiff districts were primarily minority districts resulted in a
tortured and lengthy implementation process for the court.35 Kent Tedin
similarly demonstrated that minority district winners in court had
difficulty translating those wins into reality in the legislature.36 Finally,
James Ryan recently argued that "minority school districts -particularly
urban minority districts-do not fare as well as white districts in school
finance litigation."37 Ryan provided a simple tally of the school finance
cases that minority districts won versus the percentage of cases in which
non-minority districts won and concluded that non-minority districts'
win-loss record was better."' Although this shows that race may be a
factor in these decisions, Ryan acknowledged that there are a number of
factors unrelated to race that were not controlled in his study.39 Thus,
32. Heise, supra note 6, at 172-76.
33. Id. at 1173.
34. Id. at 1'74-76.
35. REED, supra note 7; Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance
Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & Soc'y. REV. 175, i9o (I998).
36. Kent L. Tedin, Self-Interest, Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public
Schools, 56 J. POL. 628, 636-47 (1994).
37. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 432, 433
(I999).
38. Id. at 447-57.
39. Id. at 455. It should also be noted that Ryan also found that constitutional text is not
determinative of case outcomes. Id.
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although the identity of the plaintiffs may influence judicial outcomes,
the theory remains largely untested.
How can one reconcile Ryan's position and the implications of
Heise's argument? Though it is entirely plausible that the majoritarian
political process would disfavor the educational finance claims of
political minorities, it is not clear how courts will respond to minority
claims. One might argue that some form of racial animus motivates
judges to reject minority plaintiff claims. Although this may be true,
there are less blatant, though no less insidious reasons that courts may
disfavor political minorities. Although judges are theoretically sheltered
from public opinion, they may recognize that the political majority in the
state, acting in its own self-interest, may oppose any school finance
reform benefiting only minority school districts. To the extent that judges
face retention or re-election races, fear of being ousted may drive them
to vote against political minorities. More subtly, judges may realize that
an unpopular judicial decision may be ignored and will ultimately
undermine the court's own legitimacy and effectiveness.
This Article argues that judicial decision-making is more complex
than either countermajoritarian sympathy for minorities or simple racial
animus. The racial/ethnic status of educational reform plaintiffs does not
stand alone, but rather interacts with the court's own role orientation-
that is, the judges' or the court's conception of the institutional role of
the court. A court that is "activist" in the sense that it views its role as
that of policing social policy for not only legality, but also "justice," will
support the claims of political minorities. For example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has a very long and venerable tradition of judicial
activism and has, in the third wave of school finance litigation, ordered
radical intervention in educational policy to remedy the harms visited
upon minority school districts.4" In other words, race and the identity of
the plaintiffs matters, but only insofar as they are filtered through the
court's own role orientation.
c. Interest Group Politics
Two early case studies described the role of interest groups in the
development of educational finance litigation and the ultimate
implementation of remedial plans in such litigation.' Richard Elmore
and Milbrey McLaughlin's exhaustive case study of school finance
reform in California in the wake of the Serrano v. Priest decision noted
40. See RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 26
(1978) (analyzing the politics of New Jersey's Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), litigation);
REED, supra note 7, at 136-62.
41. See generally RICHARD F. ELMORE & MILBREY WALLIN McLAUGHLIN, REFORM AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1982); LEHNE, supra note 40.
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the influence of legal scholars and lawyers who crafted the theories that
ultimately were reflected in the judicial decision.42 They further analyzed
the influence of legal and technical experts and "action channels" in
mobilizing interest groups during the implementation phase of the
litigation.43 Similarly, Richard Lehne described the interaction between
the New Jersey State Department of Education and the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the "dialogue" that followed the landmark Robinson
v. Cahill decision.' At bottom, however, neither of these two studies
focused on the impact of interest group mobilization on the decision of
the state supreme court to intervene. Such influences remain largely
unexplored.
d. Educational Reform Movement
A few scholars have recently suggested that the recent turn toward
adequacy litigation is a by-product of a larger national educational
reform movement that focuses on educational excellence and outcome
standards rather than traditional educational input standards.4' Most
forcefully, William Clune has argued that school finance schemes in
general and school finance litigation in particular have perceptibly
shifted from theories of equity to theories of adequacy. 6 More to the
point, Clune argues that this shift is "being driven by an emerging
consensus that high minimum outcomes should be the orienting goal of
both policy and finance" and that school finance and school finance
litigation should be more concerned with educational adequacy.47 He
describes this as nothing short of a "social movement" caused by the
development of "objective" high minimum achievement standards and
''a consensus around the importance of minimum achievement to our
society, including economy and racial justice.""
What this argument lacks, however, is a rigorous chain of evidence
showing how courts were reacting to widespread educational failure and
the push for standards when they handed-down recent decisions
overturning school finance schemes. While it may be true, as Michael
Rebell argues, that the "common thread that runs through all [of the
42. ELMORE &McLAUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 21-32.
43. Id. at 217-41.
44. LEHNE, supra note 40, at 9o-163.
45. See William H. Clune, Comment on Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten, in HOLDING SCHOOLS
ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN EDUCATION 357, 357 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996); Clune,
supra note 22, at 485-90; Clune, Equity to Adequacy, supra note 6, at 377; Heise, supra note 6, at i168-
73; Rebell, supra note 2, at 38-45; Joseph S. Patt, Note, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All
Just a Change in Attitudes, 34. HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 561-75 (1999).
46. Clune, Equity to Adequacy, supra note 6, at 376.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 380.
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finance cases in which courts reversed or reconsidered prior school
finance rulings] is a profound concern that all children receive an
education adequate to meet contemporary needs,"49 the question is
whether this expressed concern has caused the recent judicial activity or
whether the expression is simply cover for some other judicial
motivation. Perhaps more damaging to the social movement argument is
the fact that the courts are involved at all. Why haven't the political
branches responded to this movement? After all, those branches are
supposed to be the most sensitive to changes in public opinion and the
more flexible agents of change. Why have the relatively inert courts been
at the forefront of this movement? This Article contends that the answer
can be gleaned from what others have overlooked: an understanding of
the institutional roles of courts and statehouses.
e. Institutional Cooperation and Networks Among Policy-
Making Elites
Three studies of the landmark Rose v. Council For Better Education"
decision have suggested the importance of social networks and consensus
among policy-making elites, including the judiciary.5" What these studies
collectively suggest is that state supreme courts may act to provide the
political "cover" for already willing policy elites to engage in educational
finance reform in the face of political opposition. In effect, the judiciary
and selected policy leaders cooperate across institutional lines to achieve
a preferred policy outcome. This theory is further explored below.
B. ATrITUDES AND CONSTRAINTS IN STATE SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING
Judicial decision-making in state high courts is complex. Researchers
have demonstrated that myriad factors, including the law and facts of the
case, the political players in the dispute, institutional structures, and
judges' own attitudes, may affect the decisions of such appellate courts."
49. Rebell, supra note 2, at 40.
50. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
5I . Ronald G. Dove, Acorns in a Mountain Pool: The Role of Litigation, Law and Lawyers in
Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. EDuc. FIN., Summer i995, at 83 (arguing that social relations among
the key actors influenced the outcome of the litigation); D. Frank Vinik, The Contrasting Politics of
Remedy: The Alabama and Kentucky School Equity Funding Suits, 22 J. EDuc. FIN., Summer 1996, at
60 (1996) (arguing that a consensus on educational reform among policy leaders influenced the
outcome); Victor Kuo, Networks of Influence: Kentucky School Finance Reform and the Courts
(1999) (using social network analysis to demonstrate that social network structures were stronger
among those favoring a declaration that the educational finance system was unconstitutional
(including the judges who favored the plaintiffs) than those who sought to uphold the system)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University School of Education) (on file at the Education
Library, University of Kentucky).
52. The "legal model" of judicial decision-making argues that judges, consistent with their
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Perhaps equally significant, the conditions that influence judicial
decision-making may often work in combination. 3 Identifying and
understanding the effects of the many factors that affect judicial decision-
making is thus a daunting task.
training and role orientation, make decisions by applying existing law to the facts of the case without
regard to any other external influences. Notably, using multivariate analysis, Jeffrey Segal
demonstrated that the fact patterns of certain cases had an effect on the voting of the "center" justices
on the Supreme Court. Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search
and Seizure Cases 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 891 (1984); Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court
Justices as Human Decision Makers: An Individual-Level Analysis of the Search and Seizure Cases, 48
J. POL. 938 (1986). Since that pathbreakihg study, others have shown how the facts of the case can help
explain appellate court decision-making. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts
Comparatively: The View from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1995) [hereinafter Brace &
Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively]; Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme
Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 323 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Toward
an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 2o AM. POL. Q. 147 (1992) [hereinafter Hall & Brace,
Toward an Integrated Model]; Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to
the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963
(1992). Moreover, limited research suggests that lower court decisions are influenced by higher court
legal precedent. Donald Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of
Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. ScL. 673 (1994). Alternatively, at least one
study has suggested that legal arguments that follow clearly established precedent have an
independent effect on decision-making in the California Supreme Court. See Carol Ann Traut & Craig
F. Emmert, Expanding the Integrated Model of Judicial Decision Making: The California Justices and
Capital Punishment, 6o J. POL. 1166 (1998).
Beginning with Clement Vose's classic study of early housing discrimination litigation, CLEMENT
E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
CASES (959), several scholars have argued that the political players both in and outside of the dispute
have an effect on judicial decision-making. Most influential have been a set of studies based on Marc
Galanter's thesis that, in litigation, the "haves" come out ahead of the "have-nots." See Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y. REV.
95 (1974); see also Craig Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations: Part One: Initiating Civil
Cases in Urban Trial Courts, 8 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 421 (1974); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts 187o-197o, 21 LAW & Soc'v. REV. 403
(1987).
More recently, led by the "New Institutionalism" in political science research, scholars have
argued that institutions and structures-such as judicial selection, retention, and tenure rules-shape
decision-making in appellate courts. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Courts, Executives, and Legislatures, in THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 373 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991);
Brace & Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively, supra at 5-10; Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall,
Integrated Models of Judicial Dissent, 55 J. POL. 914 (1993) [hereinafter Brace & Hall, Integrated
Models]; Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts,
52 J. POL. 54 (1990) [hereinafter Brace & Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent]; Craig F. Emmert, An
Integrated Case-Related Model of Judicial Decision Making: Explaining State Supreme Court Decisions
in Judicial Review Cases, 54 J. POL. 543 (1992); Hall & Brace, Toward an Integrated Model, supra at
148, 151-53; Traut & Emmert, supra at 1166-67.
Finally, as is discussed further in Part II.B.s below, the "attitudinal model" of judicial decision-
making in appellate courts has been employed effectively to explain-and predict-behavior in the
U.S. Supreme Court and many state supreme courts.
53. See, e.g., Hall & Brace, Toward an Integrated Model, supra note 52, at 161-62 (noting the
interaction between institutional variables and judicial seniority in judicial decision-making).
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Despite this complexity, this Article focuses on three interrelated
factors that appear prominent in judicial decision-making in educational
finance reform litigation. First, in almost any case that finds its way to a
state supreme court (a death penalty appeal, for instance), there arguably
is opportunity for the judges to act upon their passions and prejudices
and find the law and facts that best match those passions and prejudices.
That judicial attitudes play a large role in state supreme courts is
intuitive, given their status as the courts of last resort on questions of
state law.
One type of judicial attitude, a court's orientation toward its role in
state governance, is particularly pronounced in educational finance
litigation that asks a court to rule on the constitutionality of legislative
and executive branch policies. These "norms of behavior which constrain
the activities of the role occupant" take two general forms. 4 If a court is
oriented toward supporting the policies of its sister branches and
maintaining the status quo, this restraintist attitude may prompt the court
to uphold state policy.5 Alternatively, if the court has a propensity
toward policing legislative policy for not only constitutionality, but also
"justice," such an activist attitude may influence the court to strike down
that same policy." In either event, judicial role orientation may well affect
the outcome of the case.
A different type of judicial attitude and the second factor on which
this Article focuses are the policy preferences of the court or judicial
ideology.7 Loosely speaking, American political ideology is sometimes
organized on a scale from conservative to liberal. Although these terms
are notoriously difficult to define, it is not a stretch to argue that judicial
policy preferences toward more equalized and adequate spending on
education can best be characterized as "liberal" in that they favor those
who tend to be poor, racial minorities, and/or politically marginalized.
54. James L. Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 911, 917 (1978).
55. See id. at 917-21.
56. Id.
57. Role orientation and ideology are conceptually distinct ideas. This becomes apparent upon
review of the record of the Rehnquist Court during the 199os. That Court, with an avowedly and at
times deeply conservative majority, has actively struck down federal legislative policies that may be
characterized as "liberal," including policies that permit individuals to sue states for age
discrimination, Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2ooo), a statute that safeguarded the free
exercise of religion (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), and another statute that required states to clean up their nuclear waste, New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). So long as legislative/executive policy is aligned with tradition, judicial
intervention is activist in an effort to further liberal ideals (e.g., Warren Court intervention), but when
legislative/executive policy seeks to change institutions and traditions, judicial intervention is activist in
the name of conservative ideals (e.g., Rehnquist Court intervention).
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Below this Article argues that judicial ideology, operating in tandem with
judicial role orientation, affect the outcome of educational finance
litigations.
Third and finally, in school finance litigation, unlike many other
types of litigation which pose state law questions that reach the state
supreme court level, judicial passions and prejudices may be tempered if
not squelched by the potential for conflict with the court's co-equal sister
institutions, the legislative and executive branches. This potential for
institutional conflict and the concomitant institutional constraints faced by
state supreme courts may play a stronger than usual role in educational
finance cases. In sum, in educational finance reform litigation, one can
expect judicial role orientation, judicial ideology, and institutional
constraints to play a larger than usual role in the outcome of the
litigation. Below, each of these factors is explored more fully as part of a
conceptual framework for of judicial decisionmaking in school finance
litigation.
i. The Attitudinal Model: Judicial Role Orientation and Ideology
The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, sometimes
referred to as the policy preferences model, holds that appellate court
judges decide cases in light of the facts as viewed through their individual
ideological attitudes and values . Finding its roots in the sociological
jurisprudence movement at the turn of the i 9th century, and later in the
legal realist movement, the attitudinal model is a stark departure from
the deterministic view of legal reasoning. According to the model, many
appellate court judges "further their policy goals because they lack
electoral or political accountability, ambition for higher office, and
comprise a court of last resort that controls its own jurisdiction."59
Perhaps the best way to study the impact of judicial attitudes is to
identify, quantify, and analyze the effects of those attitudes directly. This
has been the approach of an influential group of studies in which the
authors have found that judges' personal attitudes toward the subject of
the case play a significant role in determining the votes they cast.6o So
influential is this approach, that one commentator writing in 1996
claimed that "it [is] hard to find a serious political science scholar of the
Supreme Court who thought that the instrumental political ideology or
58. Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth's comprehensive study of the U.S. Supreme Court is often
held up as the prototype for empirical research applying the attitudinal model. JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
59. Id. at 59.
6o. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 70-93 (1976);
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 58; Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989).
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attitudes of justices [are] not the most significant variable affecting the
Court's decisions."6' This approach is premised on the notion that
attitudes are an interrelated set of beliefs, are relatively enduring, and
are reflected in the behavior of judges. 6' Based on these characteristics
and how judges vote in certain types of cases, researchers have been able
to construct attitudinal scales for judges, often on a spectrum from
conservative to liberal. 63 These scale rankings are used to predict future
decision-making. 64 According to two reviewers of the judicial decision-
making literature, these studies have "demonstrated conclusively that
judicial policy preferences, which are organized so as to constitute well-
defined ideologies, are a primary determinant of choices in the Supreme
Court."6' Like their federal counterparts, this Article argues, state
supreme court judges are similarly influenced by their "attitudes" toward
their role in state governance and toward the policies of their sister
branches.66
61. Richard A. Brisbin Jr., Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of Law in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 4o AM. J. POL. SCI. 1004, IOIO (1996).
62. ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 60, at 1140-51; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 58.
63. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 58, at 242-55.
64. See id.
65. Brace & Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively, supra note 52, at it.
66. Id. Apart from assessing the impact of attitudes directly, some scholars have been interested
in the indirect effects of certain background characteristics such as judges' party affiliations, prior
career patterns, and religious orientations. Recent work has even gone so far as to argue that attitudes
and background attributes are so interchangeable as to be direct influences on judicial voting. C. Neal
Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in
Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 356-66 (198I); C. Neal
Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme
Court Voting Behavior i916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. ScI. 460, 46o-72 (I99I). That said, the findings on the
influence of personal attributes on judicial decision-making have been modest. Though some studies
have found strong and significant effects of attributes such as region of the country and party
affiliation, Brace & Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively, supra note 52; Songer & Haire, supra note
52, others have found much weaker effects of party affiliation than expected. Donald R. Songer & Sue
Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals,
r955-I986, 43 WEST. POL. Q. 317, 330-33 (1990). Finally, researchers have argued that evidence of
partisan voting patterns at the state supreme court level is weak and that partisanship may not be a
significant determinant of state court decision-making because of non-partisan selection procedures
and many one-party states. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 287-88
(1988). Perhaps the most damaging criticism of the judicial background model is that leveled by Segal
and Spaeth who argue that many of the judicial background variables that have been used by
scholars-partisanship and appointing president, for example-are too dependent upon latent
attitudes to provide independent explanations for judicial voting behavior. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note
58, at 232. This Article therefore concurs with Segal and Spaeth's conclusion that "although the ability
to predict behavior from social attributes may be possible, we are still largely unable to explain
behavior from social background characteristics." Id.
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a. Judicial Role Orientation: Activism and Restraint
Ever since Marbury v. Madison,6 scholars and judges have struggled
to find the proper role for the court in the constitutional dialogue among
the three branches. Modern scholars often point to Alexander Bickel's
classic book, The Least Dangerous Branch6s, as having framed the debate
between those who would counsel judicial self-restraint and those who
would counsel a more active role for the courts. 69 Some suggest that
courts should exercise restraint and modesty in their interpretation of the
Constitution so as not to entangle the judiciary in political questions and
thereby compromise their legitimacy.7"
Judicial self-restraint has accordingly become a principle by which
many judges approach judicial review. Even if the plaintiffs present a
persuasive factual or even policy justification for the court to intervene
and overturn a state law, some state supreme courts will not step in to
rectify the perceived problem because they view their role in government
as one of restraint, thereby protecting the decisions of majority
institutions such as the legislature. Given the fact that constitutional
interpretation in educational finance reform cases most often requires a
first-time reading of the state's constitutional law, restraintist courts are
unlikely to read the law in an expansive fashion. Rather, they would be
more likely to maintain the status quo through a narrow interpretation of
the constitution. Restraint in decision-making therefore mediates other
attitudes and policy preferences.
Other scholars-following the lead of John Hart Ely-counsel the
courts to devote themselves to assuring majority governance, while
protecting minority rights.' Accordingly, some judges may view their
role as one of policing all of the potential misdeeds of majoritarian
institutions so as to achieve justice, not merely legality. Whether it is
because they view themselves as the countermajoritarian check on the
political institutions or the champions of individual rights against the
state, some judges are more inclined to intervene in social policy.
Scholars and legal commentators have loosely referred to such a
propensity as "judicial activism."72 "Thus it is perhaps simplistic but
67. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
68. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962).
69. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 43, 71-72
(1980) ("It wouldn't do, [Bickel] acknowledged, for the justices simply to impose their own values: he
recognized, as others have pretended not to, that given the enormous influence of the judiciary such a
course would be fundamentally inconsistent with the first principles of our democracy.").
70. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
71. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (I980)
72. Gibson, supra note 54, at 263.
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nonetheless useful to conceptualize decision-making role orientations on
a continuum ranging from restraintism -following precedents, strict
construction of constitutions, and deference to legislative intent-to
activism-the subordination of precedents and statutes, and deference to
personal attitudes, values, and goals."73 Yet without a clear definition of
the term "judicial activism" it is difficult to determine its effect on the
outcome of cases.
The political science literature on judicial activism provides little by
way of a precise and universal definition of the term. Canon identified
several different dimensions of judicial activism in the United States
Supreme Court.74 As noted by Charles Lopeman, three of these
definitions can be applied to activist policy-making in state supreme
courts: negation of policies that were democratically adopted, alteration
of earlier court doctrine, and making of substantive policy. " Stated
differently, whenever a court regulates behavior or distributes benefits
according to its own preferences and thereby alters the established
regulation or distribution prescribed by another authoritative policy-
maker, it is acting as the policy-making equal of the political branches
and can therefore be considered activist. 6 In the context of educational
finance litigation, a court that is activist in the sense that it has the
propensity to strike down the policies of the legislature, governor, or its
predecessor courts, is more likely to strike down school finance policy.
b. Judicial Ideology: Conservatism and Liberalism
Judicial ideology is not without complexities. For instance, judicial
protection of free speech is sought by groups ranging from corporate
advertisers and pro-life advocates to flag-burning protestors and
underclad high schoolers.77 Any definition of the terms "liberal" and
"conservative" may be readily criticized. Mindful of complexities, this
Article has constructed definitions of judicial conservatism and judicial
73. Id.
74. Id. at 386-87.
75. CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 3
('999).
76. Lopeman's study of judicial activism in the state supreme courts thus provides a useful
definition of judicial activism that relies on Canon's initial categories:
A court is activist when its decisions conflict with those of other political policy makers.
This definition of judicial activism is both succinct and precise and it serves a subsidiary and
related interest in establishing the relative importance of state supreme courts and state
legislatures and governors as policy makers .... A court is activist when its decisions conflict
with those of other political policy makers, including predecessor courts. An activist court
has implicitly considered established policy and has either struck it down or reversed it as a
necessary preliminary to the establishment of its preferred policy.
Id. at 3 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
77. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Lorillard Tobacco Co., v. Reilly, 553
U.S. 525 (2001); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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liberalism that gibe with popular notions of those terms as related to the
issues posed in educational finance reform cases. A "conservative"
judicial ideology is one that supports free-market principles against
government regulation (e.g., invocation of the "takings" clause against
environmental regulation) and the right of the State to regulate what the
political majority and legislature characterize as "deviant" behavior (e.g.,
vigorous enforcement of strict sentencing guidelines, the death penalty,
or "three strikes" policies). A "liberal" judicial ideology is one that
supports the use of law and policy to curb the perceived harms visited
upon individuals by laissez faire economic policies (e.g., provision of the
right to sue for wrongful termination and defective products or
expansion of the rights of individuals to organize and collectively
bargain) and the rights of individuals and political minorities against
legislative and popular majorities (e.g., the development of anti-
discrimination law and the expansion of the rights of the accused).
Although these definitions are hardly all-inclusive and may tend to blur
at the edges, they do capture the popular ideas of liberal and
conservative and provide a sufficient working definition to guide the
categorization of state supreme court decisions.
Because "liberal" judiciaries would be more likely to permit the
taxation of persons and corporations to address market harms and
because they would also support the rights of the poor and racial
minorities against the political will of the majority, it is likely that such
liberal judiciaries would be more likely to strike down educational finance
policies on the grounds of adequacy or equity. The propensity toward
activism or restraint, or toward conservatism or liberalism alone,
however, do not dictate the outcome of the case. Judicial role orientation
and ideology are tempered by the institutional constraints inherent in a
government of separate powers.
2. Institutional Constraints, Conflict, and Cooperation
a. Institutional Constraints and Conflict
In recent years, scholars have paid greater attention to the institutional
strengths and limitations of courts in their efforts to bring about social
reform. In I99I, Gerald Rosenberg published a provocative book, The
Hollow Hope, which argued that courts cannot bring about meaningful
social change on their own.78 Contrary to popular belief, Rosenberg
argued, activist courts are institutionally constrained from effecting
significant social reform.79
78. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOuT SOCIAL CHANGE?
('99').
79. Id. at 30-36.
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Rosenberg's thesis weaves together two competing paradigms of courts
as agents of social change: the "dynamic" (or "strong") court perspective
and the "constrained" court perspective. 8 The dynamic court view argues
that because courts enjoy relative economic and institutional
independence from the executive and legislative branches (collectively,
the political branches) they can act (and act effectively) when the
legislative and executive branches are unable or unwilling to do so.
First, because federal judges are appointed to life tenures on "good
behavior," they are shielded from electoral politics and public,
constituency, and interest group pressures that the political branches
face. Second, because judicial decisions turn on legal rights and the
quality of argument, rather than political power, even weak and
unpopular groups can prevail in court.83 Thus, in theory judicial policy
should look different from the policy of the political branches.
A constrained court perspective, on the other hand, posits that
courts face three major hurdles which prevent them from making social
policy that differs from that which the political branches would produce:
(i) the rights constraint, (2) the independence constraint, and (3) the
capacity constraint.84 Putting aside the question of how law and
precedent-the supposed determinants of legal rights-may constrain
judicial decision-making, I turn to the independence constraint.
Courts will not produce social policy that is meaningfully different
from the political branches because they are not politically or
economically independent of the political branches.85 At the extreme, if
the political branches disagree with judicial rulings, they can repeal
statutes, seek to amend the Constitution, or simply ignore the judicial
interpretation. Southern "massive resistance" to Brown's mandate-for
example, repealing compulsory attendance laws and blocking the doors
of Little Rock High-are particularly dramatic examples of the challenge
to judicial legitimacy. Less dramatically, some state supreme court
justices are appointed by legislatures or governors, and their views on
social policy likely reflect the views of their appointing political bodies,
or so the argument goes. 6 Funding for such amenities as courtroom
8o. Id.
81. Id. at 21-28.
82. Id. at 22-25.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 10-21.
85. Id.
86. HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 129-68 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing judicial




technology or staff is often set by the political branches8s Put bluntly,
judges who stray too far from the political branches' policy are subject to
threats of economic reprisal.
More informally, judges may often share similar social networks
with the political branch members.8" They may have served in official
capacities together and are likely see each other frequently in the
medium sized cities that are typical of state capitals. Judges, as members
of the political elite, likely share feelings of a common mission with the
political branches' members and are consequently likely to display
deference to their co-equal branches regarding social policy, such as
educational finance policy. Because judges most often live in the very
communities in which they seek to bring about educational reform, they
are exposed to the local nightly news, their neighbors' opinions, and their
own understanding of community politics. Thus, contrary to the dynamic
court view, judges are not sheltered but rather part of the political
establishment.
The capacity constraint is straightforward. Having determined that
some school system practice violates some legal right, the court is left to
craft and implement an effective equitable remedy that will place the
aggrieved plaintiffs in the position they would be in had they never been
wronged. The remedy should also prevent future constitutional
violations. The theory of limited capacity is rooted in the notion that
courts lack the social fact finding tools and power to develop appropriate
policies."' Courts do not run schools on a day-to-day basis and therefore
cannot directly implement remedial decrees.
Because of these limitations on the judiciary as an institution, courts
may not be as independent of the political branches as is sometimes
assumed. They may also fear that their institutional legitimacy will be
challenged if their rulings are ignored. They may be unwilling or unable
to challenge the social policy of their co-equal branches.
In educational finance reform litigation this judicial deference
should be particularly pronounced. Courts are not well-equipped to
design educational finance policy and they do not enjoy the latitude to
make the necessary tradeoffs among competing interests and obligations
of state government and its limited budget. Indeed, even when courts do
strike down educational finance schemes, they nearly always order
declaratory relief (as opposed to injunctive, prospective, coercive relief)
87. See George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State
School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 554 (1994) ("Pet projects such as data processing
systems and courthouse upgradings could easily fall victim to interbranch conflict.").
88. Id. at 555.
89. Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 16-21.
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and admonish the state legislature to develop and implement a new
school finance policy within the broad and often vague constitutional
guidelines set forth by the court.'
Almost needless to say, state legislatures and governors do not
always adhere to the letter or spirit of their supreme courts' school
finance orders.' Legislative remedial schemes face the same political
pressures and tradeoffs that the original (and unconstitutional) school
finance plans faced in the first instance. Wealthy school districts and
other interests with a claim on the public treasury may resist meaningful
redistribution of educational resources, while no legislator is interested in
taking a tax hike back to her constituents. The result is reform with little
change.
Of course the court always has the opportunity to disagree with the
legislative remedy, strike down the remedial funding scheme, and send it
back to the statehouse for another try. Some have viewed this "dialogue"
between the judiciary and legislature as a logical, if not healthy, approach
to reforming educational finance systems.92 But some have complained
that this dialogic process is cumbersome, expensive, and possibly
frustrating for all parties involved. As Mark Yudof eloquently put it,
"school finance reform is like a Russian novel: it's long, tedious, and
everybody dies in the end."'93 Perhaps more significant, this "dialogue"
and the legislature's failure to act expeditiously to meet the judicial
declaration works to undermine the legitimacy of the judicial institution.
Courts are aware of this potential loss of legitimacy and the risk of
entering the morass of educational finance policy before rendering their
first decisions in any school finance case. Take the words of the Idaho
Supreme Court, for instance: "We reject the arguments advanced by the
plaintiffs.... To do otherwise would be an unwise and unwarranted
entry into the controversial area of public school financing, whereby this
Court would convene as a 'super-legislature,' legislating in a turbulent
field of social, economic and political policy."' In sum, the risk of conflict
90. See Brown, supra note 87, at 548-550.
9 i . See infra Part II.C.5 for a description of the state executive and legislative branches refusal to
respond fully to the school finance litigation in Ohio.
92. See George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Court's Perspective on the State
School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 563-67 (1994); Mark Jaffe & Kenneth Kersch,
Guaranteeing a State Right to a Quality Education: The Judicial-Political Dialogue in New Jersey, 20
J.L. & EDUC. 271 (99).
93. Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
499, 499 (199). One need look no further than the iterative and sometimes disappointing process of
reform in Texas or the Dickensian school finance litigation in New Jersey. See REED, supra note 7, at
69-75, 136-62 (describing the Texas "debacle" and analyzing the "geo-politics" of New Jersey school
finance reform).
94. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 640 (Idaho 1975).
[Vol. 55:1077
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
with the governor and the legislature makes state high courts wary of
entering the fracas. Thus, institutional constraints and the potential for
institutional conflict temper the propensity of courts to find
unconstitutional a state's educational finance policy.
b. Institutional Cooperation
Whether the goal is equity or adequacy, educational finance reform
requires legislative participation. This enhanced role of the state in
educational funding inevitably requires some degree of redistribution of
tax funds to less affluent districts, whether accomplished through
property tax recapture or heightened sales or income taxes. The natural
response of tax-averse citizens and wealthy districts would be to oppose
such reform. Consequently, legislators from wealthy electoral districts
may be loath to embrace school finance reform, even if they privately
support the goals of reform, for fear of reprisal at the ballot box. The
result of lawmakers' unwillingness to engage in redistributive educational
finance reform is the failure to develop a coherent, comprehensive,
statewide remedy for educational failure or inequity.' For this reason,
even those educational finance reform policies favored by policy-makers
may never be enacted, or even introduced.
This is where courts may feel free to step in to break up the
legislative log-jam, provide the "political cover" necessary for willing
policy-makers to act. Court intervention may permit the development of
educational finance reform that is favored by a significant bloc of
political elites or even a large portion of the populace. This tacit
''collusion" among the policy elite in Kentucky appears to have
influenced the outcome of the storied Rose litigation where a former
governor represented the plaintiffs, the current governor had openly
called for reform, and the legislature quickly responded to the judicial
decision with a comprehensive reform package. 6 Under these conditions,
the court itself need not be "activist" in the sense that it has a propensity
to invalidate the policies of the political branches. Rather, it need only
recognize that it plays a role in the policy-making process of state
government. Thus, in jurisdictions in which there is a high degree of
consensus among political elites in the jurisdiction that educational finance
95. See REED, supra note 7, at 69-75.
96. See supra, notes 44-45 and accompanying text. In response to a workshop presentation of this
Article, William Simon suggested that the role of the court might not be one of providing "political
cover" ("Why would the elite policy-makers and opinion-shapers need cover?" he asks), but rather a
role of "facilitator" to overcome a coordination problem among the elite. In either event, whether the




reform should be undertaken, the state supreme court will be more likely
to strike down the state's educational finance system.97
Arguing that judicial attitudes and institutional constraints play an
enhanced role in judicial decision-making in educational policy reform
cases, this study sought to address the straightforward question: Why do
state supreme courts decide as they do in educational policy reform
litigations? In addressing that question, this study compares Ohio's
DeRolph litigation to Wisconsin's Vincent litigation to determine what
factors influenced decision-making in those cases (Appendix A provides
a description of the study's methodology.). The case studies are
organized as follows: (i) a description of the legal context in which the
decisions were rendered, including prior case precedent; (2) an
attitudinal profile of the DeRolph and Vincent courts, and (3) a
descriptive history of the litigations that emphasizes the inter-
institutional and political-environmental pressures on the courts.
II. A CONTENTIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: A CASE STUDY OF
DEROLPH V. STATE
We will not dodge our responsibility by asserting that this case involves
a nonjusticiable political question. To do so is unthinkable. We refuse
to undermine our role as judicial arbiters and to pass our
responsibilities onto the lap of the General Assembly.
... By our decision today, we send a clear message to lawmakers: the
time has come to fix the system. Let there be no misunderstanding.
Ohio's public school financing scheme must undergo a complete
systematic overhaul....
We therefore hold that Ohio's elementary and secondary public
school financing system violates Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio
97. Although the research focuses on the court's attitudes and constraints, data colection was
guided by a broader conceptual framework that considers the myriad factors that may influence
judicial decision-making in educational policy reform litigation. See supra note 52. These factors are
best divided into the four primary categories: legal, attitudinal, environmental, and institutional. The
legal factors that may influence judicial decision-making include the law and legal strategy employed,
i.e., the strength of the state's education article, the prior interpretation of the state's equal protection
provision, and whether the plaintiffs relied upon an adequacy or equity theory. The facts that may
influence judicial decision-making include the magnitude of revenue and spending disparities, the level
of educational adequacy, and how students perform in the state. The attitudinal factors, which are a
focus of this study, include the court's role identity and ideology. Courts may also be affected by their
political environment. Powerful interest groups such as taxpayer associations or coalitions of school
districts may affect their decision-making. Whether the plaintiffs are poor, minority, or rural may
affect the court. And popular attitudes toward school finance reform may also factor-in to the court's
decision. Finally, institutions may shape judicial decision-making. The likelihood of inter-institutional
conflict is one such factor that is a focus of the study. Other factors, such as the judicial selection and
retention methods or the justices' length of tenure may also play a role.
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Constitution, which mandates a thorough and efficient system of
common schools throughout the state.8
Writing for a 4-3 majority in DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), Justice
Francis Sweeney tackled head on the separation of powers issue. The
Ohio Supreme Court not only held that it had the authority to apply the
state constitution's "thorough and efficient" clause to the state's school
funding system, it had the obligation to do so.9 With this decision, Justice
Sweeney and three of his colleagues struck down the state's school
finance system, directly confronting a powerful governor and the
legislative leadership.'" The court initiated an institutional showdown
that ended with the court surrendering jurisdiction over the problem.'°'
Ohio is a demographic, political, and economic microcosm of the
entire United States. And like the United States, Ohio is very diverse.
Economically, the state boasts several large, industrialized cities, rural
coal mining and logging areas, small mill towns, and stretches of
agriculture land.' 2 The state ranks number three nationally in industrial
output, while at the same time ranking sixth or higher in the production
of corn, soybeans, chickens, and eggs." 3 Some of the state's residents in
affluent Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati suburbs enjoy
breathtaking wealth, while many in the rural Appalachian region, the
urban core, or decaying rust belt towns like Akron, Youngstown, and
Canton suffer from desperate poverty. Ohio has also earned the
reputation of keeping its finger on the pulse of American politics. In the
20th Century, Ohioans voted for the presidential winner in twenty of the
twenty-six races, splitting themselves up among rural and suburban
Republicans and urban, often labor-minded, Democrats. 4 This status as
a "political laboratory" stems in part from the state's near balance
between large and medium-sized cities in which no one metropolitan
area dominates. Demographically, the 2000 Census showed that some
11.5 percent of Ohioans identify as African American, while just under
two percent identify as Hispanic or Latino.' °6 It is amidst all this
environmental diversity that the Ohio Supreme Court handed down its
decision in DeRolph I.
98. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733,737, 747 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph I).
99. Id. at 737.
too. Id. at 746-47.
ioi. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003) (DeRolph IV).
102. See Lopeman, supra note 75, at 61-62.
103. MICHAEL F. CURTIN, THE OHIO PoUTics ALMANAC 93 (1996).
IO4. Id. at 7.
io5. Id. at 93
io6. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACrS: OHIO, available at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39ooo.html (July 9, 2004).
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A. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION
IN OHIO
This section discusses the primary source of the law of educational
finance in Ohio-the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of its
constitutional "thorough and efficient" education clause and the court's
application of the state's equal protection and benefits provision in
Board of Education v. Walter."°
i. Background and Context of the Walter Case'°
The Walter case was filed on April 5, 1976 as a class-action lawsuit
on behalf of all children, parents, taxpayers, and school board members
similarly situated to those in the Cincinnati School District, i.e., all
children and adults in allegedly under-funded school districts.'" This class
of plaintiffs sought to strike down the state's newly minted school finance
plan-the Equal Yield Plan-on the grounds that it created dramatic
fiscal inequities and did not provide many urban and rural districts with
sufficient funds to meet the state's own educational standards."' Despite
the breadth of the class, this was not a case made up of a broad coalition
of school districts, education officials, and civil rights groups. Although
there may have been some sympathy from many Ohio districts, this was
the Cincinnati school board's case.
The Cincinnati school board at the time was controlled by
conservative Republicans who had failed to obtain from the
Democratically controlled legislature what they believed were sufficient
funds to operate the behemoth urban district. Having just labored
mightily to pass the state's Equal Yield Plan, the democratically
controlled Senate and Assembly believed that the scheme should be
given a chance to work. That sentiment was shared by the first-named
defendant in the case, Superintendent of Public Instruction Dr. Franklin
Walter, a long-time educator and, by all accounts, a venerable
educational leader and consensus-builder."' Dr. Walter reflected that the
filing of the lawsuit "didn't create a lot of trauma" in part because this
107. 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).
io8. Much of the information contained in this section was derived from the following interviews:
Interview with Russell Harris, Director, Government Services Division, Ohio Education Association,
in Columbus, Ohio (May 9, 2001); Interview with Dr. Franklin Walter, former Superintendent of
Public Instruction, Ohio, in Columbus, Ohio (May 1O, 2001); Interview with Henry Arnett, Livorno &
Arnett, in Columbus, Ohio (May 9, 2001).
lO9. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 815.
1 1o. See id. at 815-17. Equal yield or guaranteed yield school finance plans distribute state school
aid funds in a manner that guarantees to each eligible school district the same number of dollars per
pupil, in state and local funds combined, for each mill of local property tax effort as in any other
district, up to a maximum millage rate set by the state. Id.
i I i. Interview with Dr. Franklin Walter, supra note lo8.
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was only the latest maneuver from a district that "was continually
pushing the limits" on school finance and because it was a "pretty
isolated case as opposed to the broad based case that Ohio" faced in
DeRolph." And, almost naturally, Ohio's powerful Republican
governor, James Rhodes, opposed the attack on the school finance
system. As if that were not enough, prior to trial the largest teachers
union in the state, the Ohio Education Association (OEA) assisted the
state's lawyers in preparing their case and defending the Equal Yield
Plan."3 Put simply, Ohio's first school finance trial was Cincinnati vs. The
State and most of the Education Establishment or as one participant put
it, "[t]here were big forces on the side of the defendants; there were
really no substantial forces on the side of the plaintiffs.""4
What Cincinnati did have going for it was clear evidence of dramatic
educational finance inequity and inadequacy. The Cincinnati plaintiffs
had gathered evidence in mostly urban and property-poor districts of a
lack of textbooks, inadequate teacher salaries, cramped facilities,
outmoded equipment, low teacher morale, payless paydays, consistent
failures of school tax levies and bond issues, flagging student
performance, myriad individual violations of the state's educational
standards and, most dramatic, the shut downs of schools due to lack of
funds."5 How could this amount to a "thorough and efficient" education?
The State's counter-argument, however, was persuasive. First, the
State argued, its Equal Yield Plan had just been enacted and was not yet
fully funded at the time the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit."'6 During 1976,
the year that evidence was taken for the record, the plan had only been
funded at seventeen percent. "' Much of the complained-of inequity
would diminish as the Plan came on line. Perhaps equally significant, the
State argued, the SBE had developed what we now might consider
primitive educational standards."8 These standards were nonetheless the
foundation for what the State defined as a "high quality" and "thorough
and efficient" education: the resources districts received were adequate,
the State argued, because almost all districts, including Cincinnati, met or
exceeded the state's educational standards in nearly all respects, while
112. Id.
113. Interview with Russel Harris, supra note io8. Only after losing at the trial court level did the
union assume its usual role of challenging the system for its failure to provide sufficient funds to poor
students.
114. Id.
I15. Walter, 39o N.E.2d at 827-29 (Locher, J., dissenting).
116. Defendants' Post-Trial Brief Proposing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at i8, Bd. of





the State itself was diligent about monitoring and enforcing the
standards."9 Any modest differences in curricular offerings were simply a
matter of local discretion.
2. The Courts Below
The trial commenced on December 6, 1976 and would not conclude
until exactly a year had passed. Judge Paul E. Riley, who was sitting in
the Hamilton County courtroom on a part-time basis, heard seventy-
eight days of testimony from some seventy-seven witnesses, reviewed
2,4oo exhibits, and compiled a transcript of 7,530 pages.'20 His decision,
issued on December 5, 1977, completely vindicated the plaintiffs' claims.
Adopting virtually verbatim all of the nearly 400 pages of plaintiffs'
proposed findings of fact, Riley detailed the desperate state of
Cincinnati's schools and contrasted it with the relative opulence of many
suburban schools.'2 ' Citing the New Jersey Supreme Court's Robinson
decision, he concluded that these facts demonstrated the failure of the
State to provide a "thorough and efficient" system of public schools.'2
Citing California's Serrano decision, he held that education was a
fundamental interest in Ohio and that the disparities between wealthy
and poor districts violated Ohio's equal protection and benefits clause.' 3
The State, needless to say, appealed.
On September 5, 1978, the Hamilton County Court of Appeals
issued an opinion that had something for everybody.' 4 The three-judge
panel reversed Judge Riley's decision that the Equal Yield Plan violated
the "thorough and efficient" clause on the grounds that the
determination of what was "thorough and efficient" education was one
solely for the legislature.'25 Yet that same panel agreed with Riley's
decision that the Plan ran afoul of the equal protection and benefits
clause. '26 Consequently, the appellate judges upheld the order striking
down the system. This time, both parties appealed separate parts of the
intermediate appellate court's decision with which they did not agree.'27
i19. Id. at 368-8i,39i-409.
120. Walter, 39o N.E.2d at 815 .
121. See generally Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, No. A76-o2725
(Ct. Corn. Pl. Ohio 1977).
122. Id. at 64.
123. Id.
124. Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, No. C-78oooi, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 8264 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5,
1978).
125. Id. at *I9-*24.
126. Id. at *29.
127. Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1979).
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3. The Ohio Supreme Court's Walter Decision
On June 13, 1979, a 6-1 Ohio Supreme Court, led by its populist
chief justice Frank Celebreeze, issued its decision in Walter. ,8 Noting that
the court had long applied the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection
analysis when construing Ohio's broad equal protection and benefits
provision, the court first agreed that it must apply the two-tiered test:
strict scrutiny applied when a fundamental interest is implicated, or
rational relation applied if no such interest is involved.'29 At this point,
however, the Ohio court departed from the U.S. Supreme Court and
rejected the Rodriguez test for identifying a fundamental interest.' Just
because the right to an education is explicitly stated in the Ohio
Constitution does not mean it is a fundamental interest, the court
reasoned, because the Ohio Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution is
not one of limited powers.'3 ' It contains provisions which would be
suitable for statutory enactment, but are not fundamental to our concept
of ordered liberty, e.g., workers' compensation. Though the court's
pronouncement is not without ambiguity, it explicitly refused to find that
education is a fundamental right.'32 In addition, the court stated "[t]his
case is more directly concerned with the way in which Ohio has decided
to collect and spend state and local taxes than it is a challenge to the way
in which Ohio educates its children."'33 Thus, even if education was a
fundamental right, that right was not directly implicated. Of course, this
ignores the reams of evidence of educational inequity and inadequacy
that were introduced by the plaintiffs at trial, but with this sleight of
judicial hand, the court turned an education case into a tax case.
Applying the rational relation test, the court specifically noted that even
the State admits that disparity exists in per pupil expenditures, but that
such disparities are merely the result of permitting school districts local
control over spending and educational decision-making. ' Such local
control, the court held, was a rational basis that supports Ohio's Equal
Yield Plan.'35
After dispensing with the equal protection argument, the court
turned toward the plaintiffs' argument that the evidence of widespread
educational inadequacy demonstrated a failure of the legislature to
provide the constitutionally guaranteed "thorough and efficient"
128. Id. at 813.
129. Id. at 817-18.
130. Id. at 818-19.
131. Id. at 818.
132. Id. at 819.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 821.
135. Id. at 822.
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education. This argument presented the court with two separate issues:
(i) whether the court had jurisdiction to apply the "thorough and
efficient" clause to the school funding scheme, i.e., whether the appellate
court was correct in finding that the court had the power to enforce the
constitutional mandate that was directed at the legislature, and (2) if the
court had such power, whether the Equal Yield Plan ran afoul of Article
VI, Section 2 of the Constitution.
As to the first question, the court made it clear that it not only had
the authority, but also the duty "to review legislation to determine its
constitutionality under the Constitution of Ohio."'' 6 More specifically,
the court rejected the State's argument that this case was a non-
justiciable political question.'37 Though it cited the Supreme Court's
Baker v. Carr decision setting forth the political question doctrine, the
Ohio high court did not apply its analysis; it simply distinguished the case
(on rather superficial grounds) and cited other cases in which state high
courts applied their education articles to school funding schemes.'98
Arguably, the court had no choice but to find a justiciable controversy
because to do otherwise would have required the reversal or
distinguishing of a prior Ohio case, Miller v. Korns, in which the court
interpreted and applied the "thorough and efficient" clause.'39 But the
court did find that it must exercise "great circumspection" before
declaring a school funding scheme unconstitutional because the Ohio
Constitution places responsibility with the legislature to develop a
thorough and efficient system of public schools.'4" Notwithstanding this
difference, however, the "thorough and efficient" clause did not allow
the legislature to fall below some minimal provision of educational
resources, the court held.'4 ' That said, this lower limit had not been
reached under the Equal Yield Plan. The court specifically found that
rather than being "starved for funds," the Cincinnati schools "offer
136. Id. at 823.
137. Id. at 823-24.
138. Id. at 824 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
139. 14o N.E. 773, 776 (Ohio 1923). Miller involved a constitutional challenge to a statute that
authorized funds raised by property taxes in one school district to be used to finance schools in
another school district within the same county. Id. at 774-75. Citing the "thorough and efficient"
clause as support for the legislature's plan to shift tax revenues from one school district to another, the
Miller court upheld the plan, but recognized the wide discretion the legislature enjoyed under the
clause was not without limits: "A thorough system could not mean one in which part or any number of
the school districts of the state were starved for funds. An efficient system could not mean one in
which part or any number of the school districts of the state lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment."
Id. at 776.
140. Walter, 39o N.E.2d at 824.
141. Id. at 825.
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programs and services in excess of state minimum standards.' 42 In other
words, an adequate education is provided to Ohio's children.
To sum up, the Walter opinion stands for at least three propositions:
(i) that education is not a fundamental interest under the Ohio
Constitution for purposes of equal protection analysis; (2) that the Ohio
Supreme Court has the authority and duty to interpret and apply the
"thorough and efficient" clause to questions of whether the school
funding scheme meets the dictates of that clause; and (3) that the
evidence presented in Walter did not demonstrate that the Ohio school
funding system was unconstitutionally inadequate. From a strictly legal
vantage point, these are the constraints-and potential opportunities-
that the DeRolph plaintiffs faced.
B. THE DEROLPHIOHIO SUPREME COURT
To understand why the Ohio Supreme Court struck down the state's
educational finance scheme in DeRolph, an analysis of the Ohio
Constitution's educational provisions and the Cincinnati case is not
enough. Indeed, the DeRolph Court would reach the opposite conclusion
from the Walter Court with a reading of the same constitutional
language. This section goes beyond the text of the law and explores the
attitudinal characteristics of the court and justices that handed down the
DeRolph decision.
Thomas Moyer, the newly elected Chief Justice of the Ohio
Supreme Court, a position he holds through this writing, publicly
announced in his inaugural address his intention to restore the reputation
of a supreme court that had been tarnished by scandal under his
predecessor, Chief Justice Frank Celebreeze.'" Upon being sworn in as
the eighth Chief Justice on January 5, 1987, Moyer said that "[t]his
ceremony is not a celebration of a candidate's personal victory. It is the
beginning of the restoration of an institution."'" As depicted in Table i,
below, to assist in his repair work, Moyer enjoyed a Republican majority
during his entire tenure which started at a narrow 4-3 margin and
stabilized at 5-2 during the 1995 judicial term through the DeRolph
litigation.
142. Id. at 826.
143. Thomas J. Moyer, The Supreme Court of Ohio: Restoration of an Institution, 6o OHIO STATE
BAR Assoc. REP. 84, 84 (1987). Celebreeze, known for his blue-collar politicking and political
aspirations, infuriated the Ohio State Bar Association by stripping it of its power to investigate
attorney misconduct, was accused of wiretapping the telephone lines of two of his associate justices,
and was caught up in a labor union scandal-all conduct deemed unbecoming of a judge. See
LOPEMAN, supra note 75 at 66-70; G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME
COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 131-48 (1988).
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The most striking and immediately obvious fact that can be gleaned
from Table I and the composition of the Moyer Court is that the
DeRolph I (I997) and DeRolph I (2ooo) decisions were handed down by
a court with a Republican majority. Nearly every person interviewed for
145. Most of the information summarized in this table was culled from a collection of judicial
biographies maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices, and
CHARLES LOPEMAN'S novel, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN STATE SUPREME COURTS, supra
note 75, at 67.
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this study pointed out that superficial anomaly. Moreover, in both
decisions the Chief Justice was relegated to the minority as Democrats
Alice Robie Resnick and Francis Sweeney were joined by Republicans
Andrew Douglas and Paul Pfeifer in the majority. 4 Republicans
Deborah Cook and Evelyn Lundberg Stratton dissented from the
majority along with the Chief Justice.47 Despite the partisan rancor that
historically divided the Ohio high court, pure partisan politics cannot
explain the court's DeRoiph decisions."' Nonetheless, it is still possible
that judicial ideology and role orientation may have played a part in the
DeRolph outcome.
i. The Justices.'49
Little in Chief Justice Thomas Moyer's background suggests that he
would be either a charismatic or iron-fisted ideological leader of the
court. Raised in Sandusky, Ohio, Moyer received his undergraduate and
law degrees from the Ohio State University and spent the bulk of his
adult life in Columbus.'5° Moyer's career reflects a typical path to the
bench. He practiced briefly in the Ohio Attorney General's office and
served as a probate court referee before entering private practice. Moyer
worked for an established Columbus law firm whose mainstay clients
were insurance companies. Between stints in private practice, Moyer
served as first a deputy assistant, then the Executive Assistant to the
Republican governor. Before becoming Chief Justice, Moyer served
briefly as an administrative judge, then as a judge for the intermediate
court of appeals in Columbus. His professional activities included
prestigious, albeit bland fare. He served as president of the local bar
association and was a member of the board of trustees of the Franklin
University and the Ohio State University Alumni Association. Moyer's
only substantial experience with elected public office-other than the
judiciary-was his service as president of the Columbus Board of
Education, a post which is traditionally non-partisan (supposedly, non-
"political") in nature.
146. 677 N.E.2d 773,733; 728 N.E.2d 993, 993.
147. 677 N.E.2d 773,733; 728 N.E.2d 993, 993.
148. Alan Tarr and Mary Porter's 1989 case study of the Ohio Supreme Court was dubbed "Ohio:
Partisan Justice." TARR & PORTER, supra note 143, at 124.
149. Much of the biographical information on the justices was collected from biographical profiles
on the website for the Ohio Supreme Court, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices.
i5o. See Thomas J. Moyer, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/moyer (May 26, 2004). Some
studies have suggested that the law school attended by a judge may affect the judge's decision-making.
Specifically, if a judge attended one of the "national" or "elite" law schools, she or he may be more
inclined to reside on the cutting edge of law. See LOPEMAN, supra note 75, at 7, 16 n.37. Interestingly,
none of the Ohio State Supreme Court Justices received her or his law degree from a law school




Moyer's off-the-bench comments and writing all suggest that Moyer
is a restraintist judge, willing to leave the policy-making to the political
branches. At the time Moyer was elected to the Chief Justiceship, the
Ohio Lawyer concluded that there was "positive evidence" that his
judicial philosophy and approach fit well within the "Supreme Court's
historical context of legislative deference, self-restraint, and strict
construction of both statutes and administrative regulations" based on a
sample of Moyer's opinions on the appellate bench.'5' Considered by the
press to be a "strict constructionist,.' 52 Moyer's writings seem to bear out
the characterization.'53 Moyer also lectured and wrote on personal
responsibility and the erosion of civility in the courtroom.54 At bottom,
Moyer's background and writing suggest that he is deeply concerned with
the reputation and integrity of the court, and that he approaches judging
from a restraintist perspective.
Joining Moyer on the restraintist wing of the court are Justices
Evelyn Lundberg Stratton and Deborah Cook. Stratton's unusual
childhood as a Bangkok-born child of American missionaries seems to
have shaped her adult life. After growing up and being schooled under
conditions of desperate poverty in Viet Nam and Malaysia, Stratton
moved to the U.S. as an eighteen year-old with only $500 in her pocket. 5
Citing her personal experiences, Stratton wrote of America's generosity
to the poor and her outrage at the American press for failing to cover the
atrocities perpetrated by the Viet Cong.' 56 She believed that America
provided hope and opportunity.'57 She put herself through law school at
Ohio State with part-time work, grants, and scholarships. Her experience
seems to have infused in Stratton both compassion (particularly for
children who are disabled or in foster care) and a pull-yourself-up-by-
the-bootstraps attitude that emphasizes individual responsibility. Before
151. Robert E. Goostree, How New Will the New Court Be?, OHIo LAw., 1987, at 5,8.
152. James Bradshaw, Editorial, High Court Tends to be Apolitical, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 1o,
1996, at 9A.
153. Moyer, supra note 143, at 84-86.
[Liet me assure the leaders of the General Assembly that the new Chief Justice understands
that judges are not legislators in robes. It is not the role of judges to impose our will upon
legislation that is clear on its face. It is the role of judges to interpret and apply the law and
to determine the constitutionality of statutes.
Id.
154. See T.C. Brown & Joe Hallett, Court's Leaning Hard to Predict: Justices to Decide if School
Funding is Fair, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 9, 1996, at IA; Thomas J. Moyer, ADR as an
Alternative to Our Culture of Confrontation, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 13 (1995).
155. Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/stratton (May 28, 2004).
156. Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Perspective: Contrasts, 6I ALB. L. REV., 1573, 1573 (1998)
[hereinafter Stratton, Contrasts]; Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Preface, Survey of Ohio Law: Ohio
Supreme Court, 24 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 387, 387 (1998) [hereinafter Stratton, Survey].
157. Stratton, Contrasts, supra note 156, at 1573-74.
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being elected as the first woman and the youngest judge (age thirty-four)
to the Court of Common Pleas in Columbus, and being appointed by
Republican Governor George Voinovich to the Supreme Court in 1996
(the only member of the DeRolph court to be appointed),' 58 Stratton
practiced as both a corporate defense attorney and a plaintiffs-side
personal injury lawyer.
Stratton's writing exposes her preference for judicial restraint, fiscal
conservatism, and individual responsibility. Reflecting on her youth in
one essay, she dismissed the current American debates between
"greedy" plaintiffs lawyers and "fat cat" insurance companies, by noting
that "in my youth, no one even had insurance;" she complained about
Americans' "suing at the slightest appearance of malpractice," pointing
out that in southeast Asia, "no one malingered to recover undeserved
benefits;" she characterized punitive damages in some products liability
suits as "outrageous," and mentioned the judiciary's "struggle" with
"piles of zoning ordinances, EPA restrictions, OSHA regulations, [and]
building codes."'59 In reviewing the court's 1997 term for the Ohio
Northern University Law Review, Stratton offered a candid assessment of
the court's attitudinal rift, characterizing four justices as "activist" and
three as "restraintist." '6 She placed herself in the latter category with
Moyer and Cook, and classified Resnick, Sweeney, Pfeifer, and Douglas
as the activists.'
6'
Deborah Cook is a former Akron appellate court judge, the first
female partner of a prestigious Akron law firm, and nominee of George
W. Bush for the Sixth Circuit. 62 Four years after taking the Ohio high
court bench, with hundreds of decisions, and a track record behind her,
Cook wrote that ideological categories can and do describe the Ohio
Supreme Court:
The constant struggle to "exercise restraint where emotion
tempts us to expand the use of our powers," versus meting out
"justice," as that is intuited by an individual justice with regard
to the situation of the parties at bar, is what divides this court
in many of its decisions. The clash between these two schools
158. Upon her taking the oath of office, Governor Voinovich reportedly commended Stratton for
"respecting the legislative system" and resisting the tendency of some judges to write the law instead
of interpret it. James Bradshaw, Stratton Becomes the Third Woman Justice on State's High Court,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 1996, at iB.
159. Stratton, Contrasts, supra note 156, at 1574.
i6o. Stratton, Survey, supra note 156, at 387.
i6I. See id. at 387-88.
162. Deborah Cook, Akron Women's History, at http://www3.uakron.edu/schlcomm/
womenshistory/cook.d.htm (last visited Sept. so, 2004); Deborah L. Cook, at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/cook (May 28, 2004).
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of thought, both represented in the current makeup of the
court, is reflected in the predictability of votes in many of this
court's opinions. 6
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Moyer-Cook-Stratton
trio is Associate Justice Alice Robie Resnick. A product of Catholic
education (Notre Dame Academy of Toledo, Siena Heights College in
Adrian, Michigan, and the University of Detroit College of Law),
Resnick spent most of her professional career before ascending to the
high bench in the blue-collar, mid-sized city of Toledo.' 6' Resnick was in
private practice from 1964 to 1975, during which time she also served as
an assistant county prosecutor and tried some 150 felony cases. In 1975,
she was elected to Toledo Municipal Court, and in 1982 to the
intermediate court of appeals in Toledo. At the time of her election to
the state supreme court in 1988, she was only the fourth woman elected
to statewide office in Ohio and the second elected to the supreme court.
Resnick's trailblazing professional career permeated her policy
preferences. She chaired a Joint Task Force on Gender Fairness that
sought to ensure gender equality for all participants in the legal system
including lawyers, judges, litigants, witnesses, jurors, and court
personnel,'6 ' opined on "the essence of gender fairness,"' and authored
an article that called for the institution of the "reasonable woman"
standard in hostile work environment claims.' 6 Resnick expressed her
views of judging in off-the-bench writings. In her review of the court's
1993 decisions, Resnick hinted at a belief that law and precedent should
be interpreted with flexibility and an eye toward the modern context'
She wrote that many of the cases reviewed "recognize, implicitly or
explicitly, that incorrect results may follow as a result of a blind
application of a general rule" and that a lack of uniformity among
opinions on the court served "to strengthen, not weaken, the value of an
opinion."' ' She continued by saying that "[t]he sometimes divergent
163. Deborah L. Cook, Preface, Survey of Ohio Law: Ohio Supreme Court, 25 OHio N.U. L. REV.
199, i99 (I999) (citations omitted).
164. Alice Robie Resnick, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/resnick (May 26, 2004).
i65. Alice Robie Resnick, Report of the Joint Task Force on Gender Fairness, OlIo LAW., July-
Aug. 1993, at 16.
i66. Alice Robie Resnick, The Essence of Gender Fairness, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 549 (1993).
167. Alice Robie Resnick, The Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 Olo N.U. L. REV. 17, 120-22
(1992)-





views amongst the justices accentuates [sic] the gravity of the issues and
the role of flexibility in the development of the law."'7
Often mentioned in the same breath as Resnick in the press,'
Associate Justice Francis Sweeney's background and off-the-bench
commentary provide little evidence of his ideology or role orientation.
Sweeney attended law school in Cleveland, practiced there in a legal
department of an insurance company and later as an assistant
prosecutor.'7' He served as both a trial court and an appellate court judge
in Cleveland's Cuyahoga County. In a survey conducted by the Akron
Beacon Journal in 1992, Sweeney responded to a question asking
whether a court should be activist or restrained in its decision-making by
cryptically remarking that "If the Supreme Court does not administer




The other two justices, Andrew Douglas and Paul Pfeifer, are
partisan puzzles. Republicans both, they are frequently associated with
the activist/liberal wing of the court when the issues are worker's rights,
access to public records, and compensation for personal injury.'74 What
distinguishes them from their colleagues is their long-time service in
elected, policy-making positions. Pfeifer spent sixteen years in the Ohio
Senate, chairing the Senate Judiciary Committee for ten years.7 5 As a
legislator, Pfeifer authored or sponsored numerous tough-on-crime
initiatives, including Ohio's driving-under-the-influence law, its death
penalty statute, its mandatory sentencing guidelines, and its anti-
racketeering and organized crime legislation.'76 Douglas, the Senior
Associate Justice on the court, is a native and resident of Toledo and
served for nineteen years on the Toledo City Council.'77 In one case, in
which Pfeifer joined a majority in striking parts of a newly enacted
workers' compensation bill, he expressed little confidence in the
legislature's ability to make sound policy decisions:
The true affront to the Constitution in this area of the law has
historically been and continues to be... how the legislation is created.
The legislative process has never flourished in this area. Workers'
compensation legislation is historically brokered legislation, designed
170. Id.
171. One article described him as "tough in criminal cases but a steward for constitutional
rights.... He is viewed as a Pro-plaintiff and labor judge" See Brown & Hallett, supra note 154, at IA.
172. Francis Sweeney at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/sweeney (June 29, 2004).
173. Justice Cook Objects to Linking Profiles to Case, AKRON BEACON-JOURNAL, Sept. 9, 1996, at
A8.
I74. See infra Part.It.B.2.
175. Paul Pfeifer, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/pfeifer (May 27, 2004).
176. See The Ohio Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Sketch, 24 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 391, 392
(1998).
177. Andrew Douglas, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/douglas (May 27, 2004).
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and agreed upon by interested parties, and not by the one hundred
thirty-two elected representatives who make up the General
Assembly....
The offshoot of this flawed process is our flawed workers'
compensation system. It is not the result of the legislature working its
will over time, but is instead the result of the changing wills of the most
powerful interested parties. Legislators who would have valuable,
incisive input simply lie down and accept the brokered result.
While these inner workings never appear in the legislative journals,
they are far more insidious and damaging than the claimed violations
of the Constitution in this case.' 78
It takes little imagination to apply this very same argument to the
crafting of school finance legislation.
Right from the start, Douglas was labeled a "maverick" and a
somewhat "quirky" "populist."'79 Douglas enjoyed a lengthy career in
private practice and on the appellate bench before ascending to the high
court.'8 He was labeled an ardent defender of free speech and individual
rights.'8 ' He also shared an activist's view of the law as a dynamic
institution. Speaking to the court's frequent 4-3 division, Douglas wrote
that: "The law is an evolving institution. It is dynamic, and[,] through our
jurisprudence[,] is designed to meet the needs of an ever-changing
society. Accordingly, division and differences represent strength-not
weakness."I2
Justice, formerly Senator, Pfeifer possesses a talent and propensity
for plain speech. He hails from Crawford County, where he operates a
cattle and standard-bred horse breeding farm with his adult children.'
83
He has written a weekly newspaper column explaining the legal issues in
some of the court's decisions. He is also unusually outspoken off the
bench. In a 1994 article, he wrote that "[t]he working majority of this
court is clearly focused on protecting the right to remedy and to trial for
those who have been killed or seriously injured as a result of the
negligence of another." '84 Placing himself, Resnick, Douglas, A.W.
178. State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 599 (Ohio 1994) (Pfeifer, J.,
concurring). In a newspaper interview, Pfeifer expressed a similar sentiment: "I didn't come to the
court as a cataloger of legislative intent .... You're really lucky if there is legislative cognizance, let
alone intent." Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Justices Work Out of Public Eye: Their Life Stories
are Diverse, AKRON BEACON-JOURNAL, Sept. 9, 1996, at AI.
179. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 143, at 177.
i8o. Andrew Douglas, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/douglas (May 27, 2004).
181. Court's Decision May Be an Indicator, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 2B.
182. Andrew Douglas, Survey of Ohio Law 1992, 59 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 339, 339 (1992).
183. Paul Pfeifer, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/pfeifer (May 27, 2004).
184. Paul Pfeifer, Preface, Survey of Ohio Law 1993, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1105, 110 5 (1994).
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Sweeney, and Francis Sweeney in that majority,'8 5 he brushed off Justice
Wright's suggestion that the working majority was on a crusade to ensure
plaintiff victory, saying "[the] working majority of this court simply seeks
to preserve a meaningful right to a meaningful remedy in Ohio."' 86 He
characterized judicial decision-making as the "process of constant
evolution" saying, "[w]hat some may view as 'cutting edge' today is
something that will be seen as an absolute right ten or fifteen years from
now."187
Based on their writing, biographical information, and press reports
alone, a striking attitudinal pattern appears on the Moyer Court.
Generally, a four-justice majority (Resnick, Sweeney, Douglas, and
Pfeifer) seem unafraid to interpret Ohio law and its constitution in a
dynamic fashion. On the other end, Justices Moyer, Cook, and Stratton
are avowed restraintists and tend toward conservative outcomes. These
divisions are reflected in the justices' decision-making.
2. The Court's Significant Decisions.
With the return of the Ohio high court to Republican control under
Chief Justice Moyer, some expected or hoped for a retreat from the
Celebreeze legacy. That has not been the case. In his comparative study
of state supreme court activism, Charles Lopeman concluded that during
the 1986 to I99I time period, the Moyer Court "would embrace activism
as often as it rejected it.... [W]hen it did, its range of activism was
broader than its predecessor and included both economic and social
cases.""" The Moyer Court's tendency to uphold and occasionally extend
the economic underdog decisions of the Celebreeze Court, however,
stems not so much from the leadership of the Chief Justice, but from the
clear attitudinal divisions that have developed on his court. Finding
himself in the minority on many-but by no means all-cases regarding
worker's rights, rights of the insured, rights of those injured by corporate
negligence, and rights of those seeking access to the public record, Moyer
has been relegated to a dissenting position against a majority voting bloc
that initially was comprised of Justices Douglas, Resnick, A.W. Sweeney,
and Herbert Brown. As of late it has consisted of Justices Douglas,
Resnick, Frank Sweeney, and Pfeifer, and has tended to the liberal and
activist on matters pitting the "little guy" against a corporate interest or
the State in economic and public access cases. The pivot point on the
Moyer Court is the "maverick" Douglas, and occasionally Pfiefer.
185. Id. at IIo8, n.i.
186. Id. at iio8.
187. James Bradshaw, Pfeifer is Viewed as Crucial in Close Decisions, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July
12, 1998, at 4D.
188. LOPEMAN, supra note 75, at 76.
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Despite occasionally shifting alliances, the court's criminal law decisions
have remained largely restraintist and conservative, particularly when
dealing with the rights of the accused, the death penalty, and criminal
sentencing.
To determine whether these apparent attitudinal differences play
out in voting behavior, this study analyzed the court's significant
decisions in six areas of law: workers' compensation; personal injury and
tort law outside of the workplace; labor law; public records; civil rights
and civil liberties; and criminal law.'
89
Workers' Compensation. Nowhere is the liberal-conservative split on
the Ohio court so evident as it is in the cases that match an individual
economic underdog against a wealthier employer, corporation, and/or
insurance company. After Paul Pfeifer joined the court in 1992, the
court's significant decisions in workers' compensation were often
uniformly liberal and reflected the four-three, liberal-conservative split.
In one activist decision, the Douglas-Resnick-Sweeney-Pfeifer majority
outvoted the Moyer-Cook-Stratton minority to extend workers'
compensation "death benefits" to survivors of persons who worked in a
welfare program and struck down as unconstitutional a state statute
barring such recovery." In other activist decisions, a unanimous court:
(I) concluded that the customer companies of temporary service agencies
are "employers" who are subject to claims for violations of the specific
safety requirements of Ohio law;' 9' (2) addressed the "coming and going"
from work rule to award compensation to three "riggers" of a drilling
company injured in accidents traveling from their homes to remote job-
site locations;'9 2 and (3) overruled court precedent to hold that an
employee's legal representative, anyone whom he assigns his right to, or
189. The following summary of the significant decisions of the Moyer Court between 1990 and
2ooo was culled from a review of the decisions highlighted by the Ohio Northern University Law
Review's annual Survey of Ohio Law and the decisions that received significant attention from the
newspaper in the state capital, The Columbus Dispatch.
i9o. State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 672 N.E.2d ioO8, 1013 (Ohio 1996). Writing
in Cremeans v. Wilmar Mfg Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio i99I), and rejecting the doctrine of
assumption of risk, Justice Douglas summed up the working majority's workers' compensation
jurisprudence as follows:
[W]e believe that the time has come for Ohio to realize that the days of laissez-faire
economics are long gone, and that the industrial revolution is no longer with us. Today, an
employee must either accept the dangers of his or her job or face the prospect of finding
new employment in an economic setting where the supply of work has become increasingly
limited. Ohio should now move into the Twentieth Century and join the ranks of the
growing number of state and federal courts that have ruled on the question. The trend in
this country set by the jurisdictions which have carefully analyzed the issue is that the
defense of assumption of risk in the employment setting is no longer valid.
Id. at 1207.
191. State ex rel. Newman v. Indus. Comm'n, 673 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (Ohio 1997).
192. Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling Inc., 689 N.E.2d 917, 925 (Ohio 1998).
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any other person with a right to recover against an employer in
connection with an employee's injury may sue an employer directly for
intentional torts.
93
Personal Injury and Tort Law Outside the Workplace. Despite the
Chief Justice's own efforts to the contrary, the Moyer Court may best be
remembered for its decisions to create new methods for injured persons
to recover from corporations and insurers, while at the same time staving
off legislative efforts to prevent such recovery. For instance, in the high
profile and controversial case of Browning v. Burt, Justices A.W. and
Frank Sweeney, Douglas, and Pfeifer extended the conditions under
which hospitals can be held liable for the "negligent credentialing" of a
physician.'"' Shortly thereafter, the watershed case of Gallimore v.
Children's Hospital Medical Center, not only established that parents
could collect damages for their loss of consortium with an injured child,
but also reversed the court's year-old bar on a child's recovery for loss of
consortium with a parent.'95 In Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Medical
Group, Justices Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick, and Pfeifer voted to
overturn the court's legal rule that a wrongful death plaintiff suing for
malpractice could not recover for the "loss of chance" of survival of the
deceased resulting from the physician's negligence when the odds of
survival were less than fifty-fifty.' 96 In lower profile, but nonetheless
influential cases, the court held that a hospital could be liable for the
negligence of independent medical practitioners if the hospital had held
itself out as the medical provider and the patient looked to the hospital-
not the doctor-as the provider;"9 that, contrary to the "American Rule"
on attorneys fees, a plaintiff could recover attorneys fees in a declaratory
judgment action even in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or stubbornly
litigious behavior; '98 that the child of a deceased father could collect
under Ohio's wrongful death act even if his father's paternity had not
been established before he died;"9 that a psychotherapist could be held
liable for failure to hospitalize a mentally ill patient who committed a
violent act;" and that a federal safety law which did not require that
airbags be installed in cars in 1990 did not preempt an action for failure
to install those protections in that same year."' In every one of these
193. Conley v. Brown Corp. of Waverly, 696 N.E.2d 1035, 1043 (Ohio 1998).
194. 613 N.E.2d 993, 1003-04 (Ohio 1993).
195. 617 N.E.2d 1052, io6o (Ohio 1993).
I96. 668 N.E.2d 480, 489-90 (Ohio 1996).
197. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr, 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994).
198. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, 648 N.E.2d 488,490 (Ohio 1995).
199. Brookbank v. Gray, 658 N.E.2d 724,734 (Ohio 1996).
200. Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 , 1324 (Ohio 1997).
201. Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 648, 655 (Ohio 1997). One significant case,
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cases the court split with Resnick, Douglas, Sweeney, and Pfeifer in the
majority and Moyer, Cook, and Stratton (or Wright) in dissent.
Most controversially, in a series of decisions starting in i99I, the
liberal wing of the Ohio court whittled away at the legislature's tort
reform efforts until it eventually wielded the sledgehammer and
invalidated the legislature's newly minted tort reform package in i999."°
The court struck down in toto legislation that comprehensively regulated
the conditions under which damage awards can be sought and limited the
amount of damages that could be recovered in civil actions." Writing for
a majority that included Justices Pfeifer, Douglas, and Sweeney, Justice
Resnick drew an institutional line in the sand:
[This tort reform legislation] marks the first time in modern history
that the General Assembly has openly challenged this court's authority
to prescribe rules governing the courts of Ohio and to render definitive
interpretations of the Ohio Constitution binding upon the other
branches....
... [The act] intrudes upon judicial power by declaring itself
constitutional, by reenacting legislation struck down as
unconstitutional, and by interfering with this court's power to regulate
court procedure.' °4
Labor and Employment Law. The four liberals on the Moyer Court
have also shaped Ohio labor and employment law in favor of employees
and unions in several significant labor and employment decisions. In
Ohio's most notable collective bargaining case in recent memory, the
however, did not fit the typical voting pattern. In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc., 671
N.E.2d 225, 225 (Ohio 1996), the court faced the delicate question of whether Ohio would recognize a
"wrongful living" (or continued living) claim for damages in the case of a man whose life was
prolonged after a hospital administered defibrillation despite his known desire to not be resuscitated.
In a re-alignment of the justices, Sweeney, Moyer, and Cook joined a plurality opinion that refused to
recognize the new claim, while Douglas joined in the result only. Resnick, Pfeifer, and an intermediate
appellate court judge sitting for Justice Stratton dissented. Id.
202. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio i99I) (striking down the statutory cap of
$200,000 on medical malpractice jury awards as being unreasonable and arbitrary); Sorrell v. Thevenir,
633 N.E.2d 504, 513 (Ohio i994) (invalidating as violative of the right to a jury trial, to remedy, and to
due process a portion of Ohio's 1987 Tort Reform Act that required the deduction from any jury
award past and future benefits received by the plaintiff related to the same injury); Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the legislation's requirement that
after a jury found a defendant liable for punitive damages, the court would determine the amount of
damages violated the plaintiff's right to a jury trial); Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298,
302 (Ohio 1994) (holding that Ohio's statute that required the periodic payment of future damages
over a certain amount violated the right to a jury trial and due process rights found in the Ohio
Constitution).
203. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d io62, 1095 (Ohio 1999).
204. Id. at 1073, 1076.
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court held that an Ohio statute that deemed university workload policies
to be an inappropriate subject for collective bargaining; the statute ran
afoul of the federal Equal Protection Clause because it bore no rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose."' Employees not protected by
collective bargaining agreements also fared well with the working
majority. The court broadened the definition of what could be called a
"discharge" for purposes of an age discrimination suit,2' 6 extended the
categories of persons with "handicaps" who are protected from
discrimination to potentially include persons suffering from cancer,"°7 and
held that an employee who was discharged in retaliation for filing a
complaint regarding unhealthy working conditions could maintain an
action for damages in court."
Public Records. On the margin, in cases involving Ohio's Public
Records Act (PRA), the Moyer Court has tipped this balance in favor of
sunshine and public access and has done so with both shifting majorities
and unanimity. In three significant unanimous decisions, the court held
that a public agency's magnetic data tapes constituted public records and
were therefore subject to a PRA request;" that the public has a right to
obtain the terms of a settlement agreement between a private party and
public entity, even when the settlement agreement contained a
confidentiality clause;1 0 and that a private company that provided a
firefighting service to the public could not shield its investigative reports
from the public.'
205. Am. Ass'n. of Univ. Professors v. Cent. State Univ.. 699 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ohio 1998), rev'd,
526 U.S. 124 (1999). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal, however, the Ohio Supreme
Court backed down and refused to extend Ohio's equal benefits protections beyond the federal Equal
Protection Clause. Am. Ass'n. of Univ. Professors v. Cent. State Univ., 717 N.E.2d 286, 292-93 (Ohio
1999). See also State Employment Relations Bd. v. Adena Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 613 N.E.2d
605, 615 (Ohio 1993) (holding that retaliatory discharge could be proved by demonstrating that the
employer was motivated at least "in part" by anti-union animus); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. Ass'n. v.
Mohawk Mech., 716 N.E.2d 198, 2oo-oi (Ohio 1999) (ruling in favor of a labor union that sought to
represent a subcontractor's employees in wage disputes that were exempt from competitive bidding
requirements).
206. Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 664 N.E.2d 1272 , 1276 (Ohio 1996).
207. Hood v. Diamond Prods., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 738, 742 (Ohio 1996). It should be noted that
Justice Sweeney joined the conservatives in another case and rejected a claim of a would-be firefighter
that his visual impairment was a "handicap" for which he could not be discriminated against by a
prospective employer. Columbus Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McGlone, 697 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ohio 1998).
208. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308,319-20 (Ohio i997). In a unanimous decision,
the court also held that the Ohio Civil Rights Act permits an award of punitive damages if there is
evidence of malice on the part of the defendant. Rice v. Certain Teed Corp., 704 N.E.2d 1217, 1218
(Ohio 1999).
209. State ex rel. Margolius v. Cleveland, 584 N.E.2d 665, 669 (1992).
210. State ex rel. Findlay Pub. Co. v. Hancock County Bd. of Comm., 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1224-25
(Ohio 1997).
21. State ex rel. Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Elida Cmty. Fire Co., 697 N.E.2d 210, 244
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Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Outside of police practices and
criminal procedure, the Moyer Court has had little opportunity to rule on
significant civil rights matters. The DeRolph cases and the university
professors' workload case raise significant equal protection and
fundamental rights issues, but the court's civil rights work has
predominantly involved interpreting the meaning of statutes designed to
protect people with disabilities from discrimination,"2 and two very
conspicuous First Amendment cases. First, upholding free speech rights,
the Moyer Court struck down a lower court's injunction against the
simultaneous picketing of a private residence by opposing groups."3
Second, the court tackled the issue of whether public monies could be
used to provide vouchers to students to attend private, religious
schools. 14 There, Justice Pfeifer joined Justice Moyer and two appellate
court judges sitting for Justices Cook and Stratton in finding that the
Cleveland school voucher program did not create "excessive
entanglement" between government and religion and therefore held that
it did not violate the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and
Ohio Constitution."5 Justices Resnick, Douglas, and Sweeney dissented
from this portion of the decision, but joined the court in striking the
program on the grounds that the legislation creating the program-which
had been included in a large budget bill-violated the Ohio
Constitution's single subject rule."6 The ruling probably reflects the
court's preference for free-market education reform as much as it does
(Ohio 1998); see also Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 68o N.E.2d 956, 959 (Ohio 1997) (finding that
Ohio PRA overrode the privacy protections of the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act and
ordered Miami University to produce the unredacted student discipline records). Not all of the court's
significant PRA decisions favored public access, however. In one case, Douglas, Sweeney, Resnick,
and Stratton held, over dissents by Moyer, Pfeifer, and Cook, that a Common Pleas Court Judge need
not produce letters she received from the public prior to sentencing a man convicted of rape. State ex
rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Whitmore, 697 N.E.2d 640, 642 (Ohio 1998).
212. In Ohio Civil Rights Conm'n. v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 666 N.E.2d 1376, 1388 (Ohio
1996), the court rejected a claim of discrimination by a blind pre-medical student who was denied
admittance by Case Western Reserve's Medical School, reasoning that the student was not "otherwise
qualified" to participate in the medical school's program and that any accommodations made for the
student would have resulted in the modification of the essential nature of the program. Pfeifer,
Resnick, and Douglas dissented from this decision that arguably tested just how far the court would go
to provide access and opportunity to persons with disabilities.
213. Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 667 N.E.2d 942, 949 (Ohio 1996) (upending an injunction
against "simultaneous picketing" outside the home of the infamous accused Nazi war criminal John
Demjanjuk).
214. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
215. Id. at 2o7- Ii.
216. Id. at 216-18 (Douglas, J., concuring). As a practical matter, this "activist" decision had little
"activist" effect, as the legislature needed only, and in fact did, re-adopt the legislation in a single bill.
See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313-974-3313.979.
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the court's views on the separation of church and state."7 On balance, the
court's treatment of civil liberties/civil rights outside the criminal context
is limited and ambiguous.
Criminal Law. With occasional exceptions, the Ohio Supreme Court
justices have tended to support the law-and-order policies of the
Voinovich and Taft administrations. By way of example only, the
following restraintist and conservative decisions were rendered by the
Moyer Court. The court (I) approved an Ohio Rule of Evidence that
arguably eroded slightly the right of criminal defendants to confront their
accusers in cases of child sexual abuse; 8 (2) sustained the admission of
illegally obtained evidence as "harmless error" even though the search
from which the evidence was obtained violated Fourth Amendment
rights;" 9 (3) ruled that, irrespective of whether a police officer has an
ulterior motive for making a traffic stop, evidence need not be
suppressed so long as the officer has probable cause and acts in an
objectively reasonable manner in making the stop;20 (4) effectively
ratified a state statute that permits a juvenile judge to impose consecutive
terms of commitment upon a delinquent minor;22' (5) declined to extend
the Ohio Constitution's protections and agreed with the U.S. Supreme
Court's "totality of the circumstances" test in determining whether a
motorist has given a police officer voluntary permission to conduct the
search of a car (Douglas and Sweeney dissented);. (6) upheld a newly
enacted Ohio law that required the classification and registration of sex
offenders, as well as community notification, against challenges that it
was an unconstitutional ex post facto and retroactive law;23 and (7) held
that there is no need for a trial court to ensure that jurors in a death
penalty case are "life qualified," that is, that they must be asked
questions that would expose any bias in favor of the death penalty that
would impede their rendering of a "life" verdict instead of a death
sentence. 4
217. In a footnote, however, Justice Douglas expressed his concerns about the voucher program's
impact on public education: "It is possible that a greatly expanded School Voucher Program or similar
program could damage public education. Such a program could be subject to a renewed constitutional
challenge." Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212 n.2. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the
Cleveland voucher program in the face of an Establishment Clause challenge in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002).
218. State v. Storch, 612 N.E.2d 305,316 (Ohio 1993).
219. State v. Brown, 605 N.E.2d 46,49 (Ohio 1992).
220. Dayton v. Erickson, 665 N.E.2d io9I, Io97 (Ohio 1996). Pfeifer dissented. Id. at io98 (Pfeifer,
J., dissenting).
221. In Re Caldwell, 666 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (Ohio 1996).
222. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762,771-72 (Ohio 1997).
223. State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio i998) .
224. State v. Stojetz, 705 N.E.2d 329, 346-47 (Ohio 1999).
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After surveying the Moyer Court's significant opinions from 199o to
2ooo, a few observations can be made. First, for the cases that raise issues
of workers' or individuals' rights to recover against employers, insurance
companies, and corporations, a distinctly liberal and activist majority
emerges. Second, the same majority tends to vote in favor of unions in
matters that implicate collective bargaining and union organizing. These
first two observations suggest that this majority of the court would also
support the claims of educational finance reform plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs tend to be economic underdogs from property-poor school
districts, and because the plaintiffs often include (or are at least
supported by) the state's teachers unions. Third, in matters of criminal
law and procedure, the Moyer Court will generally vote in a conservative
and restraintist fashion. Less clear is the court's view of civil rights and
civil liberties outside of the criminal context. Understanding that these
conclusions are limited to significant matters that tend to be skewed
towards activist outcomes, however, this study next turns to a systematic
analysis of all of the court's decisions-not merely the significant
decisions-in two specific areas of law.
3. A Systematic Analysis of the Court's Ideology and Role
Orientation.
To better capture the Ohio Supreme Court's role orientation and
ideology, this study analyzed the decisions of the court and the votes of
each of the justices in two areas of law: workers' compensation and
criminal justice. 25 Table 2 below presents the results of an analysis of the
court's and justices' ideological and role-oriented behavior in the
workers' compensation and criminal cases.
225. Workers' compensation cases and criminal law and criminal procedure cases between 1995
and 1997 were selected. The time period was selected for two reasons: (i) it covers a sufficient number
of years up to and including the year in which DeRolph was decided to provide a large enough sample
of cases to establish the court's and justices' ideological attitudes, and (2) during those years, the
Moyer Court, consisting of Moyer, Douglas, Resnick, Pfeifer, Sweeney, Cook, and Stratton remained
quite stable, as all members of the DeRolph court were on the court during the entire time period




LIBERAL AND ACTIVIST DECISION-MAKING BY THE DEROLPH COURT AND ITS
JUSTICES IN SELECTED POLICY AREAS BY PERCENTAGE AND RANK, 1995-
1997
Policy Area Court Moyer Douglas Resnick Sweeney Pfeifer Cook Stratton
30.6 30.5 40.8 43.3 42.6 35.5 22.6 27.8
n n232 =236 n=233 n=231 n=235 n=234 n=230 n=133
0 JRank 5 3 I 2 4 7 6
~-0
34.4 28.1 32.3 38.7 31.3 32.2 25.8 28.6
n=32 n=32 n=3i n=31 n= 32 n=31 n=31 n=21
< Rank 6 2 I 4 3 7 5
44.8 37.2 65.I 68.8 66.7 43.8 31.8 37.8
= n=i25 n=129 n=129 n=I28 n=129 n=128 n=129 n=82
Rank 6 3 i 2 4 7 5
50.0 30.0 40.0 44.4 40.0 50.0 40.0 28.6S%
. n=io n=Io n=o n=9 n=lo n=o n=o n=7
< Rank 4 3 2 3 1 3 5
% t4.0 22.4 io.6 1I.7 13.2 25.5 10.9 1t.8
n=Io7 n=Io7 n=Io4 n=1o3 n=io6 n=to6 n=loi n=51
r O  Rank 2 7 5 3 1 6 4
• 27.3 27.3 28.6 36.4 27.3 23.8 19.0 28.6
.) n=22 n=22 n=21 n=22 n=22 n=21 n=2i n=14
L P Rank 3 2 1 3 4 5 2
Looking at the court's and justices' decisions in the combined
workers' compensation and criminal cases, several observations
regarding the court's ideology are noteworthy. The court's range of
liberalism among justices may seem relatively limited. The court's liberal
policy output is 30.6 percent, while the justices' individual percentages
range from 22.6 (Cook) to 43.3 (Resnick), a percentage point range of
20.7. Those whom we would expect to be most liberal-Resnick,
Douglas, Sweeney, and Pfeifer-are the four most liberal justices.
Pfeifer's number four position suggests that he may be the swing voter on
the court. Cook's position as the most conservative (and restraintist)
jurist is consistent with her writing. The same is true for Stratton's scores.
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Despite the seemingly limited range of rates in liberal voting in
workers' compensation and criminal justice cases combined, there are
significant differences in the voting patterns among justices. T-tests were
conducted to determine whether the voting rates among pairs of justices
were significantly different from each other at the .05 level (two-tailed).
Justices Cook and Stratton were significantly more conservative than the
justices of the working majority, Douglas, Resnick, Sweeney, and Pfeifer.
Chief Justice Moyer was significantly more conservative than Douglas,
Resnick, and Sweeney. (Moyer was also more conservative than Pfeifer
at the .055 level.) Thus, the working majority justices were, by and large,
significantly more liberal than their colleagues in workers' compensation
and criminal justice matters.
The seemingly relatively limited range of liberalism in the combined
workers' compensation and criminal cases also masks significant
ideological differences among the justices in specific areas of law. In
those cases that match the economic underdog against corporate and
employer interests, Justices Resnick, Douglas, and Sweeney demonstrate
a relatively high degree of liberalism. Conversely, Justices Cook, Moyer,
and Stratton are much more conservative, as the range from the most
liberal (Resnick, 68.8 percent) to the most conservative (Cook, 31.8
percent) is a gaping thirty-seven percentage points. In pairwise t-test
comparisons among justices, all the working majority justices are again
significantly more liberal at the .05 level (two-tailed) than the three
conservative justices. Moreover, Justice Pfeifer appears to be the swing
vote, as his liberalism score is 43.8 percent, a mere percentage point away
from the court's average of 44.8 percent. As Pfeifer votes on workers'
compensation cases, so votes the court.
The liberal rankings in economic cases do not hold steady in law-
and-order cases. Indeed, in criminal law cases, Justices Douglas and
Resnick become, respectively, the most and third most conservative
justices. Justices Pfeifer and Moyer champion the rights and liberties of
criminal defendants more often than their colleagues.225 Overall, the
226. Justice Pfeiffer's concerns for civil liberties and his relatively liberal positions on criminal law
matters before the court may best be captured by his dissent in a case in which the court upheld the
practice of police officers stopping motorists for what may be pretextual, though technically valid,
reasons:
Fourth Amendment cases are some of the most difficult cases for judges to decide for the
simple reason that it is most often unsympathetic people who seek protection from unlawful
searches. These cases are brought by persons confronted with damning evidence, which
evidence, they claim, while relevant and probably persuasive, was unlawfully gained and
ought to be ignored. While it is always a criminal defendant seeking the Fourth
Amendment's protection, ultimately Fourth Amendment jurisprudence protects us all from
unreasonable intrusions on our liberty. It was not a criminal who lost in this case today-all
of us who value our freedom did.
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court's 14 percent liberal output in criminal cases is much more
conservative than the 44.8 percent in workers' compensation cases." 7 At
bottom, the systematic analysis of the court's decisions seems to confirm
the overview of the court's significant cases. The picture that emerges is a
divided court on matters of economic justice and a mostly conservative
court on criminal law matters.
Although any conclusions drawn from the activism scores should be
viewed with caution due to the limited number of cases that presented a
potential for activist decision-making (n=32), it is interesting that the
range of activism in the combined workers' compensation and criminal
law cases among the justices is again relatively limited (38.7% (Resnick)
to 25.8% (Cook)).22 One final observation is in order: The DeRolph
court has a high rate of dissent. In the combined criminal law/workers'
compensation cases, a dissenting position is taken 42.7 percent of the
time, while dissents are registered in 51.9 percent of the workers'
compensation cases and 31.5 percent of the criminal cases.
There is little doubt that the justices fall into clear ideological camps.
On issues of the free market vs. protecting those injured by the market,
Resnick, Douglas, and Sweeney are liberal, and Pfeifer often casts the
liberal swing vote. On issues of protecting the rights of the politically
unpopular, like criminal defendants, the court as a whole is quite
conservative with only Moyer and Pfeifer showing occasional sympathy
for civil liberties. In regard to the court's role orientation, it appears that
the court is more often than not restraintist, but individual justices do not
seem to balk at overturning executive, legislative, and prior judicial
policy to further their ideological agendas. What does this suggest for
school finance litigation? Even with the clear precedent of Walter
favoring the State in school finance cases, to the extent we view school
finance cases as involving economic underdogs, there exists a working
majority who would entertain a school finance complaint and appear
willing to overturn or avoid precedent to do so.
City of Dayton v. Erickson, 665 N.E.2d IO9I, 5O98 (Ohio 1996) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
227. To test the proposition that Justice Pfeifer provides the swing vote on the court in economic
justice cases, but tends to be more liberal than the court in criminal cases, paired-sample t-tests were
conducted for all of the justices' liberalism scores paired with the court's liberalism scores. Only
Justice Pfeifer's liberalism score on workers' compensation cases (43.8 percent) did not differ
significantly at the or level (2-tailed) from the court's liberalism score (44.8 percent), while Resnick,
Douglas, and Sweeney were significantly more liberal than the court as a whole and Cook, Stratton,
and Moyer were significantly more conservative than the court as a whole. Thus, there is evidence that
Pfeifer provides the swing vote in economic justice cases.




C. AN HISTORICAL-POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF DEROLPH V. STATE
i. The Genesis of DeRolph v. State229
Geographically, culturally, and socially, it is a long way from the
urban core of Cincinnati to the rural hill country of Perry County. Yet
many of the challenges faced by the Cincinnati schools were similar to
those faced by the rural and Appalachian school districts of Ohio in the
mid-I98os. The coal mines of that portion of the state had long since
played themselves out. There was very little by way of an industrial and
commercial base in the twenty-nine-county Appalachia region of Ohio.
And the average school district did not have much of a property base to
tax for facilities and operations. Consequently, the schools of that region
were deteriorating, the course offerings were meager, and the specialized
educational services, including gifted and talented, advanced placement,
and mental health counseling were virtually nonexistent. This in contrast
to what the rural districts saw in the affluent metropolitan suburbs: lavish
facilities, rich curricular offerings, and myriad extracurricular and co-
curricular activities. Against this backdrop, a small group of school
superintendents in that southeastern part of Ohio began to talk about the
educational opportunities available to their students.
a. The Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools
In 1986, the Southeastern Ohio Superintendents Association
(SEOSA) existed as a professional support and networking group for
school superintendents in approximately eleven counties in southeastern
Ohio.23 Although the usual topics of business for SEOSA ranged from
routine bureaucratic concerns to curricular issues, Perry County
Superintendent of Schools Richard "Dick" Fisher and a small
contingency of the superintendents, primarily from Athens and Perry
Counties, began to discuss the unequal educational opportunities their
children received and the source of this inequality: small local tax bases
and a school finance system that depended on those tax bases. Not
inclined toward political action, the group was initially uncertain how to
approach this seemingly intractable problem. It wasn't until a bureaucrat
from the Ohio Department of Education (ODE) came to town that the
superintendents began to focus their energies. William "Bill" Phillis, who
229. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section was derived from the following
interviews: Interview with Richard Fisher, Executive Director, Coalition of Rural & Appalachian
Schools, in Oxford, Ohio (May 7, 2001); Interview with William Phillis, Executive Director, Coalition
for Equity and Adequacy in School Funding, in Columbus, Ohio (May iO, 200i); Interview with
Michael Shoemaker, Ohio State Senator, in Columbus, Ohio (May 15, 2001).
230. Interview with Richard Fisher, supra note 229. The author is deeply indebted to Dick Fisher
for not only spending hours discussing the history of the DeRolph case, but also sharing and explaining
the complex development of the litigation.
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had been a school administrator in southeastern Ohio, and who was
serving as the Assistant Superintendent of Public Instruction for the
State, was on one of his many lengthy road trips to visit schools,
administrators, and teachers. While in Perry County in May of 1986,
Phillis met with a delegation from SEOSA who explained their problem.
Phillis, having a keen understanding of politics in Columbus and a
recognition that the twenty-nine counties of rural Appalachia had about
as many legislative representatives as Cleveland's Cuyahoga County
alone, told the assembled superintendents that if they wanted the state to
help them with their fiscal misery, they had better get organized.
From that point to the beginning of 1988, the core SEOSA members,
all of whom had more than full-time professional responsibilities,
reached out to other administrators in Appalachia and began to exercise
their new political muscles. In October of 1986, the group met with a
delegation of Appalachian legislators to press their concerns; in
November the group again met with Bill Phillis; and in December they
sat down with a group of affluent school districts called "138 Plus" to
discuss school finance issues. These tentative first steps at securing more
educational resources through political channels continued and became
more formal in 1987, as SEOSA launched an initiative dubbed
"Promoting Appalachian and Rural Initiatives for Teaching Youth"
(PARITY) which aimed to publicize the lack of educational
opportunities for rural children. More important, the group began to
make high-level legislative contacts, including a meeting with the Senate
and House Education Committee Chairs. Despite these fledgling efforts
at political lobbying, the group was hampered by its lack of a formal
organizational structure and the limited time of its members.
To address the first of these obstacles, four superintendents from
SEOSA met at Ohio University with the Dean of its College of
Education, Allen Myers, and another group of educators, the South East
Ohio, Kentucky and West Virginia Study Council (SEOKWA). The
group resolved to form a much larger lobbying and professional
organization to address the school finance issue. Over the next few
months, these educators expanded their reach over the entire twenty-
nine-county rural Appalachian region of Ohio and beyond and convened
again on July i, 1988 to form the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian
Schools (CORAS). CORAS was made up of some ninety school districts
in southeastern Ohio. Its mission was to advocate for equitable and
quality educational opportunities for Ohio's students and to create
avenues for communication and information exchange among districts in
the region.
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By early 199o, however, it had become clear that the politically weak
rural counties from southeastern Ohio held little influence in Columbus.
Although SEOSA and later CORAS had resolved to exhaust all political
channels first, CORAS was well aware that school districts in other states
had successfully sued to obtain equitable educational opportunities.
Indeed, Appalachian Ohio's neighbors across the river-West Virginia in
the early i98os23" ' and Kentucky in 1989 "32-had their educational finance
systems revamped by judicial decree. CORAS had even met at least once
with the architect of Kentucky's school finance challenge, Dr. Kern
Alexander. In a CORAS meeting on January 12, 199o, CORAS voted to
pursue litigation and commissioned Alexander, to conduct a school
finance equity study to develop the factual basis for their case.233
b. The Formation of The Coalition for Adequacy and Equity
During the year between the time CORAS resolved to sue the State
and the actual filing of their first lawsuit in May i99i, the organization
reached out to school leaders outside of Appalachia and other politically
active organizations and persons in an effort to create a favorable
political climate for a school finance lawsuit (and, perhaps, to make a last
ditch effort at avoiding litigation by achieving success through the
legislature). CORAS recognized that its political ineffectiveness had, in
part, stemmed from the fact that the districts and school leaders in
CORAS were exclusively rural, from southeastern Ohio, and white. The
weight of Ohio educational politics rested largely in the affluent
metropolitan suburbs and the three major urban districts of Cleveland,
231. Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
232. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
233. Alexander would not be plowing new ground. Ohio's school finance system and its provision
of educational opportunities to its youth had been studied and restudied many times since the 1970s.
Notably, in 1987, the bipartisan Select House Committee to Study Education chaired by Rep. Michael
Shoemaker traveled throughout the state to assess the condition of Ohio education. As Shoemaker
described it, the Committee's goal was to get out of the Capitol and take a look at what was going on
in schools. Interview with Senator Michael Shoemaker, Ohio Senate, in Columbus, Ohio (May 15,
2ooI). The report on the Committee's work, which was ultimately issued in December 1988, called for,
among other things, a tax increase for school support. Id. Also in 1988, the Senate and Governor
Richard Celeste commissioned separate special committees to study the needs of public education.
The results of the studies, which were leaked after the November 1988 elections, like the House Select
Committee's study recommended that the state income tax be increased one percentage point to raise
an additional $6oo million year for education. Id. But when the biennial budget was passed in the
spring of 1989, the lawmakers did not vote to submit the proposal to the electorate. Perhaps more
revealing was a 199o study commissioned by the ODE of Ohio's school facilities called the "Ohio
Public School Facility Survey." See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph 1).
That study found that more than $io billion would be needed to bring Ohio school buildings up to
adequate and safe conditions. Id. Thus, even without Alexander's study, there was plenty of evidence
that Ohio's children were being educationally shortchanged.
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Columbus, and Cincinnati and, to a lesser extent, the remainder of the
"Big Eight" school districts.
34
It could be argued that the Coalition's rural insecurity was misplaced
because the salient factor in educational finance litigation is not the
rural-suburban distinction, but rather the black-white distinction.235
Minority school districts are simply more likely to lose these cases.236
Thus, it would be detrimental to the school finance reform campaign to
enlist the urban minority school districts. Indeed, the rural and urban
districts were hardly natural allies. Although CORAS recognized that
the needs of the urban districts were aligned with CORAS in some
respects-they both needed more money from Columbus-the sources
of their educational woes and the specific educational needs differed
rather dramatically. Appalachia's fiscal woes were almost exclusively the
product of Ohio's school finance formula-a foundation formula-and
the region's paltry property tax base, while the urban districts enjoyed
greater school revenues.37 Columbus already sent substantial dollars to
the urban districts in the form of categorical grants.238 The urban districts
continued to suffer, however, from municipal and educational
overburden. Their tax bases were overworked and their children simply
needed more resources to compensate for social-educational deprivation.
If CORAS were waging a political battle for more funds through the
legislature, these differences would not be significant because a broad-
based coalition of rural and urban districts could simply argue for both
state aid to property poor districts and additional aid for districts with
high concentrations of poverty. But the fact that they would ultimately
be pursuing redress through the courts would force CORAS to devise
both an all-encompassing theory of the educational right and a proposal
for a remedy. Thus, the theoretical tension between equity and adequacy
came to the fore. The rural districts, which suffered from very low per
pupil revenues compared to the suburban and even urban districts, might
be best off arguing that equity was the wrong and equalization was the
remedy. The urban districts, on the other hand, might prefer an adequacy
or vertical equity remedy. No doubt an adequacy or vertical equity
234. In I998, the Big Eight (Akron, Canton, Cincinatti, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo,
and Youngstown) enrolled approximately seventeen percent of the state's students (309,095 of
1,822,517). Data were derived from the Ohio Department of Education website, at http://
www.ode.state.oh.us/data/(last visited June 5, 2004).
235. See Ryan, supra note 37, at 433.
236. Id.
237. Interview with Richard Fisher, supra note 229.
238. Even prior to the Walter litigation, the State of Ohio provided substantial categorical funding
to urban districts like Cincinnati. Defendants' Post-Trial Brief Proposing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 151-57, Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, Case No. A76-o2725 (Ct. Com. PI. Ohio 1977).
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remedy would benefit both urban and rural districts, but in the late I98os
and early 199os, educational policy had not yet developed a working
language for adequacy (despite the fact that the adequacy or vertical
equity theory had existed at least since West Virginia's Pauley v. Kelly239
case of 1979) or a clear understanding of whether an equity or adequacy
remedy would be best for the would-be DeRolph plaintiffs. This
ambivalence would later be reflected in the coalition's moniker, its
litigation strategy, and even the Ohio Supreme Court's decision. 4 That
said, CORAS had by that time in 199o forged a close relationship with
Kern Alexander, a leading proponent and architect of the modern
educational adequacy theory and his ideas would help frame the
conversations with the big city school districts."'
On April i6, August 31, and November 20 of 1990, CORAS leaders
met with representatives of the most influential urban districts in Ohio to
garner their support for the proposed litigation. Though productive and
critical to forging early ties with the big city districts, the meetings were
not without tension. Although Cleveland would remain hostile to
CORAS and Cincinnati would sit on the fence,242 CORAS scored a major
victory when Conrad Ott, the superintendent of the Akron Public
Schools, broke ranks with the Big Eight at the November meeting. He
acknowledged the similar needs of the rural and inner-city school
districts (while ignoring the differences), and agreed to join the
Coalition. Ultimately, Dayton, Columbus, Canton, and Lima City would
join the Coalition, thereby creating a true rural-urban alliance.
Just after Akron broke the urban-rural barrier, Kern Alexander and
his colleague, Richard Salmon released the curriculum equity study
commissioned by CORAS.243 The III-page study was based upon data
239. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
240. This is not to suggest that the organization's refusal or failure to develop a single, coherent
theory of educational rights is in any way a weakness of their strategy. On the contrary, such
ambivalence may have created a litigation advantage because it helped the group in constructing the
largest possible coalition, provided the Ohio high court with maximum flexibility to overcome the
Walter precedent and strike down the educational finance system, and recognized the inherent
fuzziness in what the school finance scholars like to portray as distinct theories of educational rights
See Koski, supra note 3, at 1262-64, 1296-98.
241. According to Kuo, supra note 51, at 92-93, Alexander's notions of educational adequacy also
found their way into the court's opinions in the Kentucky Rose decision and formed the foundation for
widespread reform in the state.
242. Throughout the course of the pre-litigation and litigation proceedings, Cincinnati would
alternately join and abandon the Coalition, depending upon the political swings on the Cincinnati
school board. By the time that the case was reviewed in the supreme court, however, Cincinnati would
be among the Coalition supporters.
243. KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD SALMON, FISCAL EQUITY OF THE OHIO PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1990).
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gathered from ioo of the 612 school districts in Ohio.2" These districts
represented the fifty highest per pupil spenders and the fifty lowest per
pupil spenders. The study found that wide disparities in property
valuations across the state translated into wide disparities in spending per
pupil.245 With this study, CORAS had the evidence of the systemic
inequity in the school finance program and a prominent expert witness to
present that evidence. Although legislative efforts had not been
completely abandoned, litigation seemed imminent.
But Cleveland beat them to the courthouse. Attorneys for the
Cleveland Board of Education filed a class-action school-finance lawsuit
entitled Howard v. Walter in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County.46 CORAS feared that the Howard suit would be doomed to
failure or would hold little benefit for most Ohio districts because it
looked too much like the failed Cincinnati case, did not enjoy broad
support in the educational community, and raised issues that were highly
specific to the Cleveland district.247 However, the filing of the Cleveland
lawsuit was a catalyst that prompted CORAS to further consolidate and
formalize its organization and, significantly, retain legal counsel. By the
end of January I99I, CORAS had become a true statewide coalition of
well over 200 of the state's 612 school districts. CORAS chose as its
attorneys the Columbus firm of Bricker & Eckler, the namesake of John
Bricker, the six-year Republican Governor and Vice Presidential running
mate to Thomas Dewey. The firm was selected due in large part to the
244 Id. at 2.
245. "For 1988-1989, the 50 high fiscal capacity school districts received a mean per-pupil state and
local revenue of $5,269, while the 50 low fiscal capacity school districts received $2,886 per pupil.
Statewide, the mean combined state and local revenue per pupil was ... $3,391." Id. at 21.
246. See Howard v. Walter, No. 61514, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4223, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
20, 1992).
247. Moreover, the Cleveland suit was not designed to fundamentally alter the distribution of
educational resources in the state as was the goal of CORAS; rather, as Cleveland School Board
President Lawrence Lumpkin described the difference in approaches between Cleveland and CORAS
is that CORAS wants to design a new funding formula itself, but "[o]ur attorneys tell me that is the
function of the state legislature, I believe this group is confused." Evelyn Theiss, Districts Try to Write
Way Out of School-Funding Suit, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 18, 1993, at IB. Despite
CORAS's fervent requests that Cleveland join the emerging coalition of districts, continue to pursue
legislative solutions, and, failing that, only then file suit. Cleveland instead named a statewide class of
children as plaintiffs in the Howard case. Id. at *1-*2. If Common Pleas Court Judge Daniel 0.
Corrigan certified the class, the Cleveland lawsuit would effectively become the school finance lawsuit
in the state. In an unusually quick decision, Judge Corrigan certified the statewide class on February
20, 1991. Id. at *2. In response, a group of wealthy districts opted out of the class, while representatives
of the CORAS districts appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at *3-*6. The high court
upheld the class certification and thereby permitted the Howard suit to proceed. Howard v. Walter,
605 N.E.2d 951,951 (Ohio 1993).
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education law and school finance expertise of the firm's partner,
Nicholas Pittner, and the firm's stature in the Ohio legal community.
Facing the likelihood of lengthy and expensive legal and legislative
battles, CORAS and its extended coalition decided to again reorganize
itself to emphasize its mission and statewide presence. On February 12,
i99i at the law offices of Bricker & Eckler, kitty-corner from the State
Capitol, the first official meeting of the Coalition for Adequacy and
Equity in School Funding (the Coalition) was held. The meeting was
significant in that representatives of more than three hundred school
districts attended, and the group formally acknowledged the need to
walk the thin and fuzzy line between equity and adequacy by highlighting
both terms in its name. To ensure as much consensus as possible in
decision-making, the Coalition was to be directed by a steering
committee made up of member representatives. And to defray the costs
of legal counsel, expert witnesses, organization expenses, and other
charges, the Coalition would set up a dues structure in which member
school districts would pay 50 cents per average daily membership
(ADM) a year.
Over the next two months, the coalition met with Superintendent of
Public Instruction Franklin Walter, the Republican President of the Ohio
Senate, Stanley Aronoff, and Republican Governor George Voinovich.
Much to the Coalition's disappointment, any hope of a legislative
solution was dissipating, as the state was falling deeper into a recession
that was strangling the Midwest's economies and prompting legislators to
back away from any proposals that might test the state's budget or result
in higher taxes.24 The only victory over those two months for the
Coalition, albeit a significant victory, was securing the membership of the
powerful Ohio Education Association (OEA). The OEA immediately
provided a substantial infusion of cash to the Coalition and would remain
its largest single financial and political ally in the school funding struggle.
Equally important, this somewhat uncomfortable "labor-management"
alliance between OEA and the Coalition would galvanize teachers across
the state, create a largely unified education community, and possibly
prevent the OEA from pursuing its own objectives.
Its pleas to the legislature having been ignored, on December I9,
199i, the Coalition filed DeRolph v. State, naming son and father Nathan
and Dale DeRolph from the Northern Local School District as the lead
plaintiffs.249 The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that education was a
248. Interview with Richard Fisher, supra note 229.
249. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph I) (detailing the procedural
history of the DeRolph litigation). DeRolph was technically not the first case filed by the Coalition.
Rather, on May 9, 1991 the Coalition had filed a lawsuit in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas
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fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution, that the school funding
system violated Ohio's Equal Protection and Benefits Provision, and that
it also violated the state's Thorough and Efficient Clause."' The
Coalition knew its success was hardly guaranteed. But it also would make
a move that many regard as the decision most critical to the Coalition's
success: hiring Bill Phillis.
c. The Phillis Factor: Organizational Leadership and the
Statewide Plaintiffs Coalition
Bill Phillis is either the courageous hero or the villain of Ohio
educational finance politics, depending upon one's perspective. One fact
that all seem to agree upon, however, is that the success of the Coalition
as an organization is due to Phillis's political savvy, his boundless energy,
and determined leadership.
Phillis began his career in education in 1958 as a high school teacher
in the Richmondale, Ross County Southeastern High School, a
prototypical rural Appalachian school." ' Indeed, all of Phillis's local
educational experience was in the Appalachian region-as a teacher,
principal at Southeastern, district superintendent of the Minford Local
Schools in Scioto County, and a county vocational school superintendent
called Thompson v. Ohio. The lawsuit asked for a declaration that education was a fundamental right
under the Ohio Constitution and that the Ohio school funding scheme violated both the Ohio and U.S.
Constitutions. But two months after it was filed, the state defendants removed the case to the federal
courtroom of Judge John D. Holschuh on the grounds that the lawsuit implicated federal questions.
Interview with Nicholas Pittner, Bricker & Eckler, in Columbus, Ohio (May 1o, 2oo0). The Thompson
lawsuit continued to languish for many years in its pre-trial phase in the federal courts as a
significantly pared-down version of itself. The lawsuit now focuses only on the narrow allegations of
the state's failure to provide adequate services and funding for special education programs in the state.
250. Interview with Nicholas Pitnner, supra note 249. Nearly all who participated in the study
pointed out that the selection of Perry County was strategic. Plaintiffs' attorney Nicolas Pittner,
claimed that they chose Perry County because of the trial court's reputation for quickly processing
cases and because the Fifth Appellate District in which Perry County sat also had an uncrowded
docket and would move the case along expeditiously. This would be an advantage because everybody
knew that the case would not be over until the Ohio Supreme Court weighed in.
Supporters of the state and others argued, however, that this was classic forum shopping by the
plaintiffs. First, and most obvious, many of the districts in Perry County-one of the twenty-nine
Appalachian counties-were poor, underfunded districts. Not only would the court be sympathetic to
the plaintiffs' claims, but any judge sitting on that court would know that his or her electoral fortunes
rested with the residents of those districts. Second, the only judge in the county was Linton Lewis, Jr.
Lewis is a lifelong resident of Perry County whose family's roots in the county date back to the turn of
the century. He is the son of a former principal, Linton Lewis Sr., at New Lexington High School in
Perry County; Lewis Sr. also served as an assistant superintendent. Judge Lewis graduated from New
Lexington High School in 1971 and played guard and forward on the school's basketball team. One
could hardly find a judge more sympathetic to the plight of poor districts and education than Lewis is
on paper.
251. Interview with William Phillis, Executive Director, Coalition for Equity and Adequacy in
School Funding, in Columbus, Ohio (May 1O, 2001).
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in Columbiana County. As an educator, Phillis experienced firsthand the
pressures and frustrations that resulted from limited local tax capacity,
including a dearth of certified and qualified teachers, large class sizes,
lack of equipment and supplies, and inadequate educational facilities.
Phillis joined the Ohio Department of Education in 1977 as an assistant
superintendent of public instruction. Among his many duties at the
ODE, two responsibilities would prove invaluable to the Coalition.
Phillis often represented the ODE as a lobbyist and liaison to the Ohio
legislature and consequently became intimately familiar with the
workings of the General Assembly and the persons who controlled those
workings. Phillis also represented the ODE as a liaison to the local and
county school districts throughout the state. In that capacity, Phillis met
hundreds of local educational leaders and would frequently log hundreds
of miles in a single day traveling from school site to school site. Phillis
boasted that rare combination of the insider's knowledge of Columbus
politics and the populist ease with the rank-and-file educators and
bureaucrats throughout the state.
In 199o, the long-time Superintendent of Public Instruction, Dr.
Franklin Walter, announced his retirement from the ODE. It had been
some fourteen years since the Ohio State Board of Education, which has
the authority to select and hire the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
had conducted a search for a superintendent. While the search and
deliberation process proceeded, the Board appointed Phillis to be Acting
Superintendent. Phillis was also one of the leading candidates for the
permanent position. But the locus of power in educational politics had
perceptibly shifted from the State Board and ODE to the very popular
Republican Governor George Voinovich who had won the office in 199o
as a penny-pinching tax-cutter and the self-proclaimed "Education
Governor..... For the Superintendent's post, Voinovich clearly favored
Dr. John T. "Ted" Sanders, who had recently completed a stint with the
George H.W. Bush administration as Deputy Secretary of Education in
the U.S. Department of Education.253 In a reportedly contentious debate
and vote, the State Board ultimately passed over Phillis and selected
Sanders for the position.54 One clear result of Sanders's selection was
Phillis's decision to leave the ODE on April 13, 1992.
252. See Mark Tatge & Mary Beth Lane, Legislators Shy From School-Funding Reform, Plain
Dealer, Dec. 6, 1992, at IB.
253. See, e.g., Lee Leonard, Blunt Bureaucrat Turned Crusader, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 6, 1997,
IC; Interview with Martha Wise, Member, Ohio Board of Education, in Columbus, Ohio (May 13,
2001); Interview with William Phillis, supra note 251.
254. Interview with Martha Wise, supra note 253.
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The next day, Phillis became the Executive Director of the
Coalition. No doubt this appointment had been in the works for quite
some time, but it was nonetheless significant that the person who had
long toed the line between insider and outsider was becoming the
archetypal outsider. Characteristic of his work at the ODE, Phillis wasted
no time developing the organization. Within a year, Phillis expanded the
organization from some 287 districts to some 480 members, a substantial
majority of the districts in the state. Phillis even ultimately persuaded the
fence-sitting statewide education organizations, such as the Ohio School
Boards Association and the Buckeye Association of School
Administrators, whose members likely disagreed with each other about
the utility of the Coalition's legal fight, to support the plaintiffs. This is
testament to Phillis's extensive professional network and his ample
persuasive powers. The Coalition's internal organization and
communication capacity were also enhanced. Legally organized as a
council of governments, the Coalition's policy decisions are made by a
very large steering committee, which has been chaired since the
inception of the Coalition by veteran educator and administrator, Larry
Miller. Phillis is quick to point out the hard work and dedication of this
voluntary committee.255  But Phillis nearly single-handedly has
orchestrated a communications and information campaign that is
unequaled in school finance reform efforts. Among the many public
relations and internal communication initiatives launched by his office
over the years are near daily e-mails to all of the membership regarding
educational issues and school finance updates, monthly, and at times,
weekly newsletters to administrators, teachers, and education officials
throughout the state, a large body of reports and publications regarding
the condition of schooling and proposals for reform in Ohio, and some
twenty-four high quality videotapes, documenting the conditions facing
Ohio's children. The collective impact of these efforts is not possible to
determine, but those who participated in the study believe that they had
the undeniable effect of keeping a diverse and potentially divergent
group of school districts focused on the Coalition's singular set of goals
through the victories, defeats, and lulls in the epic DeRolph litigation.
Phillis's vociferous rhetorical style and the circumstances under
which he left the ODE have left some with a more jaundiced view of the
man.257 Even Phillis would concede that he is a single-minded advocate
255. Interview with William Phillis, supra note 251.
256. See, e.g., Interview with Fred Blosser, Superintendent, Canton City School District, Canton,
Ohio (May 14, 2001); Interview with Nicholas Pittner, supra note 249.




who speaks his mind and sometimes ignores the fallout. Descriptions of
Phillis range from "complicated,"25 to "vitriolic," '259 to "heroic. '  For his
part, Phillis manages his public persona carefully, shifting credit for
victories to the Steering Committee and the Coalition rank-and-file and
serving as the target for opponents' barbs in the belief that their
vilification of him only makes the Coalition stronger at the grass roots. In
any event, under Phillis's leadership, the Coalition grew to a statewide
organization that included almost the entirety of the state education
community and provided the Coalition with the political clout and
financial resources to wage the legal fight in court and the political fight
in the media and communities.
2. The Courts Below'
a. Ohio's Education Czar in Perry County
The Proceedings. The DeRolph trial began in Judge Linton Lewis's
Perry County courtroom on October 25, 1993 and would last for 30262
days. The plaintiffs were represented by a Bricker & Eckler legal team
and, as is usual, the Ohio Attorney General's office was charged with
defending the State. 63 Recognizing the complexity of the case and the
need for seasoned civil trial attorneys, however, Democratic Attorney
General Lee Fisher appointed Joel Taylor of the Dinsmore & Shohl law
firm to represent the State at trial.'64 The parties presented sixty-one
witnesses (either through live testimony or deposition testimony) and
introduced over 45o exhibits 6 The witnesses themselves reflected the
many levels on which the school finance battle was being fought: the
political, technical, and emotional levels. To demonstrate their political
clout (and to stir up the emotional pot), the plaintiffs put on
Representative Michael Shoemaker as a friendly witness, while the
defendants countered with Senate President Stanley Aronoff and the
258. Interview with John Brandt, Executive Director, Ohio School Boards Association, in
Columbus, Ohio (May 7, 2001).
259. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 257.
260. Interview with Fred Blosser, supra note 256.
261. When William Phillis joined the coalition in April 1992, it was still not entirely clear that the
Coalition would ever get its day in court because the school finance lawsuit in the state was the
certified class action brought by the Cleveland School Board, Howard v. Walter. After much
procedural drama, including an effort by the Howard trial court judge to enjoin the DeRolph
proceedings, the DeRolph case went to trial, while the Howard case was ultimately dismissed.
Interview with Nicholas Pittner, Partner, supra note 249.
262. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph I); see also Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum at 2, DeRolph v. State, Case No. 22043 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Ohio 1994) [hereinafter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum].
263. See generally Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, supra note 262.
264. Id.
265. DeRolph, 677 N.E. 2d at 733.
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Governor's right-hand policy man, Office of Budget and Management
Director Gregory Browning.266  To demonstrate the technical
constitutionality of the school finance system, the State presented experts
from the ODE and the nationally recognized school finance expert
James Guthrie of Vanderbilt University, who testified that although the
system needed some fixing to make it more equitable, it was
fundamentally a sound method for financing schools.267 For their part, the
plaintiffs presented Kern Alexander and his equity study to go head-to-
head with Guthrie.
On the emotional front the plaintiffs seemed to enjoy the advantage.
Through superintendents, parents, students, and even state officials, the
plaintiffs presented evidence of decaying facilities, inadequate curricular
offerings, and understaffed classrooms.69 State School Board President
and former Senator, Oliver Ocasek, agreed that it was the State's
obligation to provide adequate resources that are equitably distributed
among the state's children and admitted that the State had failed to
adequately fund public education. 7 Perhaps the most memorable and
damaging testimony to the State came from Dr. Ted Sanders, who was a
defendant in his official capacity as the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction. 7' In an exhibit presented at trial, Superintendent Sanders
acknowledged that:
I do know that the state's system of school finance is not morally
right... the disparity between high-spending and low-spending
districts is too wide.., classrooms in some districts are not equipped
with appropriate instructional materials and equipment; many teachers
use their personal funds to purchase supplies for their classrooms; the
state still raises the majority of its resources for education through the
property tax; the system has not responded to the categorical problems
changing demographics of communities, families, and children; and
categorical problems limit local communities' and schools' flexibility to
address the underlying problems and needs of students."2
The Evidence. The factual record that would ultimately be reviewed
by the Ohio Supreme Court was voluminous. Thousands of pages of trial
transcript and thousands of pages of exhibits and deposition transcripts
were admitted into evidence. The evidence, loosely speaking, can be
categorized into three categories: (i) a description of the state's
266. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, supra note 262, at paras.
11.47- 3- 8.
267. Id. paras. 11.7, .i,.14, .i6, .17, .20, .35,.4, .44,.45, .51, .52, .56, .59, V.O.i-.i22.
268. Id. para. II.i.
269. Id. paras. VI, VIII, XIV, XVII.
270. Id. paras. 111.9, XVIII.i 7 .
271. Id. para. 11.42.
272. Id. at para. 111.13 (emphasis added).
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educational and educational financing systems and their structural flaws;
(2) the inequities among schools, school districts, and even states that are
created by the system; and (3) the inadequate educational facilities,
opportunities, and outcomes produced by the system.
Description of the Financing System and Its Structural Flaws. Ohio
operates a "foundation aid" school finance plan in which the State
ensures that a certain foundation level of educational dollars is available
at the local level, even if the local tax base cannot support that level.273 In
theory, if the state per-pupil basic aid amount is sufficiently high, an
adequate (albeit possibly inequitable) educational program could be
provided to each child. But several aspects of Ohio's system prevented
this result. During the trial, evidence of these systemic flaws was
presented through various means, but the in-court testimony of Bill
Phillis regarding his recommendations to the General Assembly during
his tenure in the ODE and the testimony of Ohio State University
Professor Dr. Howard Fleeter appear particularly persuasive to Judge
Lewis. At the behest of the Governor's office, Fleeter had conducted a
study of the state's educational finance system which was submitted as a
report to the Governor's Education Management Council in November
1992. This study confirmed many of the deficiencies about which Phillis
had been complaining for years. 74
273. Since the introduction of the first foundation plan in 1935, three basic elements have defined
Ohio's school funding system: (i) a heavy reliance on local property taxes as the source of revenues;
(2) a required local contribution to the formula, i.e., a specified number of mills that a local district is
expected to levy; and (3) a distribution mechanism based on the number of students either directly (as
in ADM) or indirectly through the teacher unit which is based on student counts. Interview with Dr.
Franklin Walter, supra note io8. State aid under r981 formula-which remained virtually untouched
through DeRolph-is parceled into two parts, "Basic Aid" and "Categorical Funding." Basic Aid,
which accounted for approximately 58 percent of the state's education funding in 1990, is calculated by
the following foundation formula. Id.
Basic Aid = (Foundation Level x Total ADM x Cost of Doing Business (CDB)) - 0.02 x
Total Assessed Valuation;
Where: CDB is a value ranging from i.ooo to 1.075 to adjust the foundation level to account
for differences in the cost of operating school districts among regions; and 0.02 is the local
millage levy of 20 mills required to participate in the foundation program, a.k.a., the
"charge off."
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum supra note 262, para. V.A-I; see also
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E. 2d 733,737 n.3 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph I).
In addition to the basic aid distribution, the state also provided "impact aid" for districts with
high concentrations of pupils in poverty and categorical aid for vocational education, special
education, gifted and talented education, and transportation, among other things.
274. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, supra note 262, paras. V., M.,
0. Those deficiencies can be summarized as follows:
(i) Because income and property wealth is not uniformly distributed across the state, districts
that enjoy higher tax bases are able to tax themselves at lower rates and raise more money than their
less affluent counterparts.
(2) The state's primary method for mitigating property tax inequity-the per-pupil foundation
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Plaintiffs also argued that because the Ohio Constitution requires
that the state provide a "thorough and efficient" education to its
children, the State must first determine the content of that thorough and
efficient (i.e. adequate) education and then provide the funding. " '
Pursuant to this thinking, the plaintiffs introduced convincing evidence
that not only had the State never undertaken a study of what is an
adequate educational program, it had relegated education to the status of
"budgetary residual. '276 That is, only after the legislature appropriated
funds for human services, including Medicaid and corrections, did
education get its slice of the pie.277 Thus, argued the plaintiffs, the State
could not logically claim that it was providing a thorough and efficient
education because it never determined what such an education should
look like.27 Instead it provided funds based only on what was left over.
The Inequities and Inadequacies Created by the System. The systemic
flaws and deficiencies discussed above created inequity and inadequacy
in the provision of educational resources, the plaintiffs argued at trial.
Though the breadth and depth of their evidence is far too great to
recount adequately here, a few examples will provide the reader with a
sense of the inequity and inadequacy. True to the formula of school
finance reform litigation, equity statistics were deployed from the
plaintiffs' arsenal. The plaintiffs' statistical case was spearheaded by
Kern Alexander. He testified, based on both Gini coefficient and
coefficient of variation measures, that there was less equity in the
aid-was only $2,710 in the 1991-1992 school year, an insufficiently low amount of money.
(3) The cost of doing business factor in the state aid formula does not reflect cost differentials
among districts.
(4) Categorical aids are not equalized.
(5) Tax rollback legislation places an artificial and stifling cap on local revenue growth by
lowering a district's effective mileage rate so as to leave property tax revenues unaffected by the
increase in value as a result of real property price inflation. Fleeter went so far as to testify that "[n]o
other state has a tax roll back or limitation measure which is this extreme in its effects." Id. at 91 V. M.
(6) Districts are shortchanged by "phantom revenue." That same legislation's tax reduction
factors take effect when property is reassessed and effectively ensures that a district receives no more
revenue than it would have received in the absence of inflation. However, the state's foundation
formula does recognize the new, reassessed valuation figure and will reduce state assistance in
response to the larger valuation per pupil. Districts are then assumed to have collected the larger
reassessed value, not the smaller rolled-back amount. From the districts' perspective this is phantom
revenue and results in the "double whammy" of losing the tax revenue increase due to inflation and
suffering the reduction of state assistance.
(7) As the state has assumed a greater regulatory role in local education, the number of state-
required activities without state funds has increased, i.e., "unfunded mandates" have increased.
275. Id. paras. IV.A.12, IV.D.8.c, XVI.
276. Id. para. V.M.3.e.




distribution of school funds in Ohio in 1991 than there was in 1981.279 As
is also the norm in school finance litigation, the plaintiffs made much ado
about the extreme cases: in 1991, Northern Local School District had an
average per-pupil expenditure of $3,453.13, while the wealthy
Beachwood district spent $6,078.36 on each of its children.2"' Based on
the coefficient of variation, which measures inequity across the entire
distribution of districts, Ohio ranked 48th out of the fifty states in
equality of inter-district school funding."5' Interestingly, however, Ohio's
average per-pupil expenditure in 1992 was only $270 below the national
average ($4,900 vs. $5,17o).B2 Plaintiffs also pointed out that taking into
account both the value of assessed property and the average adjusted
gross income of a school district's families as a combined measure of a
family's ability to pay taxes, the poorest two hundred school districts in
Ohio exerted a greater level of tax effort in 199o than the wealthiest two
hundred districts5 3 Stated differently, Ohio's system was far from fiscally
neutral based on either property tax wealth or family income.
Conversely, the defendants' Dr. Guthrie testified that it was
indisputable that equity had improved since the Walter case and that
there had been improvements in most equity measures from 1978-1979
to i99o-i99i." He generally avoided, however, assessing the magnitude
of the inequity that did exist. From an equal protection standpoint, the
parties' positions were staked out. The plaintiffs believed that the
disparities were so unconscionably great (and growing) that they violated
the constitution, while the defendants argued that equity had actually
been improving since Walter.
In addition to certain quantitative data introduced to demonstrate
the (in)adequacy of the foundation plan, the record in the case is replete
with heart-wrenching stories of children being denied adequate
educational services in some districts, while those in others receive
world-class resources.28s In addition to the inadequate educational
279. Id. para. V.O.ioo.
280. Id. para. V.J.24 .
281. Id. para. V.o.9.
282. Id. para. V.J.Io.
283. Id. para. V.I.7.a.
284. Id. para. V.O.io9.
285. Plaintiffs' witnesses testified at length about the inadequate educational inputs they were able
to provide to their students. Id. para. IX. And to cover the equal protection angle, plaintiffs, whenever
possible, made comparisons between the plaintiff districts and similarly sized wealthy districts. Id.
paras. XVII.C, .D, .E, .F. They even asked friendly superintendents from affluent school districts to
visit poor school districts and then testify about the inferior conditions under which children from poor
districts learned. Some of the evidence included:
(i) large class sizes and the Hobson's Choice many districts faced between reducing class
size and meeting the cost-reduction requirements of the emergency loan fund;
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resources in property poor school districts, plaintiffs and the court were
critical of the state for its failure to adopt, monitor, and enforce
minimum educational content and other input standards for education.'
86
Though overwhelming in itself, the evidence of inadequate
"operating" inputs and outcomes was not the centerpiece of the
plaintiffs' case. Rather, visceral reactions resulted from the plaintiffs'
portrayal of the decaying school facilities that many Ohio children had to
attend every day, including classrooms in former closets and coal bins
and inadequate or unavailable bathroom facilities.7
All told, the plaintiffs provided Judge Lewis with a factual record
that would permit him to find an appalling level of inadequacy and
inequity. Depending upon the length of the legal yardstick held up to
these levels of inadequacy and inequity, constitutionally inadequate and
inequitable resources may have been provided by the State of Ohio.
b. The Trial Court's Decision
On July I, 1994, Judge Lewis issued his ruling."" Just a few months
before the ruling, Governor Voinovich was doing pre-emptive damage
control and was quoted as saying that the State would likely lose the case
at trial because Linton Lewis's electoral fortunes were aligned with the
plaintiffs' case.28 Whether Voinovich's reasoning was right is debatable,
but his prediction of the outcome was on the mark. "[I]t is incumbent
(2) as evidenced by Alexander and Salmon's curriculum study and other testimony and
exhibits presented at trial, poor school districts do not offer the same curricular diversity,
including far fewer advanced placement courses, foreign language offerings, science
offerings and the like;
(3) a lack of qualified guidance counselors;
(4) fewer academic, athletic, and social extracurricular opportunities;
(5) outdated and insufficient numbers of textbooks and other instructional materials and
equipment, particularly laboratory equipment and other materials that should be used in
connection with the state's developing content standards;
(6) a lack of garden variety office supplies and equipment; as the court noted, "Teachers in
Southern Local School District are issued I box of paper to last the entire school year";
while "Paper is rationed, paper clips are rationed, telephone time is rationed, time on the
copier is rationed[;] [a]rt supplies, the amount of books purchased for libraries, chalk, and
even toilet paper and paper towels are rationed";
(7) limited access to technology-at Dawson-Bryant Local School District, there were only
eight computers for all 7th and 8th graders, while Beachwood provided an extensive
computer lab which enables access to students in Germany and Finland (this in 1992).
Id. paras. IX.H.5 5 , .56.
286. Id. para IX. Recall the findings in Walter that the state had a set of standards that defined
what is a "thorough and efficient" education and that the state actively enforced those standards. See
Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813,822-23 (Ohio 1979).
287. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, supra note 262, para. VIII.
288. See id.
289. Jim Woods, Group Wants Eye Kept on Legislators, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Apr. 6, 1994, at IE.
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upon the government to provide our youth with the tools for education
to provide bridges to opportunity over the dangerous and troubled
waters of ignorance,"" Lewis wrote in his opinion and order covering
more than 400 pages. Lewis went on to hold that education is a
fundamental right in Ohio, that the state's funding system violated the
equal protection and benefits provision of the constitution, and that the
State had failed to provide its children a thorough and efficient
education."9 '
Education as a Fundamental Right, Equal Protection, and the
Treatment of Board of Education v. Walter. Predictably, the State made
the two-pronged argument that the Walter case already determined that
the Ohio school funding system was constitutional and plaintiffs' issues
were therefore barred by the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis.292
Judge Lewis limited Walter to its facts. 93 The funding system in Walter
was an equal yield plan that differed radically from that before his court;
the state standards in effect at the time of Walter were repealed and
replaced with an ineffective and unenforced set of standards in 1983; the
plaintiffs are different, indeed some DeRolph plaintiffs were not alive at
the time of Walter, and the school buildings that received no attention in
Walter were now almost twenty years older.
Moreover, Lewis reasoned, the Walter Court refused to apply strict
scrutiny to the facts of that case because the case was "'more directly
concerned with the way in which Ohio has decided to collect and spend
state and local taxes than it is a challenge to the way in which Ohio
educates its children."'294 Because the evidence in this case focused on
widespread disparities in the educational opportunities provided to
children in Ohio and outcomes among children in Ohio, this case clearly
was about education, not taxation and spending. Because of the
centrality of education to living in modern Ohio and because it is
provided for specifically in the Ohio Constitution, education is a
fundamental right and any infringement of that right should be subjected
to strict scrutiny under the state's equal protection and benefits
provision."9 Consistent with the script in these cases, the State argued
that "local control" provided the compelling state interest for the
property-tax-based system of school funding and equally consistent with
the script, Lewis rejected that argument as a "cruel illusion" for poor








school districts and held that the state's system of funding its schools
failed to provide equal protection to its students.2'
A Thorough and Efficient Education. Seeking to define what is a
thorough and efficient education, Lewis cited Ohio's constitutional
convention, the expert testimony of Kern Alexander, and the admonition
of Miller v. Korns that a thorough system of education could not be one
in which school districts were starved for funds. According to Judge
Lewis, an efficient system could not be one in which districts lacked
teachers, buildings, or equipment.2" Putting the definitional issue aside,
however, Lewis turned to the facts and basically said that, whatever the
measure of adequacy, the evidence in this case demonstrates that Ohio is
not providing it.
The Remedy. Not surprisingly, the Perry County trial court judge did
not issue any specific remedial order to the defendants nor did he even
retain jurisdiction over the case until the defendants implemented a
funding system that addressed the constitutional violations detailed in his
order. Rather, he directed Ted Sanders, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, to prepare a report setting forth proposals to the legislature
for the elimination of wealth based disparities, knowing well that the case
would be taken up on appeal."l
c. The Intermediate Court of Appeals
Shortly after Lewis's July i decision, Governor Voinovich harshly
criticized the plaintiff schools for suing the State instead of "doing more
with less."2" He believed the system was thorough and efficient and
pointed his finger at the districts. "It's time for results," he was quoted as
saying, "[i]t's time to get something for our money."3" Voinovich asked




299. Vindu P. Goel, Voinovich Assails Schools Over Lawsuit, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 5,
1994, at 5B.
300. Id.
301. But not all the defendants agreed with Voinovich's position. In a 6-5 vote on July 12, 1994,
the State Board of Education, led by its insurgent president and former Senator, Oliver Ocasek,
adopted a resolution to not appeal the trial court's decision. See Jonathan Riskind, State to Appeal
School Funding Ruling, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 1994, at iC. That decision was the culmination
of a bloody internecine battle within the SBE and a long-standing power struggle between the SBE
and Voinovich. Exactly one month later, Governor Voinovich announced that the state defendants
had filed a Notice of Appeal and that the State Board of Education was included among the
appellants. Id. Ocasek threatened that "there are going to be great repercussions from this." Id.
Voinovich announced the appeal at the Riffe Center in Columbus with all of his troops behind him,
including Senate President Stanley Aronoff, House Speaker Vernal Riffe, Jr., Senate Education
Committee Chair H. Cooper Snyder, and House Education Committee Chair Ronald V. Gerberry.
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A three-judge Fifth Circuit Court of Ohio heard the appeal.02 It
seems safe to say that the appellate court knew that it was a mere
wayside on the way to the Supreme Court and treated the case that way.
Indeed, participants in the study noted that the appellate court judges did
not even review the full trial record as some five hundred trial exhibits
and all of the deposition transcripts had not been delivered to their
chambers prior to their decision on August 30, 1995 .3' 3 The substance of
the 2-1 majority ruling can be summed up in two of their sentences: "We
find that the facts found by the trial court, excluding conclusions included
as findings of fact by the court, do not rise to the level of overcoming the
ruling in the Walter case. If the funding mechanism provided under the
statutes are unconstitutional, then the Supreme Court of this State must
tell us so-not the trial court nor this court.""'
3. The Context for the Supreme Court's Decision
a. Institutional Conflict: The Political Branches
The Legislature. Capturing the collective sentiment of the 132-
member Ohio General Assembly is ultimately an impossible task.
Notwithstanding the difficulty, the interviews, documents, and press
accounts collected in this study demonstrate rather clearly that, at least
publicly, the legislative leadership bitterly opposed the plaintiffs' cause.3"
That said, not all legislators defended the status quo. Indeed, a significant
bloc of mostly Democratic lawmakers filed an amicus brief asking the
court to strike down the school finance system and give the General
Assembly a chance to craft a more fair and equitable funding scheme."°6
The message was clear: the leadership of the executive and legislative branches would not relinquish
control of the school system to the courts.
302. DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 5995 Ohio App.LEXIS 3915 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995).
303. Interview with Nicholas Pittner, supra note 249.
304. DeRolph v. State, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3915, at *8.
305. See, e.g., Jim Woods, School Finance System 'Illegal' Judge Rules Funding Violates
Constitution, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 2, 1994, at IA ("Gov. George V. Voinovich, Senate President
Stanley J. Aronoff and House Speaker Vernal G. Riffe Jr. all called for an appeal of [the trial court's
decision to strike down the state's funding scheme]."). The legislative leadership, which was divided at
the time of the trial court decision, was entirely Republican by the time of the supreme court decision.
3o6. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 735-36 (1997) (DeRolph 1) (discussing the various amicus
briefs filed in the DeRolph litigation). At the time CORAS began to actively pursue school finance
reform and potential litigation, Ohio government was divided. Prior to the 199os, Democrats
controlled the House of Representatives (Speaker Vernal Riffe, Jr.) and the Governor's office (Gov.
Richard Celeste), while Republicans had held the Senate since 1984. The 199o elections carried in a
powerful new force in Ohio politics, Governor George Voinovich. Then, with a deepening recession,
the strong Voinovich leadership, and anti-tax fervor in the state, Ohio joined the rest of the nation in
the "Republican Revolution" of 1994, as voters maintained the Senate (2o-13) and Governor's office
in the hands of Republicans and also handed the House (56-43) and Attorney General's office to the
Republicans. Conservative JoAnne Davidson was chosen Speaker of the House. This united political
party configuration has remained basically intact through this writing with only a change in faces, not
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Even before the DeRolph decision, tension existed between the
Moyer Court and the legislature due to the court's activist tort reform
and workers' compensation decisions." Arguably, this type of inter-
institutional strain should have no effect on an independent court. In
Ohio, however, the courts are not highly independent because the top
jurists are chosen in partisan primaries and rely on other political leaders
for fundraising support."° Moreover, the court's institutional integrity
had, during this time period, been repeatedly threatened by the
legislature, as some in the legislature had gone so far as to suggest that
they might not provide funding for the court to move into new facilities
that had been planned for it.3"
Beyond such brazen threats of reprisal, perhaps the most direct and
accepted manner by which an outside party, such as the state legislative
leadership, might seek to affect the decision-making of a judicial tribunal
is through the submission of amicus briefs. Twelve amicus briefs on
behalf of sixteen organizations were filed in support of the plaintiffs,
while three were filed on behalf of the State." ° Among the three was a
brief filed by Speaker Davidson and President Aronoff which laid out
the basic separation of powers argument and urged the court to stay its
hand."' In sharp contrast, thirty-seven of the 132 Ohio legislators, nearly
all Democrats, signed on to an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs."2 In
sum, the legislature delivered mixed signals to the court. The legislative
leadership vocally opposed the plaintiffs and insisted that school finance
was a matter for the legislative institution. By their silence, one might
assume that the majority of legislators supported the leadership. And a
sizable minority invited the court to intervene. From the court's
perspective, it seemed to boil down to whether it was willing to take on
the powerful Republican leadership, while providing political cover to a
substantial minority who wanted change.
The Governor. Ohio's popular Republican Governor, George
Voinovich, publicly and vocally opposed the plaintiffs' lawsuit and any
court intervention in educational finance policy.3"3 Voinovich, who was
parties. In 1998, Voinovich was elected to Senator John Glenn's U.S. Senate seat and was replaced in
the Governor's office by Bob Taft of Ohio's political "first family."
307. See supra Part.II.B.2.
308. Lopeman, supra note 75, at 62; Interview with Anonymous, supra note 257.
309. Interview with Anonymous, supra note 257.
31o. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 735-36 (DeRolph 1).
311. Id. at736.
312. Id. at 735-36. Also joining the brief were U.S. Congressmen Louis Stokes, Robert Ney, and
Frank Cremeans.
313. See, e.g.,Tim Miller, Voinovich Defends School Funding, Dayton Daily News, June 21, 1994,
at 3B; Alan Johnson, Voinovich Shaping School-Suit Appeal, Columbus Dispatch, June 21, 1994, at
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first elected to the office in 1990 on a platform that promised tax cuts and
a stump persona as the "Education Governor," held a keen interest in
education reform, but not the type of reform that the DeRolph plaintiffs
sought.3"4 Rather, Voinovich, like many of his Republican gubernatorial
counterparts, was interested in harnessing the market to reform
education. Voinovich's office was instrumental in pushing through
Ohio's first charter school law and he personally led the charge to
provide public vouchers to poor Cleveland students to spend on private
education, sectarian or not.3"5 Propping up what he viewed as the
terminally ill education bureaucracy appeared not to be on the
Governor's agenda. Nor was the Governor interested in working with
the education establishment to bring about his reforms. Indeed, as
discussed further below, Voinovich sought to consolidate education
policy-making in his office by maneuvering to gain control of the elected
State Board of Education, influencing the selection of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and tightening the day-to-day
relationship with the Ohio Department of Education.' 6
Following the trial court decision in Perry County, Voinovich gave
no public indication that he would comply with Lewis's order. On the
contrary, he publicly suggested that Lewis had overstepped his bounds
and appealed the decision against the wishes of the named defendant
SBE."7 Like the legislative leadership, Voinovich directly lobbied the
Ohio Supreme Court by filing an amicus brief.' 8 The brief was submitted
by the Columbus law firm of Chester, Willcox & Saxbe and authored in
part by the firm's Donald Brey, who served as campaign counsel for
Governor Voinovich. Brey's brief raised the formal separation of powers
argument and implicitly reminded the court of its institutional limitations
in the arena of school finance reform.3 9
Almost needless to say, Voinovich's reaction to the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision was strong. He was quoted as saying that the decision
iC; Mary Beth Lane, School Funding Unfair, But Legal, Governor Says, Plain Dealer, June 21, 1994,
at3B.
314. See Mark Tatge & Mary Beth Lane, supra note 252, at iB.
315. See Doug Oplinger & Dennis Willard, Voucher System Falls Far Short of Goals, Akron
Beacon Journal, Dec. 14, 1999, at iB.
316. See supra notes 252-254.
317. See John Chalfant, State Board of Education Protests Part in Aid Appeal, Plain Dealer, Aug.
22, 1994, at 5B; Mary Beth Lane, Ohio Kids "Deserve Better" Judge Says,Plain Dealer, July 2, 1994, at
IA; Tim Miller, Court Voids System; Ohio School Funding Unconstitutional, Dayton Daily News, July
2. 1994, at IA.
318. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Governor George Voinovich, DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d
733 (Ohio 1997) (No. 95-2066).
319. Id. at i.
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"represents judicial activism at its extreme;""32 he characterized the
decision as vague and as a veiled call for a massive, multi-billion dollar
tax increase; and he further stated that it would require the State to
supplant the authority of local school boards.32 ' Both the General
Assembly leadership and Governor Voinovich made clear their
opposition to the plaintiffs' case both before and after the high court's
decision.322 This would not be an instance in which the court would
merely be validating the wishes of the state's political elite or even
providing them cover to reform school finance. This would be a case of
institutional conflict.
The Attorney General The Ohio Attorney General's charge in cases
involving a challenge to state policy or legislation is simply to defend the
state. At the time of the filing of the lawsuit, the elected Attorney
General was Democrat Lee Fisher.3 3 Fisher dutifully played his
institutional role, whether or not he believed in the State's position. He
would run for Governor in 1998 against Bob Taft, and he was reportedly
"pleased" with the decision, which was handed down long after he left
office.324
After the I994 trial court decision in the matter, Fisher lost the
Attorney General's post to Republican Betty Montgomery.325
Montgomery's public position on the case was one of solid support
behind the Governor and legislative leadership.36 Because the case had
entered the largely paper-and-oral-argument phase of appellate
proceedings, Montgomery handed DeRolph to her newly appointed
Solicitor General, Jeff Sutton. Though a relatively junior attorney,
Sutton possessed sterling legal and conservative credentials having
clerked for Justices Lewis Powell and Antonin Scalia on the U.S.
Supreme Court.3 7 Sutton's brief for the State was artfully written, though
predictable.
320. Michael Hawthorne, Paying for Ohio Schools: Judge's School Power Challenged, THE
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 30, 1997, at Ai; Mark Skertic et al., Paying for Ohio Schools: Court
Orders Fairer School Funding, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 25, 1997, at AI.
321. Hawthorne, supra note 320, at Ai; Skertic et al., supra note 320, at Ai.
322. See Woods, supra note 305, at IA.
323. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, supra note 262.
324. Sandy Theis, Paying for Ohio Schools: Judge's School Power Challenged, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Apr. 3, 1997, at AI.
325. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio 1997).
326. See Mary Beth Lane & T.C. Brown, Court Hears Pros, Cons of School Financing, Plain
Dealer, Sept. I I, 1996, at IA. Attorney General Montgomery was so interested in the DeRolph matter
that she made a rare appearance in the gallery of the Ohio Supreme Court to support her Soclicitor
General during oral argument.
327. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Sutton, Solicitor General, Ohio Attorney General (July 26,
2001); Jeffrey S. Sutton, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, FREE CONGRESs FOUNDATION, May
May 2004]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The State first argued that the legislature had acted within its
discretion, and in deference to the tradition of local control over
education, in crafting a "two-tiered" funding system that relied on both
state and local funds.32 The State argued that even if the court had the
power to declare statutes unconstitutional, it did not have the power to
direct the legislature to enact specific legislation.329 Second, the Walter
case had already blessed the two-tiered system.33 Third, the facts
demonstrated that the system was in fact more equitable than at the time
Walter was decided.33 ' Fourth, education could not be a fundamental
interest because it was not in the Ohio Constitution's Bill of Rights.332
Finally, the State argued that the "thorough and efficient" clause did not
require that all districts receive the same amount of money per pupil and
that each of the plaintiff districts had met or exceeded the state's
minimum standards for what is a "thorough and efficient" education.333
State Board of Education. Although a constitutionally independent
policy-making body in Ohio,334 the SBE has, in recent years, struggled to
maintain its independence and has watched its authority over Ohio
school policy be ceded to the Governor's office. Put more bluntly,
through formal legislative restructuring of the SBE member selection
28, 2001, at http://www.judicialselection.org/nominees/sutton.htm. After the DeRolph case, Sutton
would build a reputation for staunchly defending states' rights and limiting the reach of federal
legislation, including legislation that protects the rights of persons with disabilities. Id. Apparently in
line with the thinking of Republican leaders, Sutton was picked by President George W. Bush to fill a
vacancy on the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
328. Appellees' Memorandum In Opposition to Jurisdiction at 3, DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d
733 (Ohio 1997) (No. 95-2066).
329. Id. at ii.
330. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 4.
332. Somewhat ironically, Sutton cited the case of Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio
1993), in support of this proposition, even though that case also recognized the "noticeable trend"
toward the new judicial federalism and the use of state constitutions to expand the civil rights-civil
liberties protections offered by the U.S. Constitution. In that case, in a remarkably "activist" fashion,
Justice Douglas wrote for the Ohio Supreme Court:
In joining the growing trend in other states, we believe that the Ohio Constitution is a
document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the
United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which
state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection
as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of
Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to
individuals and groups.
Id. at 169.
333. Appelles' Memorandum In Opposition to Jurisdiction at 7, DeRolph (No. 95-2066).
334. Article VI, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution provides:
There shall be a state board of education which shall be selected in such manner and for
such terms as shall be provided by law. There shall be a superintendent of public
instruction, who shall be appointed by the state board of education. The respective powers
and duties of the board and of the superintendent shall be Prescribed by law.
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process-which placed a significant minority of the Board's
appointments in the Governor's hands -and informal influence over its
members, Governor Voinovich had, in large part, succeeded in bringing
the once independent-minded SBE under his sway.
The Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Ohio Department of
Education. Ted Sanders, who, as noted above, had served in the Bush
Administration, was selected over Bill Phillis to replace the venerable
Franklin Walter as the Superintendent.335 The traditional hands-off
approach had been abandoned by the Governor's office during the
process of hiring Sanders, as Voinovich played an active role in the
interviews. By the time of the DeRolph trial, a much closer working
relationship had developed between the governor's office, particularly
the Office of Budget and Management, and the ODE. There was even a
staff person at the Department who was a regular liaison to the governor,
a position that did not exist prior to Sanders's tenure. Sanders also said
that he had an unusually close working relationship with the Governor
who gave him an hour of undivided attention every week to discuss
education issues. No doubt Sanders and Voinovich respected each
others' judgment, but they did not see everything eye-to-eye.
Sanders's testimony at trial reflects the difficult position in which he
was placed. He had taken an oath to uphold state law, but at the same
time, as an educator and education policy-maker, he believed the
conditions of Ohio education were abysmal . 6 On the one hand,
Sanders's testimony that the Ohio school funding system is "immoral" is
the most oft-quoted and potentially influential piece of evidence
favorable to plaintiffs in the entire case.337 On the other, Sanders never
publicly expressed the opinion that the system was unconstitutional. An
overly legalistic and meaningless distinction? Probably. Yet Sanders was
able to send the message to the courts and public about how he really
felt, but at the same time maintain his institutional role. ,8
335. Telephone Interview with Ted Sanders, former Superintendent of Public Instruction, Ohio
(Aug. 3, 2001).
336. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, supra note 262, paras.
III.12-.21.
337. Id. para. 111.12.
338. Before he left the Superintendent of Public Instruction post, Sanders did try to reach a
consensual policy solution to the school finance problem. Seizing upon Lewis's order to prepare a
report for the legislature with options to remedy the constitutional wrong, Sanders gathered together
two panels to generate recommendations, a nine-member panel of experts and a 46-member panel of
advisors to critique the proposals before they were presented to the SBE. Significantly, Sanders
selected to head the expert panel the state's Jim Guthrie, the Coalition's Kern Alexander, and the
Alliance for Educational Adequacy's (a coalition of property wealthy districts discussed below) John
Augenblick. Ohio tax policy analysts William Driscoll and Richard Levin also joined the expert panel.
Although the panel would release a collective report detailing policy options for the SBE and the
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b. The Interest Groups
Coalition for Adequacy and Equity in School Funding. By the time that
the DeRolph case was reviewed by the Ohio Supreme Court, the
Coalition had grown to include over 500 of the 612 regular school
districts in Ohio, as well as the powerful teachers' union, the Ohio
Education Association.339 Perhaps more significant is the fact that the
Coalition represented the full spectrum of rural, urban, majority minority
districts, and majority white districts. This immodest feat was
accomplished in part through Bill Phillis's leadership and the ability of
the Coalition to promise something to everyone with its dual calls for
adequacy and equity. There was much symbolic value in naming the
organization the Coalition for Adequacy and Equity in School Funding.
As Dick Fisher put it, "it was probably political that we plugged that
word [adequacy] in because we were not going to get the support across
General Assembly in July 1995, an underlying rift in allegiance, which manifested itself in a
methodological rift, split the panel from the outset. Alexander, long an advocate for plaintiffs and
having achieved success in Kentucky, wanted to ensure a high level of adequacy for Ohio students and
believed that only a "market basket" approach to constructing a funding system would produce such
an adequate outcome. In essence, the market basket model would identify the types of student
outcomes desired and, working backward from those outcomes, develop the basket of goods necessary
for all children to achieve those outcomes. These goods included facilities, administrative structures,
teachers, instructional materials and so forth. Naturally, the basket would recognize cost differentials
in different labor markets. The difficulty for Alexander, however, was that no one at the time had
developed such a basket for Ohio from which he could draw his recommendations. (Interestingly, the
consulting group Management, Analysis & Planning, Associates, L.L.C. (MAP) of which Guthrie was
a member, later crafted a market-basket funding scheme for the Wyoming public schools). On the
other side of the methodological question was Augenblick and his "inferential" model that looked to
those school districts that were achieving the state standards and used statistical techniques to infer
what an adequate amount of funding would be based on those districts' expenditures. In addition to
the myriad of technical critiques of Augenblick's model (Should any districts-e.g., the highest or
lowest spending-be excluded from the model? Should demographic factors be considered? Are the
state standards even meaningful measures of adequacy?), critics pointed out that the model necessarily
provides inadequate results and is outdated because it is based on data from a system already
adjudicated inadequate. Fortunately for Augenblick, however, he was the only analyst who had
actually performed an analysis of what an adequate education would "cost." In the end, the expert
panel's report presented several compromise options and largely went ignored in the General
Assembly. Sanders believed that the General Assembly had missed an opportunity to settle the
litigation or perhaps influence the high court's decision.
For a discussion of the difficulty in determining what is an "adequate" education generally, see
William S. Koski & Henry M. Levin, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: What Have We Learned? 02
TCHRS. C. REC. 480 (2000). For an analysis of the different approaches to designing a school finance
system that will ensure educational adequacy, see James Guthrie & Richard Rothstein, Enabling
"Adequacy" to Achieve Reality: Translating Adequacy into State School Finance Distribution
Arrangements, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 209 (Helen
F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk and Janet Hansen, eds., 1999).
339. Interview with William Phillis, supra note 229; Lynn Hulsey & Tim Miller, School Funding:
Court Hears Arguments, Dayton Daily News, Sept. I I, 1996, at IA ("The coalition, representing 553
school districts, maintains the current system is unfair ....").
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the state from school districts if we stayed strictly equity.""34 What the
adequacy vs. equity debate means for those crafting a school finance
system or for those legal scholars looking for a hook in the Ohio
Constitution was almost irrelevant to the coalition. "Adequacy and
Equity" was a political slogan that could draw in all of those districts that
felt aggrieved.34'
The Teachers Unions. Both the National Education Association-
affiliated Ohio Education Association and the American Federation of
Teachers-affiliated Ohio Federation of Teachers were members of the
Coalition.342 As noted, however, OEA support was critical from both a
political and financial perspective. OEA contributed some early seed
money to launch the litigation and has had a chair on the steering
committee throughout most of the Coalition's existence. OEA support,
however, is not without its baggage. Outside of the Coalition, the
powerful teachers union has often served as a punching bag for
Republican legislators complaining about wasteful spending in schools.343
The "Education Organizations." Columbus, like many state capitals,
has its share of education organizations that represent specific
professional groups in the public school system. Among them are the
Ohio School Boards Association, the Buckeye Association of School
Administrators, the Ohio Association of School Business Officials, the
Ohio Association of Elementary School Administrators, and the Ohio
Association of Secondary School Administrators. Significantly, all of
these organizations filed amici on behalf of the plaintiffs, even though
each has a membership that includes both poor and affluent school
districts, the latter of which might stand to lose from an equity-grounded
supreme court order and a resulting "leveling down" of school funding.3"
With "adequacy" as the common rallying cry, however, nearly the
entirety of the education establishment in the state publicly lined up
behind the DeRolph plaintiffs. The only potential dissenters were those
who stood to lose from a decision shifting funds from affluent to poor or
one educational program to another.
340. Interview with Richard Fisher, supra note 229.
341. In addition, the Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE)/AFSCME Local 4,
the Ohio AFL-CIO, and the Ohio Professional Staff Union all filed amici on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Put simply, the weight of labor in Ohio was solidly behind the plaintiffs.
342. Interview with Russell Harris, supra note io8.
343. Id.
344. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E. 2d 733, 735-36 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph 1); Interview with John
Brandt, Executive Director, Ohio School Boards Association, in Columbus, Ohio (May 7, 200);




Ohio's Wealthy Districts: The Alliance for Adequate School Funding.
Formed in direct response to the school finance lawsuits filed by
Cleveland and the Coalition, the Alliance for Adequate School Funding
(the Alliance), made up of approximately sixty of the state's wealthiest
school districts, has played a critical role in the school finance debate.345
In short, it has forged a third legal-policy route for the court to take. Self-
interested from the inception, the Alliance is guided by the following
resolutions: (I) The concept of the equal yield system of school funding
in Ohio is constitutional; but it has never been, and is not now,
adequately funded; (2) adequacy in funding should be achieved by
appropriate state funding of the equal yield formula; and (3) school
districts should retain the right to tax themselves to provide additional
funding.34 Translated into the language of the DeRolph litigation, these
principles put the Alliance in disagreement with both Judge Lewis's
ruling and the Fifth Appellate Circuit's review, as the Alliance argued in
an amicus brief to the Ohio Supreme Court that: (i) the Ohio
Constitution guarantees to each student an adequate education, but does
not protect education as a fundamental right; (2) the educational funding
system in Ohio is constitutional in design, but it is unconstitutionally
underfunded; and (3) the principle of local control militates against a
constitutional requirement of "lockstep equity in per pupil expenditures"
and in favor of permitting local districts to augment or supplement the
state funds that provide an adequate education.347 The Alliance, which
was made up of mostly wealthy metropolitan suburban districts, had thus
forged a position that would put them between the litigating parties.34
345. Interview with James Betts, Lobbyist/Attorney, The Alliance for Adequacy in School
Funding, in Columbus, Ohio (May I1, 200 ).
346. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Alliance for Adequate School Funding, in Support of Appellees,
DeRolph v.State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (No. 95-2o66).
347. Id. at 2-3, 8, 12, 24.
348. The Alliance has been directly and indirectly involved with the DeRolph litigation since its
filing. Though preferring to pursue school finance reform in the arena more hospitable to its
interests-the General Assembly-the Alliance has produced a steady stream of policy research,
policy briefs, and amicus briefs that have been used in the litigation. Interview with James Betts, supra
note 345. Recognizing the importance of influencing any ultimate remedy in the DeRolph litigation,
the Alliance retained John Augenblick to do a cost-based study of what constitutes an adequate
education for Ohio's children. As could be expected, Augenblick's study did not challenge the basic
system of school funding, but rather argued that the foundation level per pupil needed to be boosted
Although the Alliance agreed with the Coalition on the adequacy issue, the Alliance's amicus brief in
the supreme court largely argued against the plaintiffs' position on the fundamental right issue and the
requirement of equity, and was thus formally presented in support of the state-appellees. Brief of
Amicus Curiae, The Alliance for Adequate School Funding, in Support of Appellee, DeRolph (No.
95-2066). After the first DeRolph decision, the Alliance formally filed briefs in support of the plaintiffs
in further proceedings, particularly in support of plaintiffs' challenges to the phantom revenue
provisions and the state's underfunding of special education.
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4. DeRolph I: A Complete Systemic Overhaul of the Finance
System
On March 24, 1997, the Moyer Court announced its decision in the
DeRolph litigation." The working majority joined an opinion written by
Justice Sweeney that declared the funding system unconstitutional under
the "thorough and efficient" clause, while Republican Douglas drafted a
sweeping concurring opinion joined by Resnick that would have, first,
declared education a fundamental right and, second, would have found
the system unconstitutional under both the education article and the
equal protection and benefits clause. Again left in the minority, Chief
Justice Moyer authored a dissent that was joined by Justices Cook and
Stratton. Others have analyzed the legal reasoning of the DeRolph
decision.35 This study critically reviews the four opinions for clues as to
the extra-legal factors that influenced the justices.
a. The Majority Opinion
After summarily announcing that Ohio's educational finance system
violated the state's thorough and efficient clause, Justice Sweeney
quickly disposed of the question of whether the high court had
jurisdiction to hear the DeRolph case. Citing Marbury v. Madison and
Ohio precedent (but, curiously, ignoring the language of Walter on this
point), Sweeney ruled that "we are clearly within our constitutional
authority in reviewing this matter and in declaring Ohio's school
financing system unconstitutional."35' Thus, despite the institutional
resistance that the court might face, Sweeney rejected an expedient
doctrinal method to avoid an institutional struggle. Of course, this
holding on the separation of powers and political question issues was
Though happy to have their episodic support on some issues, members of the Coalition approach the
Alliance with necessary suspicion due to the Alliance's differing interests and its original opposition to
the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. And despite the Alliance's carefully tempered public persona and
desire to avoid being cast as the opponent of the educational finance equity movement, the fact
remains that the group organized to protect the wealthy districts' interests contemporaneously with
and in response to the Cleveland and Perry County school finance lawsuits. But the Alliance's
existence has provided the supreme court with a third route-a route that allowed the court to
recognize Walter's arguable holding that education is not a fundamental right and avoid the wrath of
the politically active suburban constituency, while at the same time finding that the state had not
fulfilled its obligation.
349. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 733.
350. See generally Ronald M. McMillan, Please Senator, I Want Some More: The General Assembly
Gets an "F" From the DeRolph Court, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 773 (1997); Cindy M. O'Neil, Ohio's
School Funding Dilemma: A Review of DeRolph v. State, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 891 (1999); Joseph P.
Rodgers & John F. Rodgers, Centralized Wisdom? DeRolph v. State and the Rise of Judicial
Paternalism, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 753 (1997); Janis J. Winterhof, From Rationing Toilet Paper to
Computer Hook-Ups with Moscow: Wealth-Based Disparities in Pubic School Funding Are Held
Unconstitutional in DeRolph v. Ohio, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1251 (1999).
351. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 737.
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exactly the same as that of the Walter Court, which was able to
strategically preserve its constitutional supremacy on the issue, while at
the same time ducking the institutional battle by declaring the school
funding scheme constitutional.3 52 This time, however, the Court would
not avoid the battle.
Sweeney then turned to a factual criticism of the state's finance
policy.353 In a few pages, he summarized the hundreds of pages of factual
findings in the trial court and the thousands of pages of record in the
case. First, citing Howard Fleeter's work, Sweeney criticized the
legislature for failing to establish any standards as to what is a "thorough
and efficient" public education and, instead, treating education funding
as a "budgetary residual." '354 Second, Sweeney recited the litany of
technical flaws in the system, which could have come from the pen of Bill
Phillis himself.355 He noted that the categorical funds were not equalized,
that wealthy districts benefited from the guarantee aspect of the
foundation formula, that the tax reduction factors and the so-called
"phantom revenue" resulted in an unfair "double whammy" to school
districts, and that schools are forced to borrow money to cover operating
expenses. Third and finally, Sweeney criticized the State for failing to
fund adequately capital improvements.
All of this, Sweeney wrote, violates the state's thorough and efficient
clause.357 (Having found the system unconstitutional under that provision,
the working majority felt it unnecessary to address the plaintiffs' request
that education be deemed a fundamental right and their related equal
protection claim). But nowhere does the court articulate and apply a
clear standard for what is a thorough and efficient public education.
Indeed, Sweeney's analysis of the constitutional history of the clause,
prior case precedent in Ohio, and interpretations of other high courts
and experts was superficial, at best. Although he cites Kern Alexander's
testimony that a thorough and efficient system would allow its citizens to
fully develop their human potential, he does not explicitly adopt that
test.358 In addition, he cites the negative language from Miller v. Korns
which holds that a thorough system does not starve its school districts for
funds and an efficient system is not one in which districts lack teachers,
buildings, or equipment.359 He also notes that Walter would not allow the
352. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
353. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 737.
354. Id. at 738.
355. Id. at 738-40.
356. Id. at 740.
357. Id. at 740-46.




State to deprive students of educational opportunity.' 6° But the working
majority applies no explicit standard to the current system, beyond the
vague and minimal language from Miller and Walter. Instead, Sweeney
pointed to a number of deficiencies with the current system and
essentially proclaimed that, whatever a thorough and efficient system is,
this is not it.36' In other words, many Ohio schools were "starved for
funds, lacked teachers, buildings, and equipment, and had inferior




The opinion makes clear that no system could achieve absolute
equality of opportunity and that no system should impose spending
ceilings on wealthy school districts.,6 3 Because of this language and the
refusal to declare education a fundamental right, the Alliance's position
appeared nearly completely vindicated, as their amicus specifically
argued that adequacy, not equality, was the touchstone of a
constitutional system and that no district should lose the autonomy to
spend what it wished on education. Even though the Alliance would have
preferred to maintain the current system with a higher base spending
360. Id.
361. Id. at 746-47.
362. Id. at 742. Scattered throughout the somewhat disjointed opinion are hints as to what might
constitute a constitutional education. Rather than being "thorough and efficient," Sweeney noted,
"the system has failed to educate our youth to their fullest potential." Id. at 745. But it is not clear that
this would be the majority's test for constitutionality. In containing Walter to its narrow facts (just as
the plaintiffs argued), Sweeney also noted that the current funding system was established without any
"connection with what is necessary to provide each district enough money to ensure an adequate
educational program." Id. Elsewhere, he mentions that "[t]he operation of the appellant school
districts conflicts with the historical notion that the education of our youth is of utmost concern and
that Ohio children should be educated adequately so that they are able to participate fully in society."
Id. at 747. Yet he does not adopt this as the constitutional touchstone. Unlike Kentucky's Rose
decision, nowhere in this opinion is there a statement of the skills and competencies that all children
should achieve to demonstrate that the education they received was thorough and efficient. Near the
end of the opinion, however, the majority does hold that "[a] thorough and efficient system of
common schools includes facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to
maintain these facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all local, state, and federal mandates." Id.
Thus, the only definite standard articulated by the court is one aimed exclusively at rudimentary
facilities and material inputs, not one that is based on outcomes or any set of inputs designed to reach
desired outcomes. The majority also identifies four specific aspects of the funding system that
contribute to its unworkability and which must be eliminated: (i) the operation of the Foundation
Program; (2) the emphasis on local property taxes; (3) the requirement that school districts borrow
through the spending reserve and emergency school assistance loan programs; and (4) the lack of
sufficient funding in the General Assembly's budget for the construction and maintenance of public
school buildings. Id. at 737-40. At the very least, then, the General Assembly was on notice as to
which aspects of the funding system were offensive. At the same time, however, it was given very little
guidance as to what shape a constitutional system should take.
363. Id. at 746.
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level, its position practically most aligned with the position of the
working majority.
The majority's remedial order was a calculated and pragmatic
compromise. Recognizing the enormous task before the legislature to
completely and systemically overhaul the system, the court deferred to
the General Assembly to come up with a remedial scheme, and it gave
the legislators a year to design the system. 6 ' In the meantime, the court
ordered that Judge Lewis would enjoy plenary jurisdiction to enforce the
court's order.
365
At bottom, the majority opinion is a political document. First and
foremost, in striking down the state's funding system, the working
majority seems to have satisfied its own attitudinal preference to defend
the economic underdog. Second, cognizant of the concerns of the
affluent districts and the potential negative effects of leveling down, the
majority opinion refused to find education a fundamental right and strike
down the system under the equal protection and benefits clause and
instead takes pains to point out that its order does not prevent districts
from raising funds over and above the level of adequacy.366 Third, by
citing evidence provided by the SBE and the SPI, the court indicated that
it had the support of some of the political elite in the state. More
pointedly, the court specifically cited the endorsement of the amicus brief
of the thirty-seven legislators who called for court intervention.16' Finally,
by refusing to articulate a clear and definite standard, the court
preserved its ability to respond to the economic and political realities it
would face in implementing the DeRolph decision. Indeed, employing
such fuzzy standards would prove invaluable in 200i, when, facing a
flagging economy, the court pulled back from its aggressive positions in
earlier rulings in the matter.
b. The Concurrences
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Resnick, wrote separately "to
express [his] view that public education in Ohio is a fundamental
constitutional right, and to point out that Ohio's statutory scheme for
funding public elementary and secondary schools also violates other
constitutional provisions not addressed in the majority opinion."' 68 Rich
in historical, legal, and factual analysis, Douglas penned an opinion that
would have declared Ohio's funding scheme unconstitutional under the
thorough and efficient clause, would have declared education a
364. Id. at 747.
365. Id. at 747 n.io.
366. Id. at 746, 779.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 748 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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fundamental right, and would have struck the system down under the
equal protection and benefits clause. 369 Apart from his thoroughgoing
legal and factual analysis, Douglas took specific aim at the court's sister
institutions, and stated that "I would only caution those who would
castigate us (as some did the trial judge) for their own purposes to
remember what Abraham Lincoln said" about the U.S. Supreme Court's
obligation to rule on cases brought before them.37 In short, Douglas was
far less willing than the majority to placate the court's sister branches and
instead chose to issue his opinion as a warning, not a challenge; as a
manifesto, not a consensus-building compromise.
Justice Resnick wrote a separate concurrence that was joined by
Justice Douglas.37' She emphasized the "fact that this case does not seek
equality of education throughout Ohio, but rather seeks a quality
education for every single child in Ohio regardless of where that child
resides." '372 In other words, this is an adequacy, not equity, case. This
opinion seems largely aimed at neutralizing the dissent's scare tactics that
argue that the majority's opinion will result in leveling down and capping
district spending. It asks the General assembly to first determine the cost
of a "basic quality education" and then ensure sufficient funds to provide
each student with that education. 173
Finally, apparently resting on his legislative experience as authority,
Justice Pfiefer wrote that:
[T]he [dissent] would require us to forgo addressing the issue before
us. They would defer the determination of this vital constitutional
standard to the General Assembly. This approach would severely limit
the constitutional authority of this court and would, in the long term,
harm both the legislative and judicial branches of government.
The General Assembly has long been aware that the current funding
structure is constitutionally flawed. It has been impossible to
adequately address the problem because wealthy school districts have
staunchly defended the status quo. This decision rejects the status quo
and requires the General Assembly to act."'
Remaining faithful to his activist public statements, he then argued that
the "fluid" thorough and efficient clause should be interpreted under the
present conditions of society and the state.375 In other words, what is a
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 779-80 (Resnick, J., concurring).
372. Id. at 779.
373. Id. at 780.




thorough and efficient education will change with time -a plainspoken
defense of fuzzy standards by the plainspoken former Senator.
c. The Dissent
Chief Justice Moyer's dissent, which was joined by Justices Cook
and Stratton, emphasized four points, all of which were championed by
Solicitor General Sutton's brief. 76 First, the plain text of the Ohio
Constitution commits the responsibility for ascribing a meaning to the
thorough and efficient clause to the General Assembly and therefore the
plaintiffs' case is barred by the separation of powers and political
question/nonjusticiability doctrines.377 Taking the majority to task for its
merely aspirational phrases such as enabling citizens to "fully develop to
their human potential," the dissent argued that the majority's fuzzy
standard was unmanageable and no better subject to judicial application
than the nebulous "thorough and efficient" clause."78 Cogent as this
argument seems, the majority essentially ignored it. Second, the dissent
argued, to the extent that the plaintiffs' claim is based on inequality, the
system today is more equal than that upheld in Walter.79 The majority,
however, retorted that the Walter case involved a different funding
system and should be contained to its facts.38° Third, to the extent that
plaintiffs argue that the system is inadequate, they have failed to prove
their case. 8' Indeed, the plaintiff districts themselves had achieved the
state's minimum standards and nowhere did the plaintiffs demonstrate
what constitutes an adequate education or an adequate level of funding.
Like two ships passing in the night, however, the majority simply argued
that the abhorrent conditions in the plaintiff districts simply could not
meet any judicial test of adequacy.382 Finally, since the trial in this lawsuit
the General Assembly has acted diligently and responsibly to rectify any
inequities and inadequacies that may have rendered the system
unconstitutional . 8' The majority, having been accused of over-reaching
by the dissent, simply dismissed this argument because it improperly
looked to "evidence" that was outside the appellate record-a clear
transgression of judicial procedure."'4 In any event, Sweeney wrote for
the majority, the General Assembly's efforts were simply too little, too
late.
376. Id. at 786 (Moyer, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 783-87.
378. Id. at 785.
379. Id. at 787-87.
38o. Id. at 745-46.
381. Id. at 791-93 (Moyer, J., dissenting).
382. See id. at 740-46.
383. Id. at 787-88 (Moyer, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 746.
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Had Moyer's opinion been the majority opinion, it would be difficult
to argue that he had reached a legally incorrect outcome on the
separation-of-powers and nonjusticiability issues. 5' These doctrinal
escapes are always available to courts in educational finance reform
cases. But Moyer was up against a liberal majority. In the end, the most
prophetic words may have been Moyer's when he stated that "we believe
that the majority's well-intentioned willingness to enter this fray today
will only necessitate more comprehensive judicial involvement tomorrow
as educational theories and goals evolve, conditions throughout the state
change, and the General Assembly responds." ''
5. The Aftermath of DeRolph I
To many, what happened in the five years after the DeRolph I
decision is the most significant chapter in the DeRolph saga."' 7 In a
nutshell, nothing that happened after DeRolph I contravenes any of the
discussion above. Indeed, the continued recalcitrance of the General
Assembly and Governor in the face of continued pressure from the
Education Establishment and the Ohio Supreme Court only serve to
underscore the Court's risky decision to challenge the state's political
elite. More than five years, another trial, and three major high court
opinions later, it now appears the working majority's initial resolve has
dissolved.
a. The Legislative and Gubernatorial Response
At first it seemed the political branches would act quickly to address
the DeRolph mandate. As early as April 8, 1997, the Governor formed a
"School Funding Task Force" made up of himself, the Speaker of the
House, the President of the Senate, minority leaders of the House and
Senate, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the influential
State Budget Director, R. Gregory Browning.38 To advise the Task
385. While it is true that both Miller v. Korns and Board of Education v. Walter addressed and
interpreted the state constitution's thorough and efficient clause thus providing the precedent to
overcome the political question and separation of powers doctrines, neither case dealt with a full-
blown assault on the state's educational funding system under that clause. There is a qualitative
difference between stating that the clause does not tolerate a denial of educational opportunity and
stating that there is some judicially manageable standard that can be read into the thorough and
efficient language. Thus, one could argue, the political question and separation of powers issues
remained open after Miller and Walter.
386. Id. at 786 (Moyer, J., dissenting).
387. See, e.g., Molly Townes O'Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private Process:
Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding Litigation, 18 Ohio St. J. on
Disp. Resol. 391 (2oo3) (describing the dispute resolution process following the DeRolph rulings and
their role in the complex legal, politic, public policy, and administrative issues surrounding the case).
388. See Catherine Candisky, School Group to Study Other States' Cases, Columbus Dispatch, Apr.
13, 1997, at iC; Lee Leonard, Task force Eyes School Construction, Columbus Dispatch, Apr. 20, 1997,
at 5F; Tim Miller, Clarification Not Needed, Coalition Says, Dayton Daily News, Apr. iI, 1997, at 2B.
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Force, the State also hired the Alliance's expert, John Augenblick, to
devise a base, per-pupil cost for what is an adequate education."s
Augenblick's inferential method of determining the cost of an adequate
education was appealing to the legislature, as it meshed with the
legislature's efforts at enhancing school accountability and allowed for
the possibility that efficient management of the school organization
could reduce costs. By July of I997, just a few months after DeRolph I,
Augenblick made his recommendations to the Task Force and the
remedial scheme seemed to be within reach.3"
For the next twelve months, however, the legislature would be
unable to come up with a funding scheme that met the specific concerns
of the working majority and failed to persuade the electorate to pass a
one cent sales tax that would have partially supported the remedial
scheme.3 9' Instead, the political branches fast-tracked educational and
fiscal accountability statutes, failing to address the operational resources,
facilities, phantom revenue, categorical programs, and the over-reliance
on property tax issues.392 Perhaps most damning, there was evidence that
the state's "remedial" legislation continued to relegate educational
funding to the category of "budgetary residual" and that the State had
manipulated Augenblick's methodology to the point that it was
politically palatable, not reflective of the cost of an adequate education.393
At bottom, the remedy was little more than tinkering with the current
system; far from the "complete, systemic overhaul" contemplated by the
court.
During this same time period, little changed in the political
environment. The Coalition maintained its size and stability under
Phillis's leadership. The education organizations continued to support
the plaintiffs.3" And even the Alliance would eventually argue that the
State had done too little to address the DeRolph mandate, particularly
criticizing the General Assembly's modification of Augenblick's
methodology, its failure to adopt a cost-based system for funding special
education, and its failure to address adequately the facilities issue.395 On
389. See DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125, 143-44 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio 1999); Interview with James
Betts, supra note 345.
390. Interviw with James Betts, supra note 345.
391. See DeRolph, 712 N.E.2d at 144-45.
392. See id. at 145.
393. See id. at 235-37.
394- See Interview with William Phillis, supra note 229; Interview with John Brandt, supra note
344.
395. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Alliance for Adequate School Funding, DeRolph v. State,
728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (No. 99-0570).
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the other side of the ledger, Governor Voinovich, 36 Senate President
Finan, and Speaker Davidson did little to champion the DeRolph remedy
and claimed only that they had responded to the court's mandate and
should be left alone to implement the remedial scheme.397
Despite the court's efforts, the legislature had fallen short in the
plaintiffs' mind and they asked Justice Lewis to hear their complaints
about the remedial scheme. Lewis conducted a nine-day hearing
beginning August 24, 1999 in which 491 exhibits were presented, twelve
witnesses testified in court, and another thirty-five testified by
deposition."' The State argued that, since the filing of DeRolph, it had
done enough to provide a "thorough and efficient" education and that
the court needed to give the remedial scheme time to work.3 The
plaintiffs countered that, on its face, the remedial scheme did not address
the concerns of the DeRolph majority.40' In a 263-page decision issued on
February 26, 1999, Lewis agreed with the plaintiffs and the stage was set
for a DeRolph 11.40 '
b. DeRolph II: The Working Majority Stands Firm
In an unusual procedural decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
permitted the defendants to appeal Lewis's decision directly to the high
court, bypassing the intermediate appellate court. Again the working
majority held for the plaintiffs.4 2 Writing for the working majority,
Justice Resnick first acknowledged the enormity of the task facing the
legislature and that the task "implicates more than just funding; it also
involves other complex intertwined issues."4' From there, however, she
took the legislature to task: for tampering with the Augenblick
methodology and thus failing to cost-out an adequate education; for
continuing to rely on local property taxes; for minimal efforts to address
the facilities problem; for refusing to address the "phantom revenue"
problem; and for passing unfunded mandates, such as the state's
396. Voinovich was succeeded as Governor in 1998 by Bob Taft. Although Taft has never
championed an aggressive remedial response to the DeRolph ruling, he has also never been as critical
of the court and its decision as had Voinovich.
397. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Governor Bob Taft, DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993
(Ohio 2000) (No. 99-0570); Reply Brief of Amici Curiae Richard H. Finan, President of the Ohio
Senate, and JoAnn Davidson, Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, DeRolph v. State, 728
N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (No. 99-0570).
398. DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125, 126-4o (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio 1999).
399. Id. at 247-50.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 250.
402. DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1022 (Ohio 2000) (DeRolph II).
403. Id. at 998.
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academic standards and accountability schemes, that further exacerbated
the funding shortfall.4"
In the course of the opinion, Resnick also articulated a somewhat
clearer standard for thoroughness and efficiency, thereby diminishing the
court's freedom in future cases. Although she claimed that the
"definition of 'thorough and efficient' is not static" and that "it is
impossible to generate an all-inclusive list that specifically enumerates
every possible component of a thorough and efficient system," she went
on to offer the following guidance:
A thorough system means that each and every school district has
enough funds to operate. An efficient system is one in which each and
every school district in the state has an ample number of teachers,
sound buildings that are in compliance with state fire and building
codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an
educational opportunity.4 5
Resnick's guidance continues to be more fuzzy than policy-guiding.
46
Again, the court refused to design and implement its own remedial
scheme, but rather gave the political branches until June 15, 2001 to
come up with a constitutional system.47 This time, however, the court
continued its own jurisdiction, thus expediting any further proceedings in
the matter.4 8
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Pfeifer, Justice Douglas
specifically lashed back at the "Governor of Ohio, the leaders and some
other members of the General Assembly, several large Ohio
newspapers ... and a few representatives of business interests" for their
criticism of the court's intervention. 4 In the next breath, however, he
lauded Governor Taft for his leadership and his willingness to address
the facilities problem. 40 Justice Pfeifer, in a characteristically homespun
vernacular and a second concurring opinion, chastised the General
Assembly for its failings and provided what he viewed as a recipe for a
constitutional funding scheme: accepting the constitution's affirmative
duty to act, setting statewide minimum education requirements, and
funding schools so that those requirements are met. 4 ' This he called
404. See id. at 993-1022.
405. Id. at Ioot.
406. It should also be noted that although the plaintiffs continued to urge the court to declare
education a fundamental right, the court could not muster the requisite four votes to make such a
declaration.
407. Id. at 1022 (Douglas, J., concurring).
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1023.
411. Id. at 1027-29 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
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"fourth grade math" and what the legislature had done was a mere
polishing up of the existing formula and a declaration of victory.12
c. DeRolph III: The Judicial Compromise
In the year and one month between DeRolph II and the court's June
15, 2001 deadline, the General Assembly passed four significant pieces of
legislation designed to address the court's opinion.413 In the months
leading up to the DeRolph III decision, the political environment also
began to shift. Notably, the state's economy, in lockstep with the nation's
economy, began to experience a downturn. Additionally, conservative
leaders, including a law professor at Columbus's Capital Law School,
openly called on legislators to ignore the DeRolph decisions as
unconstitutional intrusions on the legislature's prerogatives. 4'14 Put simply,
the court would be facing an even more resistant General Assembly that
would now have to tighten its belt in the face of shrinking revenues.
The court blinked. In a remarkably candid and results-oriented
opinion issued on September 6, 2001, Justice Moyer wrote:
None of us is completely comfortable with the decision we announce in
this opinion. But we have responded to a duty that is intrinsic to our
position as justices on the highest court of the state. Drawing upon our
own instincts and the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson, we have reached
the point where, while continuing to hold our previously expressed
opinions, the greater good requires us to recognize 'the necessity of
sacrificing our opinions sometimes to the opinions of others for the
sake of harmony.'
A climate of legal, financial, and political uncertainty concerning
Ohio's school-funding system has prevailed at least since this court
412. Id. at 1028-29. In dissent, Justice Moyer wrote that the court had again overstepped its
bounds and usurped the legislature's authority by again striking the system down and maintaining
jurisdiction (and its veto power) over the state's educational funding system. In effect, Moyer wrote.
"[t]he majority is really saying that it does not think that the minimum educational standards now in
place are high enough, thereby substituting its own judgment of educational sufficiency for
constitutional analysis." Id. at 1033 (Moyer, J., dissenting).
413. Am.Sub.S.B. 272, 123 Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2000), which enhanced the Classroom Facilities
Assistance Program: Am.Sub.S.B. 345, 123 Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2ooo), which sought to address the
statutory provisions deemed "unfunded mandates" and established procedures for preventing fiscal
problems in school districts; Am.Sub.S.B. I, 124 Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2001), which established a system
of educational standards and assessments used to measure the success of Ohio's schools; and, most
important, Am.Sub.H.B. 94, the biennial budget bill, which modified certain aspects of the funding
formula using the Augenblick methodology and provided other assistance to property poor school
districts. Specifically. H.B. 94 boosted the base cost for an "adequate" education, enhanced the
General Assembly's "gap aid" which addresses the phantom revenue problem by assuring that the
state contributes more funding to districts in which the tax base does not increase at the same rate as
the base cost amount: and provides for "parity aid" which is designed to close the gap between poor
and rich school districts by providing state funds to the former.
414- See David N. Mayer, Legislature Should Oust 4 Justices, Columbus Dispatch, June 6, 2001, at
15A; Glenn Sheller, School-Funding Showdown?, Columbus Dispatch, Mar. 4, 2001, at iD.
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accepted jurisdiction of the case. We have concluded that no one is
served by continued uncertainty and fractious debate. In that spirit, we
have created the consensus that should terminate the role of this court
in the dispute.4"5
Translation: to get the four votes necessary for a majority in
DeRolph III both members of the working majority and the dissent
parted from previous positions. Justices Pfeifer and Douglas from the
working majority joined Justices Moyer and Stratton from the dissent to
form a new DeRolph majority, while Sweeney and Resnick attacked the
majority from the liberal and activist wing and Cook dissented from the
conservative and restraintist wing.
The compromise was simple. Pfeifer and Douglas gave up their
commitment to a "complete systemic overhaul" of the system and were
willing to overlook continued primary reliance on property taxes, so long
as the court ordered the legislature to substantially increase the base
funding amount per student and eliminate the slow "phase-in" aspects of
the legislative remedy; while Moyer and Stratton agreed to subject the
legislature's school finance plan to judicial review.' 6 The new majority
held up the State's remedy to the fuzzy standards of DeRolph I and II
and found that the legislature had done enough provided: (I) it include
in its method for calculating the base cost the school districts previously
excluded from the Augenblick calculation, i.e., eliminate the screens
which are commonly used by school finance analysts to eliminate
outliers; and (2) it remove the phase-in period for the parity aid. Some
estimated that this change would cost the General Assembly some $1.2
billion annually.4"7
In concurrence, Justice Douglas first discussed the separation of
powers doctrine as being a fluid mandate which permits the court to
sever specific aspects of the General Assembly's method for calculating
the base cost and eliminate the phase in periods for the parity aid.4' s
More candidly, Douglas set forth five other potentially viable options
available to the court in DeRolph III: (I) approve the new legislation; (2)
declare the new legislation unconstitutional and do nothing else; (3)
appoint a special master or commission to resolve the dispute; (4) hold
the General Assembly in contempt of court; or (5) design a constitutional
415. DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d I184, I189-9o (Ohio 2001) (DeRolph III). In an irony not lost
on Justice Resnick in dissent, it should be noted that Jefferson's quote was taken from a discussion of
compromise in the legislative process, the forum where bargaining and compromise are accepted
practice norms. Id. at 1217 (Resnick, J. dissenting).
416. See id. at iI89-9o, 1214-6.
417. Memorandum from William Phillis (Oct. 10, 2001).
418. DeRolph, 754 N.E.2d at 1202-09 (DeRolph III) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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school funding system.4'9 In evaluating the alternatives, Douglas was fully
cognizant of the court's limitations, explaining that "[w]e recognize that
we have no army and no police force to send... [w]e have only our
ability to reason, persuade, and even plead with the Governor and
General Assembly to do what is right and best for school children in
Ohio."4"'
In DeRolph I, a majority of the court was willing to confront a
hostile legislature and governor. It was willing to risk its own institutional
credibility. In short, it willfully ignored its institutional limitations to
fulfill its attitudinal desires. Just over five years later, two members of
that majority were willing to compromise their policy preferences in the
face of institutional pressures.
d. DeRolph IV: The Judicial Surrender
Despite the compromise of DeRolph III, Governor Taft was
unsatisfied with the price tag attached to the compromise and the State
filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its decision."' Rather than
rendering a decision on the motion, the court initially ordered that the
parties participate in a settlement conference with the hope that they
would resolve their differences and craft a political compromise that
would be more efficacious.422 They did not.4"3 On December i i, 2002,
fifteen months after DeRolph III, the working majority regrouped and
ruled on the State's motion for reconsideration by vacating DeRolph III,
establishing DeRolph I and II as the law of the land and again declaring
the state's educational system unconstitutional and ordering the State to
adopt a school-funding scheme in line with the court's decision.4 4 But
419. Id. at 1209-14.
420. Id. at 1212. Perhaps most telling, however, is this confession:
Certain members of the majority had to forgo their argument on lack of jurisdiction. Other
members of the majority had to overcome the feeling that what has been presented to the
court is nothing more than a massaging of the system, that is, the funding legislation before
us still looks like, walks like and quacks like, and therefore, is still residual budgeting; that
under the plan the school facilities problems will not be taken care of during the lifetime of
a now middle-aged person; that the overreliance on local property taxes for educational
funding had not really been solved for the long run and that there has not been a "complete,
systematic overhaul" of the educational funding system for students in the K-12 grades ....
Finally, one member of the majority had to forgo insisting that in Ohio, education is a
fundamental right.
Id. at 1214.
421. See DeRolph v. State, 757 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio 2001).
422. See DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio 2001).
423. For a description and analysis of the failed mediation process in DeRolph, see Molly Townes
O'Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the
Remedial Process in School Funding Litigation, i8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 39I (1993) (arguing that
despite the failure of the DeRolph mediation, alternative dispute resolution processes hold the
promise of effectively addressing public school funding litigations).
424. DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529,529-32 (Ohio 2002) (DeRolph IV).
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what appears at first glance to be a victory for the plaintiffs turns out to
be hollow, as the court, in DeRolph IV relinquished its jurisdiction over
the matter, effectively waving the white flag and washing its hands of the
dispute.425
After two strong rulings in favor of the plaintiffs, the DeRolph court
began to recognize the limits of its efficacy in DeRolph III and issued a
blatant political compromise, in lieu of a principled opinion, merely to
escape protracted litigation. More revealing, the court, although standing
by its holdings in DeRolph I and II, dismissed the case in DeRolph IV.
From the perspective of DeRolph III and IV, the DeRolph I decision
seems ill-advised. Nonetheless, there was little preventing the working
majority from honoring its policy preferences (save the institutional
conflict with the political branches). The law did not preclude a ruling for
the plaintiffs on the thorough and efficient clause, the facts amply
supported plaintiffs' position, and the major educational interest groups
supported educational finance reform. Thus, the working majority
gambled that the political branches would follow suit. Five years later,
the political branches have effectively trumped the least dangerous
branch.
III. A SHARED VISION OF STATE GOVERNMENT: A CASE STUDY OF
VINCENT V. VOIGHT
On July II, 2000, four justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court
interpreted the state constitution's educational "uniformity" clause to
establish a challenging standard for what constitutes an equitable and
adequate education in the state:
We... hold that Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an
equal opportunity for a sound basic education. An equal opportunity
for a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their
roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and
personally.... An equal opportunity for a sound basic education
acknowledges that students and districts are not fungible and takes into
account districts with disproportionate numbers of disabled students,
economically disadvantaged students, and students with limited
English language skills. So long as the legislature is providing sufficient
425. See id. at 535 (Stratton, J., concuring). It should be noted that plaintiffs continued to argue
that the court granted to Judge Lewis continuing jurisdiction over DeRolph and its remedial phase.
Naturally, the state believed otherwise and opposed a plaintiffs' motion to involve Lewis. Clarifying
the situation, the Ohio Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that the Ohio courts had not jurisdiction
over the DeRolph litigation: "[O]ur DeRolph IV mandate forbids Judge Lewis and the common pleas
court to exercise further jurisdiction in this matter.... The duty now lies with the General Assembly
to remedy an educational program that has been found.., to still be unconstitutional." State v. Lewis,
789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003) (DeRolph V). It should be noted, however, that a new suit could be
filed challenging whatever remedial legislation is passed to address DeRolph IV.
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resources so that school districts offer students the equal opportunity
for a sound basic education as required by the constitution, the state
school finance system will pass constitutional muster.4"6
Yet at the same time, a different majority of four justices concluded that
"the Petitioners have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
current state school finance system violates either art. X, § 3 [the
Uniformity Clause of the Education Article] or art. I, § i [the Equal
Protection guarantee] of the Wisconsin Constitution." '427 Vincent v.
Voight, the third school finance case in Wisconsin in the past three
decades,428 badly fractured the state's high court, as the seven justices
issued six separate opinions: one justice, Patrick Crooks, joined three
dissenters in setting a seemingly high constitutional bar for the
Uniformity Clause, but joined three other justices in upholding the
state's school finance system.429 This Part explores the unique legal
landscape of Wisconsin school finance, the attitudes of the seven justices
who participated in the Vincent case, the influences on the high court,
and the political environment in which the court handed down its "split"
decision.
Wisconsin, America's Dairyland, has enjoyed a rich economic and
political history. Politically, the state is known as the incubator for the
Progressive movement and the movement's legendary "founder," Robert
"Fighting Bob" La Follette, Sr.43 ° With La Follette at the helm, the state
led the charge in dismantling the "party boss" system of the i9 th
Century, instituted one of the nation's first workers' compensation and
income tax laws, and developed an unusually close relationship between
the state's political branches and the reform-minded academics just down
the street from the Capitol at the University of Wisconsin."' Despite
being a one-party state for most of its history (Republicans have
dominated), Wisconsin has become a politically competitive state in
recent decades with control over the state senate being swapped several
times between Republicans and Democrats in the 199os. That said, state
governance and policy in the late i98os and 199os bears the indelible
mark of the state's conservative and reformist Republican Governor,
Tommy Thompson. Thompson has sought to shrink state government,
426. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000).
427. Id.
428. The other two cases, which are analyzed below, are 1976's Bus6 v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141
(Wis. 1976) and 1989's Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
429. Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 395-415.
430. See ROBERT C. NESBT, WISCONSIN: A HISTORY 399-434 (1973).
431. See id. at 426-31; see also JOSEPH RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF
WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM 256-89 (1999) (exploring the interaction between the Progressives'
legislative enactments and the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
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and instituted education and welfare policies that were controversial,
innovative to some, and dangerous to others.43 '
Demographically, Wisconsin is a mid-sized state of around 5.3
million persons.433 African Americans, most of whom live in the
Milwaukee-Racine corridor, constitute 5.7 percent of the population;
Asian-Americans constitute 1.7 percent of the population, while persons
of Hispanic origin constitute 3.6 percent of the population.434 Notably, a
couple small-sized towns-Wausau in particular-have recently become
the home of a relocated Hmong population.435 While agriculture and
dairy production still loom large on the economic and geographic
landscape of the state, heavy industry and manufacturing grew rapidly
through the middle of the 20th Century, only to recede slightly in recent
years.436 Unlike Ohio, however, Wisconsin has only one large urban
center: Milwaukee. And, in both state politics and educational policy, the
influence and concerns of Milwaukee are amplified in relation to other
towns, cities, and regions.437 It is against this backdrop of reputed "good
government," a dominant urban center with many small to mid-sized
cities, and an agrarian history that the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed
down its third educational finance decision, Vincent v. Voight.
A. The Legal Environment for School Finance Reform in Wisconsin
i. The Rise of the Suburbs and the Bus6 Case"38
Under the leadership of Democratic Governor Patrick J. Lucey, the
Wisconsin legislature passed a comprehensive property tax relief and
school finance reform package in 1973."'9 That legislation not only
provided property tax relief as the state assumed a greater share of
432. See TOMMY G. THOMPSON, POWER TO THE PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN STATE AT WORK (1996).
433. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: WISCONSIN, at http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/55ooo.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
434. Id.
435. See Northern Wisconsin Area Health Education Center, Southeast Asian Hmong, Wausau, at
http://www.nahec-wi.org/SEAsianWausau.htm ("Ten percent of the population in Wausau is now
Southeast Asian, the majority Hmong refugees.").
436. See NESBrr, supra note 43o , at 499-514; THE WISCONSIN CARTOGRAPHERS' GUILD, WISCONSIN
PAST AND PRESENT: A HISTORICAL ATLAS 44-45,52-53 (1998).
437. Interview with Douglas Haselow, Association for Equity in Funding, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
(June 4, 2001).
438. Unlsess otherwise indicated, information for this section was gathered from the following
sources: Interview with David Hase, Cook & Franke, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (June 4, 2001); Interview
with Bruce Meredith, Staff Counsel, Wisconsin Education Association Counsel, Madison, Wisconsin
(June I 1, 2001). Additionally, for an excellent critique of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's legal analysis
in Buse, see Robert Lindquist, Buss v. School Finance Reform: A Case Study of the Doctrinal, Social,
and Ideological Determinants of Judicial Decisionmaking, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 1071 (1978).
439. See Terry G. Geske, The Politics of Reforming School Finance in Wisconsin 186-242 (1975)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with author) (analyzing the passage
of Wisconsin's two-tiered tax base equalization plan).
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educational financing, it also sought to enhance equity and control
district spending through the two-tiered tax base equalization formula.' 4
But the Legislature went a step further with its progressive formula, and
adopted a recapture provision under which the wealthiest school districts
would not only be denied state assistance, they would have to send
money to Madison to be shared with property-poor districts." Naturally,
the wealthy districts were none too happy with this proposition. More
specifically, led by the Milwaukee suburb of Nicolet, a group of
suburban, soon-to-be "negative aid" districts filed suit under the
Wisconsin Constitution to invalidate the recapture provision of the 1973
Act."2 This was the initial salvo from the burgeoning suburban ring
around Milwaukee and would not be the suburbs' last effort at blocking
equity-minded school finance reform efforts.
a. Procedural History of the Case
The nominal defendants in the wealthy districts' suit were state
officials charged with implementing the 1973 reforms, while the
Wisconsin Education Association Council, participating by amicus,
aligned substantively with the state in seeking to preserve the recapture
provisions."3 In what would prove to be a critical procedural victory, the
plaintiffs were granted leave by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to file the
action as an original action in the high court."4 Thus, the parties to the
case stipulated to the facts that they believed would be relevant for the
Supreme Court's review. This would prove to be a critical mistake on the
State's part. As Robert Lindquist argued:
The parties' stipulation on [the] issues was the decisive element in
Busg. It removed critical fact questions from the court's
consideration.... The [plaintiffs] presented little evidence to prove the
magnitude of the injuries suffered by individual property taxpayers in
excess wealth districts or the aggregate fiscal impact on the educational
services delivered in these districts. The [state] failed to prove the
educational injuries suffered by children in comparatively low-wealth
districts [was] due to expenditure disparities.... In effect, the
stipulation deprived the court of the factual background necessary to




442. Bus6 v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Wis. 1976)
443. Id. at 14; Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Educational Association Council, Bus6 v. Smith,
247 N.W.2d 141(1976) (No. 75-552).
444. See Lindquist, supra note 438 at xo83.
445. Id. at 1093-94.
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What the court had before it were merely legal allegations by the
plaintiffs and legal defenses advanced by the State. The facts were
ignored or assumed.
b. The Legal Issues
Nicolet Union High School District and the other property-wealthy
districts advanced two primary and one secondary legal arguments. First,
the recapture provision of the 1973 reform legislation violated the
Wisconsin Constitution's "tax uniformity" clause."6 For purposes of this
analysis, this aspect of the Bust case is irrelevant. Second, the plaintiffs
argued that Article X, § 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the portion of
the constitution mandating local property tax support of local schools,
granted local districts an unadulterated right to control school
expenditure within their districts."7 Plaintiffs also claimed that the
negative-aid classification of the 1973 legislation constituted a
deprivation of the due process and equal protection rights of residents in
negative-aid districts.' Arguing that education is a fundamental right
under the constitution and that any infringement of that right should be
subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis, the plaintiffs contended that the
recapture provision discriminated against them."9
Both the State and amici (WEAC, League of Women Voters, and
the Wisconsin Secondary School Administrators Association) responded
that the negative-aid provision of the 1973 legislation was
constitutionally required under the Uniformity Clause of the Education
Article to ensure that all Wisconsin children had an equal educational
opportunity 50 It is not at all clear, however, why the State chose to
primarily argue that the recapture provision was constitutionally
446. See id. at io94-95 (describing the parties' contentions).
447. Id. at 1094. "Each town and city shall be required to raise by tax, annually, for the support of
common schools therein, a sum not less than one-half the amount received by such town or city
respectively for school purposes from the income of the school fund." Wis. CoNST. art. X, § 4.
448. Id. at 1094 n.96.
449. It did so in several ways: (i) the negative-aid classification ignores the ability to pay of the
residents of the negative-aid districts; (2) the classification ignores municipal overburden stemming
from other municipal taxes which may exist in negative-aid districts; (3) the classification ignores
educational cost variations among districts (e.g., transportation costs); and (4) the classification creates
a strong incentive for taxpayers in negative-aid districts to spend less on education. See id. It is worth
noting that the latter of these reasons was precisely the cost-control objective of the Legislature, while
the former three apply with equal or even greater force to lower property wealth districts such as
Milwaukee.
450. Id. at 1095. Wis. CONsT. art. X, § 3, provides (emphasis added): "The legislature shall provide
by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and
such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20
years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein; but the legislature by law may, for the




mandated as opposed to constitutionally permitted. Particularly in light of
the fact that district spending differentials had existed in the state since
its inception. It is also noteworthy that in virtually no other educational
finance case has the State so aggressively advanced the argument that
children are constitutionally entitled to an equal educational
opportunity. In addition, responding to the plaintiffs' Section 4
argument, the State argued that children in excess-wealth districts did not
have a constitutional right to a better education than their peers in
property-poor districts.45' Finally, the State argued that, in any event, the
recapture provision was a proper exercise of the State's police power and
that it had plenary control over all school districts' financing and
operation.452 Thus, recapture is permitted under the constitution and not a
violation of the tax uniformity clause.
c. The Majority Opinion
For the most part, the majority-consisting of Justices Connor
Hansen, Robert Hansen, Bruce Beilfuss, and William Callow-agreed
with Nicolet and its cohorts.453 The majority first rejected the State's
argument that the recapture provision was constitutionally mandated by
Article X, § 3 .454 Analyzing the plain language of and jurisprudence
surrounding the Uniformity Clause, the court concluded that the phrase,
"as nearly uniform as practicable," was meant to address the "character
of instruction," and that "it was left up to this court to ultimately
determine what subjects were to be included in the 'character of
instruction' and to the legislature to determine what uniformity was
'practicable."'455 Analyzing next the constitutional and legislative history
of the Uniformity Clause, the court concluded that "equal opportunity
for education as defined by art. X, sec. 3, is a fundamental right," and
that the court need not rubber stamp any legislative scheme for meeting
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. See Bus6 v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (Wis. 1976)
454. Id. at i47-50.
455. Id. at 148-49. The court based this conclusion on a line of cases that began with State ex rel.
Zilisch v. Auer, 221 N.W. 86o (Wis. 1928), in which the court held that the Uniformity Clause is
concerned "not with the method of forming school districts, but with the character of instruction that
should be given in those schools after the districts were formed-with the training that these schools
should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin." Id. at 862. The Zilisch case was reaffirmed in Joint
School District v. Sosalla, 88 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. 1958), and Larson v. State Appeal Board, 202 N.W.2d
920 (Wis. 1973). Although some members of the majority may have viewed this language as limiting
the court's role in determining how "uniform" or "equitable" the school system is, this language
actually gives the court a great deal of latitude in determining the adequacy of the educational system
by dictating what is to be included in the "character of instruction." This broad language could include
standards for staffing, curriculum, teacher credentialing, facilities, and the like.
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that constitutional obligation."56 Even so, the court went on to find that
"absolute uniformity of an equal opportunity for education in all school
districts of the state" is not what is required by the constitution.457 Indeed,
the court went on to find that under Section 4 of the Education Article,
local school districts are granted the power to control local expenditures
over and above what the state requires.? In other words, the majority
held, the State has no constitutional obligation to ensure equality of
educational opportunity through the use of the recapture provision.
Notably, Justice Shirley Abrahamson, who would eventually become
Chief Justice during Vincent, dissented and sharply criticized the majority
for failing to afford the Legislature proper deference and failing to give
the legislation the proper presumption of constitutionality.459
At bottom, the majority's opinion was a setback for equity-minded
educational finance reformers. The legislature was hamstrung from using
the innovative recapture provision to control costs and create finance
equity, while local control was elevated to a constitutional principle. That
said, there were certain kernels of hope for reformers in the decision.
First, the court recognized that Wisconsin children have a fundamental
right to an equal educational opportunity. Second, the court left open the
possibility that a judicially defined "character of instruction" could be
established to ensure an adequate education for all children. And third,
the court demonstrated its willingness to intervene in educational finance
policy.
2. The Fall of Milwaukee and The Kukor Case
The next time the Wisconsin Supreme Court would hear a
significant challenge to the state's educational finance laws, the positions
of the parties would be very different from Bust. Recognizing the limited
gains made through desegregation and frustrated by the ever worsening
plight of the Milwaukee Public Schools ("MPS"), a group of Milwaukee
area school children and their parents sued the Wisconsin DPI,
Superintendent Herbert Grover, the State Treasurer, and the
456. Id.
457. Id. Quoting from Delegate Estabrook's comments at the constitutional convention, the
majority found that "[tihe framers of the constitution recognized the importance of local interest and
some measure of local control over local schools." Id. Others persuasively argued that this reading of
Estabrook's testimony is decontextualized and strained, see Erik LeRoy, The Egalitarian Roots of the
Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Bus6 v. Smith
Criticized, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1325 (I98i); Suzanne M. Steinke, The Exception to the Rule: Wisconsin's
Fundamental Right to Education and Public School Financing, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1387 (1995), but
nonetheless has provided the court with an excuse to permit high spending Wisconsin school districts
to continue to spend above their peers.
458. Bus6, 247 N.W.2d at 15t.
459. Id. at 157 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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Department of Revenue in October 1979, alleging that the school finance
system deprived them of an equal opportunity for education'6 But this
lawsuit was really led by Milwaukee's long-time and very popular Mayor,
Henry Maier. Put simply, Maier and the MPS argued that the failure of
the State to address the extreme educational and municipal overburden
suffered by the MPS resulted in a violation of the uniformity and equal
protection clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution. 46' Though labeled an
"equity" case, this case could as easily have been considered an adequacy
case in that the Milwaukee students sought an educational program that
met their unique needs.462 Despite having argued only four years earlier
that the system would be constitutionally infirm without the recapture
provision, this time the State defended the system's equity.
a. The Trial Court's Findings and Holding
Approximately five years after the complaint was filed in Kukor, a
sixteen-day trial was held in the Dane County Circuit Court before Judge
William Sachtjen. 63 Unlike the summary facts prepared and stipulated
for the Bus6 case, the plaintiffs in Kukor presented extensive testimony
from thirty-six witnesses-parents, educators, administrators, and expert
witnesses. 464 Nearly all of this evidence portrayed conditions in the
MPS, 65 and almost none of it was seriously controverted by the State.
66
460. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d at 568, 570. Parents and school children from other districts
were, for a time, represented in the case by WEAC counsel, but were dismissed from the case on their
own motion. Evidence of educational inequity from a high-poverty rural school district called Prentice
was also presented at the trial of the case, but the clear focus was on MPS. Interview with Bruce
Meredith, supra note 438.
461. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 568,570.
462. It is worth noting that although this case was finally decided in 1989, the same year as
Kentucky's Rose decision, commentators uniformly exclude it from the third-wave, adequacy
decisions.
463. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 3-4, Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (No. 86-
1544).
464. Kukor, 436 N.W. 2d at 590 (Bablitch, J. dissenting).
465. See generally Decision, Kukor v. Grover, Case No. 79 -CV-5252 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1986). One
explanation for the fact that the evidence in the matter was so focused on Milwaukee is that, prior to
the trial, the Wisconsin Education Association Council had been plaintiffs in the case and had been
the primary party in charge of putting forth evidence from other school districts. On the eve of trial,
however, WEAC's executive director struck a deal with the State Superintendent of Public Instruction
in which WEAC agreed to withdraw from the case. Consequently, the legal horsepower and evidence
that WEAC would have brought to the table did not become part of the record (though WEAC did
submit an amicus at the supreme court level). Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 438.
466. Indeed, the state put on only two witnesses. One of whom, the DPI's Director of State School
Aid Administration, Roland Rockwell, testified that the "formula completely disregards inherent
factors within school districts which relate directly to its costs of educating students," that "[c]hildren
who live in poor areas of the state do not have the same opportunity to obtain a good education as
children in rich areas," and that the "state has not guaranteed equal educational opportunities and it
cannot do so, so long as it continues to allow local differences in willingness to finance education have
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For twenty-seven pages of his thirty-one-page opinion, Judge Sachtjen
made extensive findings of fact that were uniformly damaging to the
State. He found, among other things, that Milwaukee's schools and other
poor districts required compensatory education services to address the
needs of children in poverty; that these schools required enhanced
special education, language acquisition, and counseling/social-work
services; and that Milwaukee's taxpayers needed relief from municipal
overburden. 6 ' Sachtjen went so far as to write:
It is a fact that educational programs across the state are not uniform.
Plaintiffs established and defendants acknowledged the state aid
system specifies no minimum per pupil expenditure level. School
districts are free to spend as little or as much as they prefer. As a
result, expenditures vary by over 2:1 at the extreme and 1.5:1 between
districts spending at the 95th percentile.
No one can take issue with the facts brought out by plaintiffs showing
that there are significant inequities in the availability of financial
support for local school districts that result in significant unevenness in
the educational opportunities offered to the children of the state.46
Notwithstanding these findings, the trial court adamantly refused to find
that these "educational finance policy" questions are "of such
constitutional magnitude that [the] court should intrude upon the
decision making powers entrusted to the legislature."' ' Rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that these issues go directly to the non-uniformity of
the character of instruction in the state, the court found no infringement
of any constitutional right and flatly stated that "we do not believe
plaintiffs should be allowed to transform budget requests into a
constitutional cloak and present[] them to a court of law.,
470
b. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's Kukor Decision
Three years after the trial court's decision and nearly a decade after
the case was filed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court passed judgment on the
overwhelming facts presented by the children of the MPS.47' The court
an impact." Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief at 25, Kukor (No. 86-1544). DPI's own indictment of the state
educational finance system, penned by Rockwell and titled Disequalizing Factors in Wisconsin's
School-Aid Formula, was quoted for three single-space pages in the plaintiffs-appellants' brief. The
state's other witness was University of Wisconsin Professor, Richard Rossmiller. Id. The state's basic
defense in the case was that plaintiffs' arguments are basically policy considerations that are
constitutionally left to the legislature's discretion. Respondent's Brief at 3-4, Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (No. 86-1544).
467. Decision at 1-27, Kukor (No. 79-CV-5252).
468. Id. at 26.
469. Id. at 27.
470. Id. at3I.
471. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 568 (Wis. 1989). Although Wisconsin has an intermediate
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divided itself into three separate camps. Justices Ceci, Day, and Callow
wrote the lead (plurality) opinion upholding the state's school finance
scheme in the face of Milwaukee's challenge. Justice Steinmetz
concurred in the result, but for a different reason than the plurality.
Chief Justice Heffernan and Justices Abrahamson and Bablitch (both of
whom would participate in the Vincent case) dissented and would have
struck down the state's financing scheme. Because of the divided court
and the lack of a majority opinion, Kukor did little to advance the court's
Uniformity Clause jurisprudence, but did signal that the court would
require a very strong showing of educational failure before it would
intervene in educational finance policy. And, as a practical matter for the
Vincent plaintiffs, the positions of Abrahamson and Bablitch provided
some guidance as to how they might vote in a renewed challenge to the
scheme."2
The Plurality Opinion. Recognizing the plaintiffs' educational and
municipal overburden claims under Article X, section 3, the plurality
noted that "the question of whether this section mandates that resources
be allocated such as to guarantee that each district operates with
sufficient resources to assure equality of opportunity for education in the
sense of responding to the particularized educational needs of each child
has not been previously addressed." '473 But the Kukor plurality did
nothing to further flesh out the meaning of uniformity. Rather, the
plurality held that
[t]he present equalization system far exceeds the degree of uniformity
which might be accomplished under the constitutional provision:
whereas the constitution provides only for each district to receive an
equal amount of state resources per pupil, [the current system]
provides a greater amount of state funds per pupil to districts with
lower equalized property valuations.4
Moreover, under Busg, there is no requirement that total per-
student spending be identical among districts. 5 And, finally, the
"character of instruction," which must be uniform under Zilisch and its
court of appeals, this case bypassed the Court of Appeals pursuant to a Wisconsin court rule and the
Supreme Court's acceptance.
472. WEAC again participated by amicus along with the Wisconsin Association of School Boards
(WASB). See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Wisconsin Education Association Council, Kukor v. Grover,
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (No. 86-1544); Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Wisconsin Association of
School Boards, Inc., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (No. 86-544). WASB submitted a
brief that took no position on the constitutionality of the finance system, but argued that the
constitutional mandate of local control under Bus6 and Section 4 of the Education Article require
local funding, not full-state funding.
473. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 575.
474. Id. at 577.
475. See id. at 575.
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progeny, is legislatively mandated by the state's minimum educational
standards with which districts had to comply to receive state school aid-
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that any districts were unable to meet
the standards due to the distribution of school aid under the finance
system. 476 In this fashion, the plurality refused to articulate a minimum
standard of education to which Wisconsin's children are constitutionally
entitled. The State need only distribute its own chosen share of the
educational burden on an equitable basis.
The plurality then turned to its equal protection analysis.
Significantly, they found that an equal opportunity for education is a
fundamental right.477 But, the plurality was quick to explain that this is an
"equal opportunity for education as defined by art. X, sec. 3 . 478 In other
words, so long as the standard of the Uniformity Clause was met, there is
no infringement on the fundamental right to an equal opportunity for
education in Wisconsin.
[S]ince the deficiency allegedly exists not in the denial of a right to
attend a public school free of charge, nor in the less affluent districts'
failure to meet the educational standards delineated [by the
legislature], nor in the state's failure to distribute state resources to the
less affluent districts on at least an equal per-pupil basis as distribution
is made to wealthier districts, no fundamental right is implicated in the
challenged spending disparity.479
As a result, the court would analyze any distinctions under the state
school finance system using a rational relation test."' Citing local control
as a legitimate state interest, the two-tiered guaranteed tax base plan
easily passed muster. 48' Nowhere did the plurality meaningfully address
the extensive factual findings of the trial court. Rather, the plurality
treated the case as one of mere spending differences, which are
permitted under Bus .
The Dissent. Justice Bablitch, joined by Justices Heffernan and
Abrahamson, excoriated the plurality for ignoring the facts of the case
and treating it as a case of spending disparities.4 Bablitch chose to put
substance into the Uniformity Clause based on his reading of the
constitutional history and prior case law, though others might say that he
crafted a new constitutional standard out of whole cloth. He wrote: "I
conclude that the uniformity clause of art. X, sec. 3, of the Wisconsin
476. Id. at 577-78.
477- Id. at 579.
478. Id. at 579.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 580.
481. Id. at 58o-8i.
482. Id. at 587 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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Constitution mandates that the State provide a character of instruction in
the state schools such that each child is provided with a uniform
opportunity to become an educated person. 4 ' He elaborated: the State
must "provide a character of instruction in the state schools such that all
children are provided with a uniform opportunity to become equipped
for their future roles as citizens, participants in the political system, and
competitors both economically and intellectually. '' 484 With such a
standard, all Bablitch needed was one more vote and the wave theorists
might have been pointing to Kukor as the first of the third-wave cases.
Even so, a standard not unlike Bablitch's standard for the Uniformity
Clause would ultimately garner a majority of votes on the court in the
later Vincent litigation.
What we know for certain from Busg and Kukor about the level of
equity and adequacy to which Wisconsin children are entitled: (i)
children in Wisconsin have a fundamental right to an equal opportunity
for education; (2) the State must provide such an opportunity; and (3)
the opportunity need not be absolutely equal. We also know that
whatever level of uniformity is required under Article X, section 3, the
State had, to date, provided it. Thus, with no clear constitutional
standard for what is a "uniform" public education, yet an acknowledged
fundamental right to an equal opportunity for such a uniform education,
the Vincent court was left with a great deal of flexibility in approaching
its constitutional task.
B. THE VINCENT/WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
Even with two significant Wisconsin Supreme Court cases regarding
educational finance on the books, one could hardly claim that the
standard for the Uniformity Clause was clear and determinative. To
understand the court's Solomon-like Vincent decision, this section
analyzes the individual role orientations and ideological attitudes of the
justices who rendered the Vincent decision.
Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson doesn't seem to mind setting
precedent, whether it be in her career or her judicial opinions. First in
her law school class, the first woman to become an associate and later a
partner at one major Madison law firm, the first woman to serve on the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the first to serve as its chief justice, and an
outspoken supporter of the "new judicial federalism" movement of the
I98Os, Abrahamson has been a leader in her field. Less clear, however, is
the extent to which Abrahamson's attitudes and ideology have had a




485. See infra Part III.C.5.
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significant, systematic impact on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
decisions. This section constructs a profile of the Abrahamson court
(a.k.a. the Vincent v. Voight court).
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
TABLE 3
ELECTORAL HISTORY OF JUSTICES ON THE WISCONSIN
1992-200046
SUPREME COURT,
(shaded region indicates members of the Vincent v. Voight Court)






















486. Most of the nformation summarized in this table was collected from the biographical profiles
of the justices on the website for the Wisconsin Court System, at http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/
judges/supreme/index.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
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Immediately obvious from Table 3 are the facts that Governor
Thompson initially appointed three of the seven Vincent justices, that
Chief Justice Abrahamson was initially appointed by Democratic
Governor Lucey and thrice re-elected, and that Justices Bablitch,
Bradley and Crooks were initially elected to the high bench. Also of
interest is the fact that the three Thompson appointees all voted with the
State's position in Vincent. Abrahamson, Bablitch, and Bradley voted to
strike down the school finance system, and Crooks set the new
constitutional standard under the Uniformity Clause, while voting to
uphold the system. As will be seen below, this majority of Prosser (or his
predecessor Janine Geske), Sykes (or her predecessor Donald
Steinmetz), Wilcox, and Crooks frequently vote together, leaving




Chief Justice Abrahamson is an intellectual heavyweight on the
bench. Born and raised in New York City, Abrahamson received her
undergraduate degree from New York University in 1953, her law degree
from Indiana University in 1956, and a doctorate of law in American
legal history from the University of Wisconsin Law School."8 She has
taught at the University of Wisconsin Law School, received fourteen
honorary doctor of law degrees, is a fellow of the Wisconsin Academy of
Arts and Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, an
elected member of the American Philosophical Society, and a member of
the American Judicature Society. As discussed below, she has authored
numerous scholarly works on issues ranging from Wisconsin legal
history,489 to the new judicial federalism,4 ' to the role of women in the
bar and on the bench.49' Abrahamson's accomplishments extend far
beyond the academy. Abrahamson practiced law for a private firm in
487. Much of the biographical information on the justices was collected from their biographical
profiles on the website for the Wisconsin Court System, at http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/
supreme/index.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
488. Justice Shirley Abrahamsom, at http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/supreme/
arbrahamson.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
489. Shirley Abrahamson & Elizabeth Hartman, Building a More Perfect Union: Wisconsin's
Contribution to Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 677 (1998).
490. Shirley Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982); Shirley
Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985) [hereinafter Criminal Law and State Constitutions]; Shirley Abrahamson,
Homegrown Justice: The State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306
(Bradley D. McGraw ed. 1985) [hereinafter Homegrown Justice].
491. Shirley Abrahamson, Wisconsin Women's Law Journal Fifteenth Anniversary Issue: Forward,
15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. s (2000).
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Madison for fourteen years before becoming a judge and has participated
in numerous professional organizations and committees both on and off
the bench.492
Despite her own protestations to the contrary, Abrahamson's off-
the-bench comments and writing reflect an activist and liberal attitude.493
The "new judicial federalism" movement is often associated with the call
to arms by Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, as he implored state
supreme courts to interpret their protections of civil rights and civil
liberties more expansively than the narrow interpretations emanating
from the Burger Supreme Court.494 Although Abrahamson took pains to
suggest that the new judicial federalism is not inherently liberal, there
can be no doubt that Abrahamson's review of state constitutional
criminal law suggests that she approves of state supreme courts' reading
civil liberties protections for the criminally accused into their own
constitutions.4 5 Abrahamson demonstrated this liberal federalism in a
recent dissent in which she chided the majority for failing to adopt a
higher state constitutional standard of conduct for police officers than
required by the U.S. Constitution:
Under our system of federalism and state sovereignty, the U.S.
Supreme Court has tossed the ball back to each state court to
determine whether the state should require, as a matter of state
constitutional law or as a matter of a state supreme court's
superintending authority, that law enforcement officers clarify a
suspect's equivocal request for an attorney. This court has, in my
opinion, now fumbled that ball.J6
She also clearly views constitutional law as evolving and dynamic,
not static. She wrote, "[i]f the state court's interpretation of a state
constitutional provision differs from the federal court's interpretation of
a similar federal provision, there is a continuing dialogue on the issue.
Dialogue is healthy for the system." '497 In sum, Abrahamson's relatively
492. Yet she has had difficulty creating collegial relations among her colleagues on the high bench.
She has openly sparred with Justice Bablitch and as one reporter noted, "[exceedingly cordial to
almost everyone else, Abrahamson has been known to show some frustrations at the intellectual
limitations of certain colleagues. She's smarter than they are, and she isn't good at hiding it." Stuart
Levitan, The Rise of the Sisterhood, MADISON MAG., July i999, at 12.
493. "I do not use the labels 'liberal' and 'conservative,"' Abrahamson wrote, "[i]f forced to pin a
label on myself, I refer to myself as 'reasonable."' Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice, supra note 490, at
306.
494. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
495. See Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions, supra note 490.
496. State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142, 154 (Wis. 2002) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
497. Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice, supra note 490, at 307.
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large body of off-the-bench writing and commentary reflect a liberal and
activist streak.
According to press' accounts and participants in this study,
Abrahamson is joined on the liberal wing of the court by William
Bablitch.49 His professional experiences suggest that he may lean toward
the left as well. Bablitch has spent most of his adult life in public service.
Born in Stevens Point, Wisconsin, Bablitch served in the Peace Corps
and graduated from the Wisconsin Law School in i968."9 He practiced as
the Portage County District Attorney until 1972 when he was elected to
the state Senate as a Democrat. In the Senate, he was elected assistant
majority leader in 1975, while becoming majority leader in 1976. He
remained in that leadership position until he was elected to the state
supreme court in 1983. Bablitch himself is proud of his legal
accomplishments in pushing through pathbreaking and victim-sensitive
sexual assault and rape legislation."m He is also quite proud of the
positions he took in dissent in both Kukor v. Grover and Vincent v.
Voight. "I take most pride in the decisions that I participated in
regarding public financing of public education," he was quoted as saying,
"[a]lthough I was not in the majority in most of them, I did have
influence on the majority writers on two matters."' ' "One was
establishing that every child in the state has a right to an equal
opportunity to an education... [t]he other was defining the standards for
an equal education that will equip children as citizens.
'5 °2
Ann Walsh Bradley rounds out the liberal trio on the court. Bradley
was born in Richland Center, Wisconsin and received her law degree
from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1976.503 Her professional
career is respectable but not unusual for a state supreme court judge, as
she privately practiced law in a firm that she started before becoming a
circuit court judge in Marathon County. She also taught high school prior
to practicing law.
The apparently conservative majority of the court is made up of
Justices Crooks, Prosser, Sykes, and Wilcox. Patrick Crooks-the middle
vote in Vincent-describes himself as a "moderate conservative.' ' 4 A
498. See, e.g., Anita Weier, Bablitch Won't Seek Re-election, CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 4,2001, at Bi; to-
Year Term Won by Sykes, BELOIT DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 2000, at Bi; Levitan, supra note 492.
499. Justice William Bablitch, at: http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/supreme/bablitch.htm
(last visited June 5, 2004).
500. Weier, supra note 498.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, at: http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/supreme/




native and long-time resident of Green Bay, Crooks was the first high
court justice from northeastern Wisconsin since 1962 when he was
elected to the bench in 1996.5 He was educated in Catholic post-
secondary schools-St. Norbert's College and the University of Notre
Dame Law School. Before becoming a judge, Crooks worked in private
practice and as an officer in the U.S. Army in the Judge Advocate
General's office. In 1997, he was appointed by Democratic Governor
Martin Schreiber to serve on the Brown County trial court and was re-
elected to that post three times. His last election campaign, however, was
managed by Republican Assembly Speaker Scott Jensen. His
conservative reputation is in part based on his work in revamping and
toughening up the state's juvenile justice code and calling for limits on
early prison release for adult offenders.' °6
In a 2001 campaign statement, Justice David Prosser stated that he
"recognize[s] the unquestioned authority of the legislature to make and
change the basic law."5" Though this restraintist sentiment may be
considered part of any supreme court candidate's campaign speech,
Prosser's background would seem to support that statement. Justice
Prosser served as a Republican Representative from the Appleton area
in the Assembly from 1979 through i996.'08 During that time, he served
six years as Assembly minority leader and two years as Assembly
Speaker. He received his law school training from the University of
Wisconsin Law School, served as a district attorney in Outagamie
County, and worked in the U.S. Department of Justice. He also did a
brief stint as an administrative assistant with Republican Congressman
Harold Froehlich. Prosser was appointed to the state high court by
Governor Thompson in 1998.
The Vincent court's youngest and newest member is Diane Sykes, a
self-proclaimed judicial conservative and a member of the conservative
Federalist Society."° First appointed to the court by Governor Thompson
in 1999, Sykes began her professional career as a journalist with the
Milwaukee Journal and then graduated from Marquette University Law
School in 1984."0 After practicing law with the Milwaukee law firm of
505. Justice N. Patrick Crooks, at: http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/supreme/crooks.htm
(last visited June 5, 2004); High Court Rookie Now a Team Player, CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at
A3.
506. Patrick Crooks Joins the Wisconsin Supreme Court, WISCONSIN LAW., Aug. 1996, at 29.
507. Wisconsin Elections, State Supreme Court Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., at http://danenet
.wicip.org/lwvdc/ca2ooio4/wi.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
5o8. Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., at: http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/supreme/
prosser.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
509. Diane Sykes: Newest Supreme Court Justice, WISCONSIN LAW., June 2oo0, at 23.
51o. Justice Diane S. Sykes, at: http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/udges/supreme/sykes.htm (last
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Whyte & Hirschboeck, Sykes was elected to the Milwaukee County
Circuit Court in 1992. Sykes has earned a conservative reputation both
on and off the bench. Off the bench, she was formerly married to Hoover
Institution fellow, and conservative author and talk-show host Charles
Sykes. On the bench her decision-making has been relatively
5''conservative.
Along with Justices Bablitch (a Democrat) and Prosser (a
Republican), Justice Jon Wilcox makes up the trio of justices who served
in the Wisconsin Legislature before joining the court . 2 Wilcox was a
Republican Assemblyman from 1969 to 1975. Before attending law
school at the University of Wisconsin, Wilcox served as a First
Lieutenant in the U.S. Army from 1959 to i961. He graduated from law
school in 1965 and worked in private practice for a number of years.
After his service in the Legislature and on the Wisconsin Conservation
Congress (1975-1980), Wilcox was a circuit court judge in Waushara
County for thirteen years and served as the Sixth Judicial Administrative
District's Chief Judge from 1985 to 1992. In 1992, Governor Thompson
appointed Wilcox to the high court.
What can be gleaned from this brief review of the justices'
backgrounds? First, it is worth repeating that three of the justices-
Wilcox, Prosser, and Sykes-were initially appointed to the bench by
Governor Thompson. Three also have clear ties to the Republican
party-Prosser and Wilcox as Republican legislators, while Crooks's
campaign was managed by a Republican legislator. On the other end of
the spectrum, Abrahamson's writings and public comments have
suggested a more activist and liberal approach than her more
conservative colleagues. Former Democratic Legislator Bablitch seems
in sync with Abrahamson ideologically, but the two have publicly feuded.
Perhaps the justice with the background least susceptible to easy
stereotypes is Ann Walsh Bradley whose career has been the solid and
non-controversial fare that one might expect of a state court judge.
2. The Court's Significant Decisions
Although the background of the justices begins to paint a picture of
their role orientations and ideologies, a further exploration of the court's
decisions and voting patterns can provide a better and more systematic
visited June 5, 2004).
511. See infra notes 513-52 and accompanying text.
512. Justice Jon P. Wilcox, at: http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/udges/supreme/wilcox.htm (last
visited June 5, 2004).
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understanding of their behavior and whether it is consistent with their
personal backgrounds."1 3
Personal Injury and Tort Law. The significant cases decided by her
court suggest that Justice Abrahamson would have liked to lead the
court in a more liberal direction, but was frequently relegated to dissents
in tort cases. For instance, in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee,"4 a
majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court consisting of Justices Day,
Wilcox, Steinmetz, and Bablitch barred a twenty-seven-year-old claim of
priest sex abuse, concluding that the Archdiocese could not be held liable
for negligent hiring, retraining, training and supervision of a priest
because such claims would impinge upon the Archdiocese's First
Amendment rights."5 In dissent, Justices Nathan Heffernan and
Abrahamson objected to the First Amendment finding of the majority
and would have sent the case back to the trial court for further
factfinding.' 16 In another lonely dissent (Heffernan had left the court),
Abrahamson criticized the court for holding that police officers were
immune from liability when they failed to arrest the perpetrator of
domestic violence who murdered his girlfriend, even though they had
been told of the aggressor's violence and had promised to arrest him."7
Abrahamson and Heffernan's successor, Ann Walsh Bradley, again
found themselves in dissent when the majority refused to extend the
protections of tort law to a case in which an employer, through
misrepresentation, breached an employment contract.' 8  Finally,
Abrahamson and Bradley were relegated to a dissent in State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company v. Ford Motor Company,"9 when the
majority refused to extend tort law protections to a consumer who
suffered only "economic loss."52' In dissent, Abrahamson made her views
clear: "The public remains in an unfair bargaining position as compared
to the manufacturer.... We feel that the consumer should be protected
513. The following summary of the significant decisions of the Abrahamson Court between 1995
and 2000 is based on the annual review of the Wisconsin Supreme Court compiled by attorney Daniel
Hildebrand for the Wisconsin Lawyer magazine. The year of 1995 was chosen as a starting point
because this was the first term in which the court consisted of a majority of members that would
ultimately serve on the Vincent court (Abrahamson, Bablitch, Bradley, and Wilcox). Crooks would
join the court in i996 replacing Roland Day; Prosser joined the court in 1998 replacing Geske; Sykes
joined the court in 1999 replacing Steinmetz.
514. 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995).
515. Id. at 789-92.
516. Id. at 792-94.
517. Barillari v. Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 759 (Wis. 1995).
518. Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. i998).
519. 592 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 1999).
520. Id. at 203-04.
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by affording a legal remedy which causes the manufacturer to bear the
cost of its own defective product.
52
Public Records. The Wisconsin high court does not have liberal
inclinations in cases dealing with private citizens' access to public
records. In Woznicki v. Erickson,522 the court addressed a case in which
the privacy and reputational interests of an employee were at issue when
his personnel file was going to be made public under the public records
act by the district attorney in a criminal investigation. A majority of the
court decided to permit employees in such circumstances to seek judicial
intervention to protect their privacy interests and avoid public scrutiny. 2
Justices Abrahamson and Bradley dissented and accused the majority of
lawmaking, while lamenting the loss of public access to public records. 24
The majority (with Abrahamson, Bradley, and Prosser dissenting) later
extended Woznicki v. Erickson in Milwaukee Teachers Education
Association v. Board of School Directors to prevent a school board from
similarly disclosing a teacher's personnel file under the public records
law. 25 Although not a public records case, Vultaggio v. Yasko raised the
issue of whether citizens could freely provide information to legislative
bodies without fear of being faced with a defamation lawsuit.26 A
majority of the court refused to recognize an absolute privilege for
persons who voluntarily provide testimony to a legislative body.27 In
dissent, Justices Bradley, Abrahamson, and Steinmetz would have
recognized the privilege and feared that failing to do so would subject
521. Id. at 220 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). In many cases, however, the Abrahamson court
unanimously agreed to expand liability and compensate victims of negligence or malfeasance. See, e.g.,
Nieuwendorf v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1995) (upholding a jury verdict against the
parents of a child who injured his teacher with his violent behavior after he had been taken off his
medication for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and failing to inform the school of such actions);
Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996) (although refusing to overturn a rule
that would hold mentally disabled adults responsible for the torts they commit, regardless of their
capacity to comprehend their actions, the court held that a person who is institutionalized with a
mental disability and who does not have such capacity cannot be held liable in tort); DeChant v.
Monarch Life Ins. Co., 547 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1996) (permitting recovery of attorneys fees and bond
premiums expended in an action for bad faith breach of an insurance contract); Jacque v. Steenberg
Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (agreeing to uphold a $ioo,ooo punitive damages award for
an intentional trespass that resulted in only nominal ($i) actual damages); McEvoy v. Group Health
Cooperative, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997) (extending the tort of bad faith to cover the conduct of
health maintenance organizations).
522. 549 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Wis. i996).
523. Id. at 705-06.
524. Id. at 708 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
525. 596 N.W.2d 404, 404 (Wis. 1999).
526. 572 N.W.2d 450 (Wis. 1998).
527. Id. at 451.
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private citizens to suits by developers, landowners and others when they
freely speak their minds at city council and school board meetings."'
Constitutional Law. In several cases, the Abrahamson court was
asked to review the allocation of power among the branches of
Wisconsin government. These cases speak to the court's willingness to
overturn legislative policy on constitutional grounds. In 1996, the court
invalidated two provisions of Act 27, the biennial budget bill. A
unanimous court first struck down the legislature's approval of Governor
Thompson's attempt to consolidate educational policy-making under his
authority.29 In a second case, the court unanimously struck language
from Act 27 which prohibited a trial court from appointing counsel for
any party other than the child in a dependency matter.3 The court held
that this legislation intruded upon the judiciary's powers and would also
violate the equal protection and due process rights of parents in abuse
and neglect proceedings."' Both cases reflect judicial activism as defined
in this study.
The court has been much less willing to strike down legislation on
constitutional grounds when separation of powers concerns are not the
central issue. And a majority of the court has generally deferred to the
legislature. For instance, the court refused to invoke the Establishment
Clause and the Wisconsin State Constitution's prohibitions against state
expenditures for the benefit of religious societies or seminaries to strike
down the Milwaukee voucher program. 32
Criminal Law. Despite Chief Justice Abrahamson's call for a more
expansive reading of Wisconsin's constitutional protections for the
criminally accused than offered by the U.S. Supreme Court, her court did
not embrace judicial federalism. For instance, in two related 1995 cases, a
six-member majority of the court upheld the constitutionality of Chapter
98o of the Wisconsin Statutes which provides for the involuntary
commitment to treatment of individuals labeled "sexually violent." '533 In
lone dissent, Justice Abrahamson argued that the incarceration of
individuals for past crimes for which they had already served sentences
would violate constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex post
facto laws. 34 In another case, Justices Abrahamson and Bradley agreed
with the majority (Geske, Crooks, Bablitch, Wilcox, and Steinmetz) that
528. Id. at 461, 464.
529. Thompson v. Craney, 546 N.W.2d 123 (Wis. 1996).
530. Joni B. v. State. 549 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1996).
531. Id. at 413-17.
532. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 6o2 (Wis. 1998) (Bablitch & Abrahamson dissented).
533. State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1995); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 5995).
534. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 135-47.
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a search by a police officer at a school that uncovered a student's knife
was legal, but disagreed with the majority's application of a less stringent
"reasonable grounds" standard (as opposed to "probable cause") for the
police search when it is conducted at the behest of school officials. 35 In a
third significant case, the entire court agreed to dismiss charges against a
woman who physically resisted an unlawful arrest,136 but the majority did
so while abrogating the common law right to forcibly resist unlawful
arrest. 37 In dissent, Justice Abrahamson would have upheld that right of
citizens, while Justices Bradley and Bablitch would have recognized a
narrow right to forcibly resist arrest in certain circumstances."'
Family Law. Family law cases typically generate little attention,
unless the matter raises issues that go to the very core of community
values. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. was such a case, in that the court's
views about same-sex relationships lurked just below the surface. 39
There, a custody dispute arose between a biological mother and her
former female partner who had shared a close, committed relationship
with the biological mother for more than ten years. 4 ° They had jointly
agreed to raise the child. Although a majority of the court refused to
read the state's custody law to cover the non-biological parent in the
case, the majority did read the state's visitation rules aggressively to
permit her to petition for visitation."4  The dissenters-Wilcox,
Steinmetz, and Day-criticized the majority for its judicial activism and,
apparently, its tolerance of same-sex relationships, while Justice
Steinmetz proclaimed that "[t]he legislators of this state, representing the
views of their constituents, have consciously decided not to protect or
promote non-traditional, non-legally binding relationships, apparently
believing that such relationships are not basic to morality and
civilization. 542
The abortion issue provided the backdrop for State ex rel. Angela
M.W. v. Kruzicki,43 the highly publicized "cocaine mom" case in which
535. In the Interest of Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1997).
536. State v. Hobsen, 577 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1998).
537. Id. at 837-38.
538. Id. at 838, 842-44. On occasion, the court unanimously protected the rights of the accused.
See, e.g., State v. Harris, 557 N.W.2d 245 (Wis. 1996) (holding that passengers in a car, who were not
suspected of any wrongdoing, could challenge a police officer's illegal search of a vehicle); State v.
Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770 (Wis. 1999) (tossing out the conviction of a man who had been convicted by
a jury among whose members was a juror who had expressed bias towards the testimony of a
prosecution witness whom the juror recognized).
539. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
540. Id. at 421-23.
541. Id. at 428-29.
542. Id. at 446 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
543. 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997).
[VOL. 55:1077
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
the State attempted to invoke the Children's Code to hospitalize a
pregnant crack cocaine user and thereby protect the viable fetus." The
issue was whether the fetus constituted a "child" that could be protected
under the Code.145 A majority of the court-consisting of the three
female justices, Bradley, Abrahamson, and Geske, and Justice
Bablitch-said that the fetus was not a child. 40 In a vitriolic dissent,
Crooks, Steinmetz, and Wilcox argued the legislative purpose of the
statute would have covered unborn children.547 In a third significant
family law matter, a majority of the court made up of Justices Bradley,
Abrahamson, Bablitch, and Prosser held that it is appropriate to consider
a spouse's premarital contributions to the education of her husband in
determining the post-divorce maintenance payments to the spouse. 5 In a
dissent undergirded by beliefs about the sanctity of marriage, Justices
Sykes, Wilcox, and Crooks argued that the Family Code pertains only to
the institutions of marriage and the family, neither of which include
nonmarital or premarital cohabitation. 4
Synthesis. Several observations can be made from this analysis of
significant decisions by the Abrahamson court. First, Justices
Abrahamson and Bradley consistently take positions that are more
liberal in tort, criminal, family, and constitutional law and they are
frequently in the minority in these decisions. Second, although Justice
Bablitch is reputedly in the liberal faction of the court, this review
suggests that he just as frequently votes with his more conservative
colleagues. Third, a majority of the court is usually unwilling to overturn
prior legislative, executive, or judicial policy, i.e., the court is usually
restraintist, in significant cases.
3. A Systematic Analysis of the Abrahamson Court's Ideology and
Role Orientation
This section analyzes all of the court's employment law cases and
criminal law and procedure cases between January I, 1999 and July I,
2002.550
544 Id. at 732.
545. id. at 733.
546. Id. at 740.
547- Id. at 74-41.
548. In re Marriage of Meyer v. Meyer, 620 N.W.2d 382 (Wis. 2000).
549. Id. at 392.
55o. The time period was selected for two reasons: (i) it covers a sufficient number of years
including the year in which Vincent was decided to provide a large enough sample of cases to establish
the court's and justices' ideological attitudes, and (2) during those years, the Abrahamson Court,
consisting of Abrahamson, Bablitch, Bradley, Crooks, Prosser, Sykes, and Wilcox remained quite
stable, as all members of the Vincent court were on the court during most of the time period. Justice
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The results of the systematic analysis of the Abrahamson court's
employment law and criminal law cases over a two-and-one-half-year
period seem to confirm the tentative observations made with regard to
the justices' backgrounds and the analysis of the significant cases. To wit:
Justices Abrahamson, Bradley, and Bablitch are the most liberal justices
on the bench and they are much more liberal than their colleagues.
There is a 21.6 percentage point drop between Bablitch's liberal decision
output and the next most liberal justice, Sykes. Sykes's fourth rank in
liberal opinion output is somewhat misleading, as she is actually the
seventh most liberal justice in employment cases and is only fourth
overall because her rate of liberal voting in criminal justice is eight
percentage points higher than her fellow "conservative" (Prosser). Yet




than the nearest justice on the left wing of the court (Bablitch). Justice
Crooks's liberal ratings are also noteworthy. In matters of economic
justice (represented by the employment cases), Crooks is the fourth most
liberal justice by a comfortable margin. But when it comes to criminal
justice matters, Crooks is relatively conservative. To the extent that
educational finance matters evoke attitudes similar to those in economic
justice matters, one would expect Crooks to be more liberal than the
fourth most liberal justice, Sykes.
To test whether or not the liberal voting rates of the justices were
significantly different from each other, pairwise t-tests among all the
justices were conducted. At the .05 significance level (two-tailed), Justice
Abrahamson was significantly more liberal than all justices in the
combined employment law and criminal justice cases, while her fellow
liberals, Bradley and Bablitch were significantly more liberal than the
four conservatives, Crooks, Prosser, Wilcox, and Sykes. None of the
conservatives were significantly different from each other. In the
employment law cases alone, it is interesting to note that the liberal
justices, Abrahamson, Bradley and Bablitch were all significantly more
liberal than conservatives Wilcox, Prosser, and Sykes. But Justice Crooks
was not significantly different from either the conservatives or the
liberals. This seems consistent with his self-proclaimed moderate
conservatism and his reputation as a potential swing voter.
In terms of the court's role orientation, however, there is little
difference among the justices overall, as all are effectively clustered in
the range of 40-50 percent activist decision-making range." ' But the
similar rates of activism overall mask differences in the two subject-
matter areas. In the areas of employment law, Justices Abrahamson,
Bradley, and Bablitch are the three most activist, while in the criminal
law arena, Justices Sykes, Wilcox, Crooks, and Bablitch (followed closely
by Prosser) are the most activist. The explanation for this is relatively
straightforward. Many of the opportunities for activism in criminal
matters raise the question of whether evidence collected from a search
and seizure was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. In these
cases, Justices Abrahamson, Bradley, and Bablitch urged the justices to
restrain themselves from expanding exceptions to the general
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizures, while the
majority conservative wing crafted new exceptions to permit the
introduction of the seized evidence. In contrast, in employment law
cases, Justices Abrahamson, Bradley, and Bablitch were more likely to
551. Note that any interpretation of the court's or justice's activism rates should be viewed with
caution due to the relatively few number of cases.
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create new legal methods of recovery for aggrieved workers, while the
conservative majority urged restraint. 52
The analysis of the Vincent court provides a detailed understanding
of the court's role orientations and ideologies that shape the justices'
decision-making. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, a champion of using
state constitutions to further civil rights and civil liberties, is decidedly
liberal in her voting. She is almost always joined on the left by Justice
Bradley and, frequently by Justice Bablitch. On the other side of the
bench, the Thompson appointees (Justices Sykes, Wilcox, and Prosser)
display a clear pattern of conservative decision-making. Justice Patrick
Crooks was quite conservative in his decision-making in criminal law
matters, but the most liberal of the conservative majority in matters of
employment law. Crooks would cast the split vote in Vincent.
C. AN HISTORICAL-POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VINCENT V. VOIGHT CASE
i. The Genesis of Vincent v. Voight553
Just west of Eau Claire there is a stretch of Interstate 94 that runs
parallel to the old highway, U.S. 12, through the rolling hills of Dunn
County. For most travelers on their way from the major Wisconsin cities
to Minnesota's Twin Cities, there isn't much reason to exit off of 94 into
one of the nondescript small towns nestled alongside of highway 12. Elk
Mound (population of approximately 3,500) is one of those small towns.
The town is the home of Superintendent William Vincent, a Vietnam
veteran and former naval helicopter pilot. In an interview, Vincent
recognized that the quaint rolling hills around Elk Mound do not amount
to much when it comes to assessed property value.
Vincent is not the stereotyped picture of a social justice crusader.
His deliberate speech patterns and apparent attention to protocol belie
his military training. Nonetheless, it was Vincent who, sometime in i99i,
challenged his fellow Dunn County school superintendents to look
beyond their day-to-day scrambles to put out administrative fires and
help him resolve a bigger problem: what to do about a school finance
552. It should also be noted that the Abrahamson Court has a seemingly high rate of dissent. A
dissenting opinion was filed in 62 of the 143 cases analyzed (43.4 percent). The Ohio Supreme Court
too has a seemingly high rate of dissent with dissents filed in io3 of the 241 cases analyzed (42.7
percent).
553. Unless otherwise indicated, information for this section was gathered from personal
observations of the author and the following sources: Interview with Karen Drazkowski, Member,
Steering Committee. Association for Equity in Funding, West Salem, Wisconsin (June 7, 2001);
Interview with David Hase, supra note 438; Interview with Douglas Haselow. supra note 437;
Interview with Bruce Meredith. supra note 438; Interview with Roland Rockwell, Member,
Association for Equity in Funding, Madison, Wisconsin (June 5, 2001); Interview with William
Vincent, Chair, Association for Equity in Funding, Elk Mound, Wisconsin (June 8,2ooi).
[Vol. 55: 1077
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
system that systematically shortchanged them just because their children
were born in towns with relatively low property values. As Vincent tells
the story, an informal group of superintendents, mostly from Dunn
County, would meet on a semi-regular basis over a cup of coffee and
pastries to discuss challenges they faced in their work and to offer
support to each other. As Superintendent, Vincent bore the usual battle
scars of various budget crises, and understood the workings of the state's
school finance system. He also understood that wealthy districts, such as
Nicolet and Gibraltar, did not have to exert as much tax effort to spend
at much higher levels. More fundamentally, the superintendent
understood how low tax bases affected their ability to provide updated
facilities, instructional materials, and a variety of course offerings.
But the small-town district administrator lacked the time and the
expertise to substantiate that the system was short-changing their
students. For proof, Vincent and his allies turned to the Department of
Public Instruction's former Director of the Bureau of School Aids,
Roland Rockwell. Rockwell had been a lifelong educator, administrator
and bureaucrat with the DPI. He joined DPI in 1967 as the Supervisor of
School Finance and in 1969 became the Director of the School Aids
Administration. Rockwell served in that post until his formal retirement
in 1986. During his tenure, he implemented the tax-base equalization
plan that was passed under Governor Lucey, witnessed the demise of the
negative aids provision of that plan in the wake of Busg, and oversaw
tinkering with the former two-tiered equalization plan until his
retirement. Rockwell, like Vincent, was no crusader. Indeed, along with
Professor Richard Rossmiller of the University of Wisconsin, Rockwell
served as the State's chief witness in the Kukor litigation, explaining the
workings (but noting some failings) of the two-tiered plan. Yet Rockwell
recognized the plight of the low-property-wealth districts. With data
available from the Department of Public Instruction and his knowledge
of the two-tired (later three-tiered) system, he demonstrated that
districts with low property wealth exerted greater tax effort, yet were
able to raise significantly fewer dollars.
Armed with Rockwell's data and driven by Vincent's challenge, the
Dunn County superintendents' group set out to spread their message and
gain supporters. On their own time and mostly after hours and in the
summer, the superintendents visited other administrators and school
board members in similarly situated districts. And, perhaps most
important, they began to speak to their local legislators. The group's
early focus was decidedly not on preparing for litigation, but rather,
seeking modifications to the equalization formula through the
legislature. The group quickly realized it needed to formally organize
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and raise revenues to support its effort. Consequently, in 1992, the
growing coalition of school administrators from low property wealth
districts formed the Association for Equity in Funding (AEF) to promote
financial equity among public school districts on behalf of both students
and taxpayers.554
To oversee the Association, a steering committee of approximately
ten persons was established with Bill Vincent serving as its Chair. The
growing group of mostly rural school superintendents was still comprised
of political neophytes when it came to seeking legislative reform in
Madison. Fortunately for AEF, they found a supporter in Doug
Haselow. Haselow was a long-time government affairs officer and
lobbyist for the City of Milwaukee in Mayor Henry Maier's
administration. He knew his way around the Capitol's halls, he
understood the inequities of the school finance system as he had worked
with Maier during his support of the Kukor litigation, and he thought
AEF's cause a worthy one. Haselow helped the AEF leaders to gain
access to certain legislators and provided pointers on how best to get
their case across.
By the time that Bill Vincent and AEF approached him, Haselow
was working as the chief lobbyist for the MPS. And at that time, AEF
was still comprised of exclusively small and mid-sized school districts.
Even combined, this group wielded little electoral clout. As a result, they
knew that they would have to reach out to the larger school systems in
the state and Milwaukee seemed an obvious choice given its educational
woes. But Milwaukee and Elk Mound had different concerns. Milwaukee
had an average to above-average equalized tax base, unlike the property-
poor rural districts. Milwaukee faced the challenges of urban poverty and
municipal overburden. Elk Mound did not. Milwaukee simply needed
more money from the state; a more equalized tax base could only go so
far. In fact, some might have viewed the Association's fiscal equity
arguments as detrimental to the interests of Milwaukee's schoolchildren.
In short, adequacy, not equity, seemed Milwaukee's most promising
avenue of reform.
554. To some, this seemed a throwback to the "second wave" of school finance reform. By 1992,
the school finance and law journals were beginning to recognize a distinct jurisprudential and policy
shift away from traditional equity-minded, particularly fiscal-equity-minded, school finance reform.
FN Kentucky's Rose decision was three years old and well known and nearly a dozen adequacy
litigations were pending in other state courts. Statehouses and courts were simply growing wary of
fiscal equity arguments and the propensity to level-down spending, rather than leveling up. Adequacy
was seen as a more politically appealing theory of reform that would permit the big spenders to
continue spending big, while at the same time ensuring an adequate education for all school children.
In short, AEF was swimming against the policy tide.
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Vincent and Haselow emphasized the commonalities. There were
small and mid-sized districts that were significantly impacted by poverty
and limited English proficient students. Although Milwaukee's tax base
was far greater than the Elk Mounds of the state, it was still far smaller
than the bases enjoyed by the City's suburban ring. The suburbs-Fox
Point, Glendale/River Hills, and Maple Dale/Indian Hill-were virtual
"tax havens" because they could tax their citizens modestly, while still
providing high quality public schools and municipal services. Perhaps
most important, the interests of MPS and the small-town districts
converged around the idea of equalizing categorical aids by weighting
high-needs students greater and including them in the formula. Because
the aids were currently insufficient to meet the needs and because they
were provided on an unequalized basis, wealthier districts were
effectively receiving flat grants which they were able to supplement with
little tax effort, while Milwaukee struggled to stretch the inadequate
categorical dollars. Finally, MPS had been badly bruised by the Kukor
decision and had been the frequent target of Republican attacks on
"bloated" bureaucracies and inefficient spending (witness that
legislature's approval of the voucher program that would funnel students
and dollars away from the district). It needed some out-state allies,
particularly allies from small, conservative districts that were home to
Republican legislators. All of this said, the single-minded focus on fiscal
equity might not have been the most beneficial approach for Milwaukee.
However, Haselow saw an opportunity. He first proposed a school
finance plan to AEF that included a weighting component that would
provide greater weight, and thus more money, for "special needs"
students in poverty or with disabilities. According to Vincent, however,
AEF thought the plan too complicated and rejected it. Undeterred,
Haselow sought to join forces with AEF by persuading the Milwaukee
school board to sign on to the group's efforts. Then-Superintendent
Howard Fuller, who was a supporter of the Governor and the Milwaukee
school voucher program, and the Board promptly agreed to join the
Association. According to Haselow, it was a "no brainer. '555 For AEF, it
was a coup. Soon after, two other large districts, Racine and Beloit,
would join the group. But the group never grew beyond about 150 of the
426 school districts in the state and it was never able to attract several
prominent large districts. Most notably, Madison stood to lose from a
fiscal equity approach due to its high property values, even though it has
some of the same educational needs as Milwaukee and Racine.
555. Interview with Douglas Haselow, supra note 437.
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Although the group had developed the broad parameters of a more
equitable school finance proposal, it quickly found itself on the defensive
in the 1993 budget session. This was a session in which the Governor
pledged to move towards a system in which the state funded two-thirds
of educational costs, but at the same time demanded tax relief in the
form of revenue caps. AEF actively opposed this legislation because the
revenue caps effectively froze inequities and spending at 1993 levels. On
the eve of Governor Thompson's signing the 1993 budget bill, Bill
Vincent announced AEF's frustration with the legislative process and its
intention to study the possibility of litigation. "We're not quitting," he
was quoted as saying, "We need to continue our efforts.""' 6
2. The Lawsuit557
In the Fall of I993, several Legislators sympathetic to AEF proposed
the broad outlines of a more equitable finance system, while others
continued to push for the abolition of the property tax as the method of
financing schools. None of these proposals gathered any traction and,
consistent with its promise, AEF retained noted school finance lawyer
and University of Wisconsin Professor, Julie Underwood, to conduct a
study of the feasibility of challenging the three-tiered finance system
under the state's constitution. The study, which was authored with a
partner with an elite Milwaukee law firm, concluded in 1994 that a
lawsuit stood a good chance of success, despite the obvious negative
precedent established by Kukor. By the end of 1994, it became clear that
Governor Thompson and the undivided Republican legislature were not
interested in AEF's reform proposals and that the fate of the 1995
budget session was sealed for AEF. In a January 1995 meeting, AEF
members voted unanimously to "prepare and organize" for litigation.""
In the process, 104 districts agreed to sign on as named plaintiffs.
Even though the legislature would make good on a promise of two-
thirds funding in the 1995 biennium budget bill, it would also introduce a
three-tiered funding system with a "hold harmless" first tier that
effectively provided a flat grant to all districts irrespective of wealth.559
556. Jeff Mayers, Group May Sue Over Aid, Wis. ST. J., Aug. 1O, 1993, at iB.
557. Unlsess otherwise indicated, information for this section was gathered from personal
observations of the author and the following sources: Interview with Karen Drazkowski, supra note
553; Interview with David Hase, supra note 438; Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 438;
Interview with Roland Rockwell, supra note 553; Interview with Brian Rude, Senator, Wisconsin State
Senate, LaCrosse, Wisconsin (June it, 2001); Interview with William Vincent, supra note 553.
558. By that time AEF was holding plenary annual meetings that piggy-backed on the annual
meetings of Wisconsin's other major educational organizations the Wisconsin Association of School
Boards (WASB) and the Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators (WASDA). AEF
also held nearly monthly meetings of its steering committee during that time period.
559. Interview with Douglas Haselow, supra note 437.
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Perhaps more symbolically galling to AEF, the bill would abolish the
DPI and expand the Milwaukee "choice" program to private schools.
6°
AEF was unimpressed with the boost in overall state spending and, by
that time, had selected as its lawyer David Hase, a partner with the
Milwaukee law firm of Cook & Franke and the same attorney that co-
authored the feasibility study. Hase was an experienced trial lawyer with
a practice that ranged from general business litigation to specialized
representation of school districts and community colleges. He was a died-
in-the-wool Democrat and experienced with the workings of
government, having served as legal counsel to Democratic Governor
Patrick Lucey and as Wisconsin Deputy Attorney General during the
tenure of Attorney General Bronson LaFollette. Hase was also familiar
with the state's high court and, knowing that AEF's case would not be
over until the court weighed-in on school finance again, had analyzed the
560. The impulse behind the three-tiered formula is that state equalization aid would be applied to
three different levels of school spending. Algebraically, the formula can be described as follows:
S i = [(V' - Vi) x C'i / V,] + [(V, - Vi) x C', / V'J + [(Vg8 - V) x CYi / V3,] where school district (i)'s
equalization aid would be the sum of the aid provided by each of the three tiers with some exceptions
that will be discussed below; and where, for school district (i), V'% is the state guaranteed primary
equalized valuation per member established by the legislature, V is the assessed valuation per member
of the district, and C'i is the primary shared cost per member; and where, for school district (i), V% is
the state guaranteed secondary equalized valuation per member which is the average equalized
valuation per member for the entire state, V, is the assessed valuation per member of the district, and
C', is the secondary shared cost per member; and where, for school district (i), V', is the state
guaranteed tertiary equalized valuation per member, V, is the assessed valuation per member of the
district, and C', is the tertiary shared cost per member.
In the 1998-99 academic year, the first or "primary" tier provided for an extremely high guaranteed
tax base of $2,ooo,ooo. At the time the legislation was passed, no school district in Wisconsin possessed
an equalized valuation that exceeded this amount and, therefore, all districts were theoretically
eligible for primary aid. Notably, however, this first tier covered only the first $sooo in shared costs
for K- 12 districts.
For districts that spent above the primary cost ceiling, the secondary tier provided a guaranteed
valuation in 1998-99 of $676,977. This guaranteed valuation applied to school districts that spent
above the primary cost ceiling up to the secondary cost ceiling of $6,285.
The third or "tertiary" tier provided a guaranteed valuation of $303,298 above the secondary cost
ceiling. Notice that the state's share of funding decreases as the shared cost increases, thus providing
an incentive to districts to control costs. In an effort to further control the costs in high property value
districts and enhance spending equity, the formula also requires that those districts whose equalized
valuation is so high that the tertiary aid is a negative number will have that negative amount deducted
from their secondary aids. In other words, the tertiary "aid" is deducted from the secondary aid
amount if the amount of tertiary aid is a negative number. However, if both the tertiary and secondary
"aid" come out to a negative number, the district's primary aid amount is "held harmless," i.e., no
deduction is taken from the primary aid amount. Hence, the first tier is often called the "primary hold-
harmless tier." In effect, the primary aid level provided support to all districts in the state (read: flat
aid payment) because no district enjoyed an equalized valuation above the primary guaranteed
valuation at the time. Several participants in this study felt that that inclusion of this primary level was
a necessary political compromise to obtain the votes of the wealthier "suburban ring" districts around
Milwaukee, as those districts would otherwise gain little from the massive infusion of state support
provided by the two-thirds state funding promise.
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odds. In i995, he and others felt that AEF could capture the votes of
Justices Abrahamson, Bablitch, and Bradley. They also felt that Justice
Steinmetz could be convinced to jump ship from the majority-recall
that Steinmetz did not join the plurality in Kukor but did vote to uphold
the finance system-and join the left wing of the court. Hase thought
Janine Geske, a new Thompson appointee, was a wildcard possibility for
the plaintiffs. What is significant about this analysis is not so much its
accuracy, but rather the plaintiffs' attention to judicial attitudes and their
desire to move the case swiftly to the high court before its composition
changed.
On October 12, 1995, AEF filed the Vincent lawsuit in the Dane
County Circuit Court in Madison.56' The case was assigned to Judge
Richard Calloway. Bill Vincent, though not looking for acclaim or
notoriety, agreed to lend his name as lead plaintiff in the suit 62 The lead
defendant was the State Treasurer, Jack Voight, who was charged with
disbursing state funds but would have virtually nothing to do with the
defense of the case. 6' Also named as defendants were John Benson, the
SPI, and Cate Zeuske, Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue.56 The State defendants were represented by Democratic
Attorney General James Doyle's office, which was charged with
defending state law.56 5 More specifically, Assistant Attorney General
Bruce Olsen was to take the lead in preparing the State's case.
Upon filing the lawsuit, Superintendent Benson appeared with
plaintiffs at a press conference and publicly announced his support of the
fiscal equality goals of the plaintiffs' case.' 66 As is discussed below,
Benson's personal views in favor of the plaintiffs clashed with his official
duties as a state officer and would prove to be a source of friction
between him and Governor Thompson. The Governor, for his part,
responded to the lawsuit through a spokesperson (a practice he nearly
uniformly employed throughout the litigation) and simply expressed
561. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners at 2, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis
2000) (No. 97-3714) (detailing the procedural historyy of the Vincent litigation).
562. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388,388 (Wis. 2000).
563. Id.
564. Id. Governor Thompson was not named, according to David Hase, in part because he would
have sought to have himself removed as an improper party and would likely have claimed a modest
victory from his removal. More practically, all realized that Thompson knew that he could weigh-in on
the litigation through his informal channels of influence and through formal participation in a friend-
of-the-court brief. Interview with David Hase, supra note 438.
565. See Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 388.
566. School Districts Sue on SchoolAid Formula, Wis. ST. J., Oct. 12, 1995, at 3B.
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confidence that the school finance scheme would be found
constitutional. 6
Not long after the filing of the lawsuit, the Wisconsin Education
Association Council (WEAC), representatives of the state's largest
teachers' union, sought to intervene as a party in the lawsuit 68 There can
be no doubt that a statewide action challenging the constitutionality of
the school funding system implicated the interests of the union's rank-
and-file. Like the Ohio Education Association (OEA) in DeRolph,
WEAC believed that the current funding system was both inadequate
and inequitable 69 Unlike the OEA, however, WEAC did not choose to
join the plaintiffs coalition by becoming a member of AEF. Nor did
WEAC choose merely to submit an amicus brief as it did in Kukor.
Rather, it sought to intervene as an independent party. 7
Why? The reason was simple. WEAC leadership believed that the
pressing educational finance crisis in the state was not the fiscal inequity
of the system, but rather the system's failure to provide an adequate
education in a competitive environment to all students -particularly
those in poverty, and with disabilities, and language barriers. 7 ' WEAC
also believed that the equity argument was outdated, politically
anathema, and a legal loser."
Even though both WEAC and AEF attempted to play down the
difference in their fundamental theories of relief throughout the
litigation, this difference was irreconcilable and prompted WEAC to
enter the case as an independent party. This is not to say that WEAC
and AEF did not see eye-to-eye on certain details: both opposed revenue
caps,573 and both recognized the disequalizing effects of the current
categorical system. A readily apparent shortcoming with WEAC's theory
of the case was that it sounded much like Kukor's rejected needs-based
theory. Perhaps WEAC believed it could distinguish its argument from
Milwaukee's Kukor argument, or perhaps WEAC sensed a more
favorable environment for the adequacy/needs-based argument.
Regardless, WEAC was seeking intervention as a co-plaintiff.
567. See id.
568. See Brief of Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners at 44-54, Vincent v. Voight, 614
N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000) (No. 97-3714) (describing WEAC's intervention into the case)
569. Id.
570. Id. at 4.
571. Id. at 44-54.
572. Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 438; Interview with Michael Butera, Executive
Director, Wisconsin Education Association Council, in Madison, Wisconsin (June 7, 2001).
573. The press seemed to condense WEAC's entire argument to a single-minded assault on
revenue caps that, along with other regulations, suppressed teacher salaries. Interview with Bruce
Meredith, supra note 438.
May 20041
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Ultimately, AEF recognized that it would be futile to oppose WEAC's
entry in to the case and Judge Calloway granted WEAC's motion to
intervene on July 29, I996.
574
The only other party that took any active role at the circuit court
level was a coalition of "zero-aid," property-wealthy school districts who
called themselves the Fair Aid Coalition (FAC). FAC was a group that
pre-existed the Vincent litigation and had been formed for the purpose of
representing the interests of wealthy districts during the budget
process.575 The approximately fourty members of FAC, which were
mainly Milwaukee suburb and summer resort towns, had hired former
Acting Governor Martin Schreiber as their chief lobbyist. 6 Almost
needless to say, the so-called "silk-stocking" suburbs wielded a good deal
of clout in Madison, particularly with Schreiber's support. But the
litigation process was something that FAC could not control or predict as
well as the budget process, and FAC decided early on to employ counsel
to monitor the Vincent case and participate by amicus whenever
necessary and possible. 77 To that end, FAC hired Raymond Taffora, a
former deputy and chief legal counsel to Tommy Thompson and member
of the prestigious Madison law firm of Michael, Best & Friedrich.?7
School finance cases, like other complex cases, undergo a lengthy
incubation period during which the parties conduct factual investigation,
gather formal discovery from each other, develop expert testimony, and
narrow the legal and factual issues by agreement and motion practice. At
first, Vincent appeared to be no different. AEF retained two principal
expert witnesses to render opinions on the equity of the state's
educational finance system, Bambi Statz, the former Assistant State
Superintendent for School Financial Resources and Management
Services, and Kern Alexander, a nationally recognized educational
finance expert who had testified on behalf of both Kentucky's Rose
plaintiffs and Ohio's DeRolph plaintiffs.
Statz was intimately familiar with the operation of the two and
three-tiered formula and took the laboring oar of describing the
educational finance system's alleged inadequacies.579 In an affidavit
signed on February 23, 1997, Statz alleged:
574. Brief of Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners at 2, Vincent (No. 97-3714).
575. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Fair Aid Coalition at 1-2, Vincent v. Voight, No. 9 5 -CV-5 286
(Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997); Interview with Raymond Taffora, counsel to FAC, Michael Best & Friedrich, in
Madison, Wis. (June 5, 2001).
576. Interview with Raymond Taffora, supra note 575.
577. See Brief Amicus Curiae by Fair Aid Coalition, Vincent (No. 97-3714).
578. Interview with Raymond Taffora, supra note 575.
579. Statz described her task as follows: "I have been engaged by the plaintiffs in this action to
identify the impacts of the Wisconsin school finance system and evaluate their effects on the
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The Wisconsin system of school finance over the years has developed
to the point where fiscal disparity exists among school districts in the
following respects: (i) High wealth districts tend to spend more per
student than low wealth districts; and (2) High wealth districts tend to
tax at lower rates than low wealth districts generally, and particularly
when the effect of the School Levy Tax Credit is taken into account.
This pattern of fiscal disparity has the following effects: (i)
Educational opportunities that are dependent upon financial resources
are less accessible to students living in poorer districts than to students
living in wealthier districts; (2) Taxpayers in poorer districts have to
make a greater effort than taxpayers in wealthier districts to spend on
education at any given level; and (3) Poorer school districts have to tax
more than wealthier districts to spend at any given level."'
As a result of these effects the Wisconsin system of school finance is
not as nearly uniform as practicable and its failure to provide equitable
access to resources denies equal educational opportunities to students
in poorer districts, or without any rational basis causes taxpayers in
poorer districts to pay taxes based upon a rate disproportionately
higher than the rate paid by taxpayers in wealthier districts. 75
Statz's analysis was supported by two separate reports produced by
Kern Alexander, and his team for the 1993-94 and 1994-95 school
years."2
operations of Wisconsin school districts." Statz Aff. 4, Vincent v. Voight, Case No. 95-CV-2586 (Cir.
Ct. Wis. 1997).
580. It is worth noting that neither Statz nor any other expert opined on the relationship between
dollars and student achievement and outcomes, i.e., the "Does money matter?" question. As will be
discussed below, plaintiffs' early failure to identify specifically how the differential access to dollars
resulted in a denial of equal educational opportunities became a sore spot on appeal.
581. Id. 7. Statz supported her opinion with lengthy data analyses that provided both aggregate
measures of inequality and specific examples of inequality. For instance, Statz noted extreme
variations in local fiscal capacity, "Bowler [School District] taxpayers were only able to generate [in
1994-95] $45,201 for every mill levied compared to the $956,537 generated from each mill levied in
Gibraltar [Area School District]." Id. [I99. In terms of tax effort, she wrote that the poorer districts of
Bowler (17.35 mills), Prairie Farm (20.80 mills), and Mellen (25.55 mills), taxed themselves at far
greater rates than wealthy Gibraltar (5.74 mills), Washington (8.17 mills), and Williams Bay (9.11
mills). Id. 1 17 tbl.2. She also paired similar-spending districts with each other and demonstrated that,
despite similar spending, the low-property-wealth districts exerted a far greater tax effort. Id. [ 18,
22-25. Finally, she described how these results are institutionalized in the formula. Id. 31-6o. Statz's
classic discourse on fiscal inequities would form the foundation of the plaintiffs' claim.
582. KERN ALEXANDER, RICHARD SALMON, DEBORAH COLLINS, & JENNIFER SUGHRUE, WISCONSIN:
AN EXAMPLE OF PUPIL AND TAXPAYER INEQUrrY 1993-94 (1997) [hereinafter INEQUrrY 1993-94]; KERN
ALEXANDER, RICHARD SALMON, DEBORAH COLLINS, & JENNIFER SUGHRUE, WISCONSIN: AN EXAMPLE OF
PUPIL AND TAXPAYER INEQUrrY 1994-95 (1997) [hereinafter INEQUITY 1994-95]. Alexander's basic
analysis was straightforward. He grouped all of Wisconsin's school districts (save one) into deciles,
each comprising approximately to percent of the student membership for the state. The deciles were
stratified by total equalized value of property per member (property wealth), and each decile was
assigned an average complete annual school cost (CASC) per member (spending per member).
Alexander's conclusions were unsurprising. He demonstrated that higher wealth school districts
expend more dollars per member than lower wealth districts, while lower wealth districts put more of
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The State responded to Alexander's and Statz's reports with their
own nationally recognized school finance experts: James Guthrie of
Vanderbilt University, and Richard Rossmiller, the University of
Wisconsin professor who had assisted the state in Kukor. Guthrie's
report was a thoroughgoing attack on Alexander's findings and a clear
signal as to how the State planned to litigate,8' First, Guthrie's analysis
concluded that over the period of 1983 to 1995, i.e., the period prior to
and following Kukor, the Wisconsin educational finance system was
characterized by consistent and substantial uniformity and there have
been "no perceptible" changes in the already substantial uniformity since
Kukor.s84 In other words, the system was ruled constitutional in 1989 and
nothing has changed. Here, Guthrie relied on the same accepted statistics
that were reported by Alexander and argued that, looking at equity
across the distribution of all school districts (i.e., the Gini Coefficient and
the Coefficient of Variation), Wisconsin had a notable degree of
equity,s5 Inequities only arose when considering the "outlier" districts
such as the wealthy Door County resort area of Gibraltar and the
extremely poor Bowler district. Second, he argued, the bulk of state aid
is directed at low-wealth school districts and alterations to the formula
since Kukor have benefited low-wealth districts.586 Third, the plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate that Wisconsin school funding inadequately
addresses student need .5" Finally, Wisconsin's school finance system
surpasses surrounding states and the nation in distributing financial
resources to school districts.' 88 In short, Guthrie believed he found the
Achilles' Heel of plaintiffs case: not much had changed since Kukor,
a burden on their taxpayers. This was particularly true at the upper end, as the top decile spent a great
deal more than other deciles. Alexander also found a consistent relationship between the CASC per
member and district property wealth with high wealth districts spending more per student than low
wealth districts. More surprising; however, is the fact that Alexander excluded Milwaukee from his
decile analysis because of its size and because "the fiscal problems faced by Milwaukee likely are
considerably different than [sic] the problems faced by other Wisconsin school districts" INEQUITY
1994-95, supra, at IA-i. Though not an explicit admission that fiscal inequity is not Milwaukee's
problem, it nonetheless highlights the potential conflict within the plaintiff ranks. Finally, Alexander's
report provided the results of several classic measures of finance equity including the McLoone Index,
the Federal Range Ratio, the Restricted Range Ratio, the Theil Index, and the Gini Coefficient, but
nowhere did Alexander explain the results or indicate whether these aggregate measures of equity
demonstrated significant inequity in the state.
583. JAMES W. GUTHRIE, JACOB E. ADAMS, RICHARD A. RoSSMILLER, & MARGARET L. PLECKI, EQUITY
AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN WISCONSIN SCHOOL FINANCE (1996).
584. Id. at 4.
585. Id. at 16-23.
586. Id. at 25-32.




Wisconsin funded its schools handsomely, and the plaintiffs had not
shown any educational failure that resulted from the funding formula.
It is hardly unusual for educational finance litigation to involve the
work of experts, but expert testimony is also not normally the only
evidence presented of (in)equitable or (in)adequate conditions. Because
of the procedural posture of the case, the record in Vincent, however, is
scant on additional evidence. The plaintiffs deposed only five witnesses-
among them, Superintendent Benson; the Deputy State Superintendent
Steven Dold; and the Assistant State Superintendent for Special
Education Juanita Pawlisch-and all of them provided some testimony
helpful to their case."" The depositions were designed, in part, to
demonstrate the system's inability to ensure an adequate education for
children of differing needs."9 Remarkably, the State took no depositions.
The plaintiffs also submitted approximately two dozen relatively short
affidavits from district administrators, most from the plaintiff districts. 9 '
These diverse affidavits described specific instances of insufficient
resources: unavailable services for LEP students, lack of funds for
building maintenance, the failure to provide a wide curriculum, the
inability to raise funds to maintain sufficient staff and alleviate
overcrowding.92 There was little effort by the witnesses to describe how
the funding mechanism created these conditions, nor was there any
meaningful effort to demonstrate that the outcomes and achievement of
students in the low-wealth districts was somehow adversely affected by
the physical conditions and/or the school finance formula. Nor was there
any systematic effort to compare the alleged deficiencies in low-wealth
districts with what is offered in high wealth districts. Finally, with regard
to the sheer weight of the evidence, the Vincent record pales in
comparison to the thousands of pages of testimony developed at trial in
DeRolph. Vincent was decided on a spartan record.
3. The Courts Below
a. The Positions of the Parties in Summary Judgment
The Plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' indictment of the State's educational
finance system was summarized in their opening brief:
The system fails to provide equal educational opportunities because it
fails to adequately adjust for the disparity in tax base. In an equalized
589. Depositon of John Benson, Vincent v. Voight, No. 95-CV-2586 (Cir. Ct. Wis. i997);
Deposition of Steven Dold, Vincent v. Voight, No. 95 -CV-25 86 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997); Deposition of
Juanita Pawlisch, Vincent v. Voight, No. 95-CV-2586 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
590. See, e.g., Depositon of John Benson at 9-12, Vincent (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
591. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants-Petitioners at 393-620 app., Vincent v. Voight, 614




system, those districts that tax the same would spend the same
regardless of each community's tax base. Instead of an equalized
system, the current system contains built-in disequalizers which
prevent property-poor districts from obtaining equal access to
resources and providing equal educational opportunities. The evidence
demonstrates the disparities across Wisconsin are significant. The
evidence further demonstrates that as a result of the system's
inequities, all students are not provided with equal educational
opportunities and the quality of education in Wisconsin depends on
where a student lives. 93
The plaintiffs specifically identified four components of the three-
tiered funding system that promoted inequality. First, three types of
general school aid were provided to all districts, irrespective of property
wealth: (i) minimum aid (abolished by Act 27 in 1995); (2) integration
aid (which went to MPS and the surrounding suburbs to fund the
voluntary integration program); and (3) special adjustment aid (designed
to provide a cushion for districts that lose state aid as their property tax
values increase). 94 Second, the plaintiffs pointed out that categorical aids
for special programs were not paid out through the equalization formula
and are therefore tantamount to flat grants. 95 Third, the school levy tax
credit, though not a school aid at all, disproportionately benefitted
taxpayers in high-wealth districts s96 Finally, the revenue limits (also
called revenue caps) locked in inequality at the base year levels.5 97
Moreover, plaintiffs argued, these disequalizing aspects coupled with the
less-than-perfect equalization provided by the three-tiered formula result
in actual inequalities in tax effort and spending 9' Here the plaintiffs
cited Statz and Alexander's work.5" This structural fiscal inequality, they
further argued, resulted in actual deprivations of educational
opportunity, as described by the affiants and as acknowledged by Benson
in his deposition."'
These conditions, the plaintiffs continued, resulted in a violation of
the Education Article's Uniformity Clause and could not pass either a
strict scrutiny or rational relation analysis under the equal protection
593. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement at 2, Vincent
v. Voight, Case No. 9 5 -CV-25 86 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Motion].
594 Id. at 12-14.
595. Id. at 14-15.
596. Id. at 15-16.
597. Id. at 16-17.
598. Id. at 17-22.
599. Id.
6oo. "Some districts struggle to provide their children with one foreign language while another
district that has a lot more means offers the children options of three, four, and five foreign
languages," Benson testified. Benson Deposition at io-iI, Vincent v. Voight, Case No. 95-CV-2586
(Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
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provision of the state constitution. 6° What about the Kukor precedent?
Plaintiffs argued that the decision was not controlling (I) because there
was no clear majority opinion in the case, and (2) because the case did
not involve the same issues and was factually distinguishable. 62 In their
brief, plaintiffs characterized the issue in Kukor as a challenge to the
school finance system on the grounds that: "it failed to take into account
the fact that certain children have different educational needs requiring
greater financial resources and that districts with the greatest number of
high needs students were the least capable of raising funds due to
municipal overburden."" In contrast, the plaintiffs asserted, Vincent
demonstrates that the system did not provide equal access to resources to
provide a basic education. In any case, the plaintiffs continued, the
system had structurally changed since Kukor and now was even less
equitable.
604
The Intervenor Plaintiffs: WEAC. WEAC supported the motion for
summary judgment, writing: "The Plaintiffs' lawsuit primarily
concentrates on the broad structural inequities inherent in the current
formula. By contrast, Intervenors emphasize the harm done to individual
districts and certain classes of children by several specific aspects of the
current school financing system." 6" Again, AEF and WEAC, though
technically aligned, diverged on the theory of recovery. WEAC's brief
focused on three factual conditions that it believed violated the state's
constitution: (i) WEAC asserted that the formula did not adequately
equalize resources between wealthy and poor districts6; (2) citing rapid
and concentrated increases in the incidences of students with disabilities,
LEP students, and economically disadvantaged students, WEAC
specifically argued that the current formula failed to adequately
recognize the cost of educating certain classes of "high needs" students ;
and (3) WEAC criticized at length the revenue caps for their arbitrary
limitation on educational expenditures, particularly their failure to
account for concentrations of high needs students and their failure to
6ol. Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 593, at 32-37, 44-49.
602. Id. at 37-44.
603. Id. at 41.
6o4. Id. at 41-43. To a large extent, plaintiffs were right in the characterization of the claim in
Kukor. Unfortunately for them, however, the Kukor plurality did not engage in a meaningful analysis
of whether the children of Milwaukee had been denied a basic education that did not meet their needs.
Rather, the plurality treated the case as one of mere spending differences, which the Wisconsin
Constitution permits. Thus, although Kukor should have been distinguishable because it did not
present the issue of equal access to resources, the Kukor court nevertheless ruled on that issue.
6o5 . Intervenors' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at i, Vincent v.
Voight, Case No. 95-CV-2586 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
6o6. Id. at 4-7.
6o7. Id. at 11-17.
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recognize that average educational costs usually exceeded marginal
costs-districts with declining enrollment were therefore unfairly denied
funds necessary to maintain educational facilities and personnel.6
The principal thrust of WEAC's brief, however, was that Judge
Callaway should not feel bound by the Kukor decision as that decision
articulated no clear standard for an educational system that is as uniform
as practicable."' Although WEAC did not set forth what it would view as
the appropriate standard, it argued that the State itself had not
developed a standard for uniformity.6" The evidence presented by the
expert witnesses and school district administrators demonstrated that the
system was not uniform, whatever the standard.
The State. The State's argument was straightforward and was largely
presaged by Guthrie's report. In short, the State contended that Kukor
was binding precedent on the circuit court and that the system of
educational finance was more uniform in 1997 than it had been in 1989.
6,
Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs sought a different standard, they
had not clearly articulated it, making it impossible for a court to
adjudicate the case in their favor.6"2 Finally, the State minimized AEF's
and WEAC's complaints about the first tier, the unequalized categorical
aids, and other like components of the system by pointing out that they
comprised a relatively small amount of the ever-increasing state aid
provided to districts.6" These distributive decisions, the State argued,
were fully within the Legislature's discretion.
The Fair Aid Coalition. Because FAC's interests were potentially
affected by his decision in the case, Judge Callaway permitted the group
of high-wealth districts to submit an amicus curiae brief setting forth their
position. That position was unequivocal:
Plaintiffs must not be allowed to make an end-run around the
democratic process by seeking validation in the courts of what is
essentially an alternative legislative policy choice. Resolution for these
tensions must be found in the legislature, where current efforts are
under way to measure the effects of the new aid distribution formula
and formulate policy proposals on the basis of those measurements.' 4
6o8. Id. at 8-u1.
609. Id. at 26-3 1.
6io. Id. at 64-66.
611. Brief of Defendants in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 44-51,
Vincent v. Voight, Case No. 95 -CV-25 86 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
612. Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion of Plaintifs' and Intervening
Plaintiffs at 62-78, Vincent v. Voight, Case No. 95 -CV-25 86 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
613. Id. at 13-20.
614. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Fair Aid Coalition at 1-2, Vincent v. Voight, Case No. 9 5 -CV-
2586 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
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Even considering the court's role as a countermajoritarian check on
the political branches, the FAC's brief was a candid statement that they
wanted to keep the debate in the forum which they controlled. Without
presenting any additional evidence or facts, FAC went on to argue that
the claims brought by AEF and WEAC should be dismissed because
they were indistinguishable from the claims adjudicated in Kukor."' FAC
also criticized the plaintiffs' evidence:
The shortcoming of the administrators' [affidavit] testimony is that it
utterly fails to show a cause and effect relationship between these
[physical conditions] and the workings of the school funding
formula.... The simple reality is that the plaintiffs make no
methodologically legitimate effort to demonstrate a failure of the
school funding system to achieve the required level of uniformity,
because plaintiffs provide no systematic comparison between the





Boiled down, all four parties raised the same three fundamental issues:
(i) What was the appropriate standard for the Uniformity Clause? (2)
Whether the courts or the legislature got to choose that standard? and
(3) Was there sufficient evidence to demonstrate that children in low-
wealth districts had been denied an equal educational opportunity?
b. The Circuit Court Decision
On July I8, 1997, Judge Callaway answered these three questions in
favor of the State. Judge Callaway acknowledged plaintiffs' evidence that
many districts had reduced curricular offerings; that many had been
forced to eliminate teaching positions; that many labored under large
class sizes; that many could not afford to maintain their facilities; and
that the State refuted none of this evidence.6 '7 But his holding was
resolute:
Given the deference required regarding the legislature's budgetary
choices, a fundamental flaw of Plaintiffs' (including Intervening
Plaintiffs) case, is that they have provided the Court with volumes of
statistical evidence analyzing educational finances, a matter on which
the Court's hands are relatively tied, and very little statistical evidence
(and very little of any kind of evidence apart from anecdotes and
conclusory opinions) on the crucial question of whether children are
actually being deprived of a basic education. The Court cannot provide
Plaintiffs with the drastic remedy they seek-the sacking of the state's
615. Id. at 4-9.
616. Id. at i i.
617. Memorandum Decision & Order (Summary Judgment) at 6-7. Vincent v. Voight, Case No.
95 -CV-25 86 ( Cir. Ct. Wis. 1997).
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entire system of financing schools throughout the State on such an
unevenly developed record.
6 8
Judge Callaway could have stopped there and conducted a trial to
provide AEF and WEAC the opportunity to better develop the record.
Instead, he granted the State's motion for summary judgment.' Out of
the three opinions issued in Kukor, Judge Callaway cobbled together an
admitted "amalgam" of a standard for a uniform system of education: it
is the "character of instruction" that must be uniformly provided, the
State must "ensure that all students have an opportunity to a basic
education," and "reasonable" equality, as opposed to absolute equality,
is sufficient. 62 Because this minimum standard went unchallenged by
Justice Steinmetz's concurrence, Judge Callaway reasoned, "this Court
feels bound by the standard of the plurality."62'
In applying this standard, Judge Callaway criticized AEF and
WEAC for their failure to present systematic evidence of the State's
denial to children in low-wealth districts a basic education and
complimented the state for providing even greater funding to all schools
since the Kukor decision.62' Judge Callaway also addressed each of the
plaintiffs' complaints about specific components of the school finance
system-unequalized categorical aids, the special adjustment aid, the
school levy tax credit,"' and the revenue caps -- and promptly dismissed
them. Finally, Judge Callaway chastised the plaintiffs for failing to
present evidence that would indicate a denial of basic educational
opportunities or even the effects of the conditions complained about in
the affidavits on outcomes like graduation rates, remedial education,
college attendance. "Such evidence is crucial because there must be some
618. Id. at 25.
619. Id. at i.
620. Id. at 22.
621. Id. at 24.
622. Id. at 25, 33.
623. The court specifically found that WEAC's argument that the State should make more use of
categorical aid for high needs children was foreclosed by Kukor, "which held that the State was not
required to consider the particularized needs of students." Id. at 30. Though arguably an over-reading
of any holding in Kukor, Callaway's finding demonstrates the lengths to which he went to render
summary judgment.
624. "There is nothing wrong with allowing a district to absorb the loss of State aid gradually." Id.
at 31.
625. "[T]he appropriateness of the size of the tax credits, and the actual money spent on the school
system as well, are budgetary matters on which the court defers to the legislature." Id. at 32.
626. Noting that local voters are empowered to override the revenue caps, Callaway stated that
"allowing local taxpayers to take matters in their own hands by, in essence, waiving their protective
cap, is reasonable." Id. at 33.
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way of measuring the magnitude of any deficiencies in the State's effort
to fulfill its duty to provide students with a basic education.""'
Callaway then concluded his opinion with a plea to the state's high
court:
Whatever [the Supreme] Court's ultimate decision, it is emphatically
necessary for it to provide some reasonably clear and meaningful
standard against which the requirement of equal opportunities in
education may be measured. Until that standard is developed, the
legislature, potential litigants and the lower courts will be left groping
through more unfocused litigation every time a new budget is
created.6'
c. The Court of Appeals: Just a Stop Along the Way
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals' 3-0 decision was direct. "In
[Kukor], the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of a school
finance system similar to the current system. For us to reach a contrary
conclusion, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the current system
materially differs from the system that existed in Kukor. Plaintiffs have
not done so. ' '629 Plaintiffs appealed.
4. The Context for the Supreme Court's Decision
63
o
The historical account of the lawsuit provides only a partial view of
the complete context in which the court rendered its decision. Inter-
institutional concerns and interest group pressure also played a role.
a. Institutional Conflict: The Political Branches
The Governor. Since at least the time he was elected to the
Governor's office in 1986, Wisconsin politics were dominated by Tommy
Thompson. Although he beat the incumbent Democrat in his first
election in a relatively close race, Thompson went on to solidly win his
next three elections." Thompson was also an aggressive and, in his
627. id. at 36.
628. Id. at 40.
629. Vincent v. Voight, No. 97-3174, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1447, at *1-*2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 1998). Although recognizing the fractured decision in Kukor, Presiding Judge Dykman wrote that
a majority of the Kukor court, including Justice Steinmetz, agreed on three points: (i) absent a
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature unconstitutionally denied a uniform
opportunity for education, the court must defer to the legislative policy as to what degree of
uniformity is practicable; (2) while education is a fundamental right, the appellants in Kukor were not
asserting that they were denied that right; and (3) the Uniformity Clause did not require absolute
equality. Id. at *17- 26.
630. Unlsess otherwise indicated, information for this section was gathered from personal
observations of the author and the following sources: Interview with Michael Butera, supra note 572;
Interview with Karen Drazkowski, supra note 553; Interview with David Hase, supra note 438;
Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 438; Interview with Roland Rockwell, supra note 553;
Interview with Brian Rude, supra note 557; Interview with William Vincent, supra note 553.
631. Humphrey Institute, Center for the Study of Politics , 2oo4 Elections Project: Wisconsin
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words, "progressive" policy-maker.63 His politics centered on several key
principals: a more decentralized government with less Madison-based
bureaucracy, concomitant flexibility and innovation, individual
responsibility, and market-based solutions.633 Consistent with these
principals, Thompson's reforms gained nationwide attention in
emphasizing "work, not welfare. ' 6,34 Other than his welfare reform and
his allegiance to tax relief, Thompson's other significant policy agenda
was education reform. 6,, Consistent with his anti-bureaucratic ideas,
Thompson did not believe that meaningful reform could occur through
the education establishment in Madison or spending more money in
bloated educational systems.6 36 Instead, Thompson championed market-
based reform measures such as open enrollment, charter schools, and
parental vouchers, as he believed these would put pressure on the
traditional education bureaucracies to better serve children.6, 7 Thompson
found an ally in Polly Williams, a Milwaukee Assemblywoman, and was
able to push through in 199o the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
(MPCP), a voucher experiment that later expanded in 1995 to include
parochial schools.6 38 Significant reform of the state school aid formula
was not on his agenda.
For the most part, Thompson's reform agenda was not impeded by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. He clearly had allies on the court. During
his tenure he appointed four justices to the bench (Wilcox, Geske,
Prosser, and Sykes), three of whom served on the Vincent court.
Moreover, the court largely thwarted challenges to his policy agenda and
authority. The most visible example is the court's validation of
Thompson's aggressive expansion of the partial veto. 6, 9 The court also
approved the centerpiece of Thompson's education reform agenda when
Gubernatorial Election Results 196o-2oo2, at http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/csp/elections/
election-data/s3-WIGov.pdf.
632. See Thompson, supra note 432 at 25-34.
633. Id.
634. See id. at 35-83.
635. See id. at 85-123.
636. See id.
637. See id.
638. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. i992) (upholding the MPCP against allegations
that it violated the Uniformity Clause of the Education Article, the "public purpose" doctrine which
requires that public expenditures be for a public purpose and the Wisconsin Constitution's bar against
multiple subject "private or local" legislation); see also Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1997)
(upholding the expanded MPCP against an Establishment Clause challenge).
639. See State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1998) (upholding the
Governor's use of the "Vanna White" partial veto with which he excised from legislation single words,
single numbers, and even letters within words to make wholesale changes to legislative policy);
Citizens Util. Bd. v. Klauser, 534 N.W.2d 508 (Wis. 1995) (upholding the Governor's veto strategy of
substituting new (and naturally lower) dollar figures in budget bills).
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it twice turned back challenges to the MPCP, despite strong state
constitutional language prohibiting the provision of state funds to
religious seminaries. Thompson was not always successful before the
supreme court, however, as his attempted coup of the DPI was squelched
by the court and his veto power was eventually reigned-in.64' On the
whole, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court frequently cleared the
path for Thompson to implement his vision of good government.
Outspoken on many issues642, Thompson was publicly subdued on
the issue of Vincent. But there is no doubt that he opposed AEF's and
WEAC's efforts to strike down the state's educational finance policy. At
every significant juncture in the case-the filing of the complaint, the
trial court's ruling, the appellate court argument, and its decision-
Thompson issued a brief statement, deffered to the Attorney General's
office, and at times took questions through a spokesperson. 6" The
message was always clear and singular: the state's educational finance
system provided a tremendous amount of money to local districts, it
distributed funds equitably, and was clearly constitutional.64
Although the Governor did not express his views formally to the
circuit or appellate courts, he did file an amicus brief in the supreme
court. 6" The brief, written by Lawrence "Ladd" Wiley, his personal
attorney, emphasized the constitutional commitment of education
finance policy to the legislature, the alleged failure of plaintiffs' proof,
and the virtues of the current finance system. Echoing the classic state
argument that money does not matter, Thompson argued that "Plaintiffs
640. See Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 460; Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 407.
641. Thompson v. Craney, 546 N.W.2d 123 (Wis. 1996).
642. See generally Thompson, supra note 432, at 9-34 (describing Thompson's philosophy of state
governance).
643. See Mike Flaherty, School Funding Formula Opposed, Wisc. St. J., Aug. 14, 1998, at IC; Tom
Heinen & Joe Williams, School Financing Faces Suit; Plaintiffs Say Huge Gap Exists in State Between
Rich, Poor Districts, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Oct. 12, 1995, at i; Jeff Mayers, Lawsuits Planned Against
Budget, Wisc. St. J., July 26, 995, at iA; Chris Murphy, Plaintiffs Vow to Take Fight to the Legislature;
Court Lambasted on School Inequity, Capital Times, July II, 2000, at 3A; Kevin Murphy, Appeals
Court Backs State Aid Formula For Schools, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Dec. 24, 1998, at 2; Joe Williams,
School Aid Formula Upheld; Districts Likely to Appeal, Wisc. St. J., July i9, 1997, at 5.
644 See, e.g., Heinen & Williams, supra note 643, at i (according to Kevin Keane, Thompson's
press secretary, "[tihis past budget closed the gap between school districts .... [tihe bottom line is the
governor pumped $1.2 billion into the budget. Poor districts will get more per student than wealthier
districts"); Chris Murphy, supra note 643, at 3A ("Gov. Tommy Thompson said in a prepared
statement this morning that 'the court specifically recognized that we have successfully worked over
the last 14 years to make sure that every Wisconsin student has access to the best educational system
in the country."').
645. Nonparty Brief by Governor Tommy Thompson, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis.
2000) (No. 97-3174).
646. Id. at s-8.
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and plaintiff-intervenors have failed to provide any evidence that
demonstrates there is a critical linkage between school spending and the
quality of education. Without establishing that uniform spending would
enhance the quality of education, there is no public policy justification,
let alone constitutional mandate, for establishing such a requirement."
' 647
Thompson sought to demonstrate the point with a chart that showed no
nexus between performance on statewide reading tests and per-pupil
spending 4' Thompson also went on to contend that a greater percentage
of state aid is equalized today than in 19 86-8 7
.649
The Legislature. As an initial matter, unlike Ohio, there is no
marked institutional strain between the Legislature and the high court.
In that state, a modestly liberal working majority on the supreme court
had repeatedly struck down legislation. In Wisconsin, the Abrahamson
court has been much less activist in reviewing state legislation.
The filing and development of the Vincent litigation prompted very
little public comment from either the leadership or the rank-and-file of
the legislature. This seems consistent with the lawmakers' general
inability or unwillingness to agree upon any meaningful change to the
educational finance system. One state senator attributed this to the fact
that the case and the issue of finance equity did not create clear partisan
responses, but rather was an issue affecting different locales in different
ways irrespective of the local legislator's party label. °
The "parochial" nature of the issue did prompt twenty-four
lawmakers to submit an amicus brief to the supreme court in support of
the plaintiffs, but no briefs were filed on behalf of Wisconsin Senate or
Assembly leaders. 65I Gary Sherman, a lawyer and Democrat, and twenty-
three other legislators (eighteen Assembly Democrats, two Assembly
Republicans, three Senate Democrats, and Republican Senator Brian
Rude) 652 asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to strike down the state's
school finance scheme, develop a standard against which a new scheme
could be measured, and allow the Madison lawmakers to craft a
constitutional scheme. 653 The brief is candid in its view that meaningful
647. Id. at 3.
648. Id. at 9 cht. A.
649. Id. at 4.
650. Interview with Brian Rude, supra note 557. The Wisconsin State Assembly, after more than
two decades of a Democratic majority, was controlled by Republicans throughout the litigation. The
Senate has been in Democratic hands since 1975 except for brief periods from April 1993 to June 1996
and April 1998 to January 1999.
651. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 393-94 (Wis. 2000); Brief Amici Curiae of State
Representative Gary E. Sherman et al., Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. zooo) (No. 97-3174).
652. Eleven of the twenty-four lawmakers were from Milwaukee and Racine.
653. Id. at 9-io.
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educational finance reform will not happen through the political
process.61 4 Asserting their agreement that the Uniformity Clause requires
an equitable distribution of educational resources, the legislators, like
Judge Callaway, requested that the court provide a "clearly articulated
standard of uniformity. '" 6" Just beneath this plea for principled guidance,
however, was legislative gridlock and the legislators' status in the
minority on this issue. "Unless this court declares this as the
constitutional standard, it is inevitable that the political processes at
work in the legislature will persist in creating school finance systems that
continue to afford some school districts radically more access to
resources than others." 66 Most lawmakers were unwilling publicly to
either defend or criticize the system. Thus, there was no clear
institutional hostility to intervention, but neither was intervention the
typical role of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The Attorney General. Of all the statewide elected officials,
Democratic Attorney General James Doyle's position was the most
conflicted and complex. By the time Vincent reached the Supreme Court,
Doyle's intention to run against Tommy Thompson for Governor was
well-known. 657 Also well-known was Doyle's refusal to defend
Thompson's position in the litigation surrounding Thompson's attempt
to bring the SPI under his auspices, as well as Thompson's replacement
of Doyle on the Milwaukee voucher case.6,8 Doyle was apparently
independent-minded and had his own political agenda. That said, as
Attorney General, he was charged with upholding state law, and was
therefore obliged to defend the educational finance system against
AEF's and WEAC's attacks.
The Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction. Superintendent John Benson had
publicly sparred with the Governor in the DPI case and had publicly
announced his support of many of the goals of AEF's lawsuit upon its
filing.659 He specifically believed that aspects of the educational finance
system created serious inequities that could be repaired. 66o But Benson in
654. Id.
655. Id. at i.
656. Id. at 3.
657. See Steven Waiters, State Justices Also Write Standard for a Basic Education, Milwaukee J.
Sentinel, July 12, 2000, at i (stating that Attorney General Doyle had already announced his decision
to run for governor in 2002).
658. See Richard P. Jones, Justices Hear 2 Views on Benson's Job; High Court to Rule on Shift of
Power away from DPI to New Education Agency, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Nov. 29, 1995, at 3; Steve
Schultze, Defending Choice Law has Cost $372,oo, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Jan. I6, I997, at io.
659. Interview with David Hase, supra note 438.
660. Benson did not support a wholesale scrapping of the tiered, tax-base equalization formula.
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his official capacity was charged with upholding the school finance
regime.6"' Benson's public support of the plaintiffs in the Vincent case was
seen by participants in this study as an insignificant threat to the State
defendants. Put bluntly, the Superintendent wielded little political power
and did not control the state's education agenda. In short,
Superintendent Benson, though a supporter of equity-minded reform
and the plaintiffs, would have little ability to affect the Vincent case.
b. Environmental Influences: The Interest Groups
The Association for Equity in Funding. Established as a pressure
group seeking to reform the school finance formula to ensure equal
access to educational resources, AEF mostly appealed to rural, low-
wealth school districts. With the integral involvement of Doug Haselow,
however, AEF was able to include the urban Milwaukee, Racine, and
Beloit Districts among its ranks. AEF would not be able to attract as
plaintiffs other large districts such as Green Bay, Madison and Eau
Claire because these districts believed that the two- and three-tiered
formulas provided sufficient funding or they would rather take their
chances in the legislature. 662 Thus, at its peak of some 150 school districts,
AEF was still a minority interest group was able to attract only limited
attention among legislators.
Because AEF was an organization made up solely of school district
administrators who donated their time, the group was unable to set-up a
strong infrastructure and communications network. Unlike Ohio's
Coalition for Adequacy and Equity, AEF did not have a significant
physical presence in the capital, nor a strong publicity operation, and it
was not able to attract the support of other education organizaions in
the state. Some of these deficiencies were remedied in early 1999, when
AEF hired Doug Haselow to serve as a part-time executive director for
the group. Haselow's experience in Madison was a valuable asset and he
was able to help the group produce quarterly newsletters and much more
effective policy primers and proposals. Yet a one-person operation
Rather, he would have preferred adjustments to the formula to enhance equity such as the elimination
of the first-tier, hold-harmless provision. CAROLYN BUSCH & ANITA TYCHSEN, STATE OF WISCONSIN
SCHOOL FINANCE IN 1996-97, at t9 (1997).
66I. Early in the case, Benson argued to the Attorney General's office that he should be appointed
independent counsel to represent his position, as it diverged from the state's position. Doyle's office
denied this request. Yet Benson, in a pleading filed by DPI Chief Legal Counsel Robert Paul, asked
Judge Callaway to permit him to appear in the matter in his individual, not official capacity and file an
amicus brief drafted by DPI in-house counsel. The Attorney General's office opposed Benson's
motion and the court ultimately denied Benson's request. Interview with Anonymous, Madison, Wis.
(June 12, 2OO1).
662. Interview with Douglas Haselow, supra note 437.
[Vol. 55:1x077
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
would still not allow the group the kind of presence that Bill Phillis and
the Coalition for Adequacy and Equity commanded in Ohio.
The Teachers Union. WEAC's participation in the lawsuit was both a
blessing and burden to AEF. On the one hand, WEAC is among the
strongest interest groups in the state with a working relationship with the
DPI. ' WEAC also has the ability to mobilize resources to support its
members' interests. And WEAC's leadership and counsel have a
sophisticated understanding of Wisconsin educational policy and politics.
On the other hand, WEAC's preferred theory diverged from that of
AEF, and thereby created a risk that the plaintiffs' message would be
obscured.664
The "Education Organizations." By and large, Wisconsin's statewide
education interests-the Wisconsin Association of School Boards
(WASB), the Wisconsin Association of School Administrators
(WASDA), the Association of Wisconsin School Administrators
(AWSA), and the Wisconsin Association of School Business Officials
(WASBO)-all sat on the sidelines of the Vincent case. Unlike the Ohio
education organizations, these groups did not even submit amicus briefs
in the case. This should come as no surprise given that their memberships
would likely be divided over the question of reforming the school finance
formula. The only statewide education organization that did participate
was the 50,000-member Wisconsin Parent Teacher Association (WPTA).
The WPTA joined in an amicus brief arguing that the educational
finance system was unconstitutional because it failed to address student
need, particularly the needs of students with disabilities and students in
poverty.66' Even the participation of the WPTA, WEAC and AEF did
not generate a consensus among the education organizations in the state
and therefore could not present a unified educational front to the courts.
Wisconsin's Wealthy Districts: The Fair Aid Coalition. The FAC, an
interest group of approximately fourty "zero-aid" districts that had pre-
existed the Vincent litigation, delivered a clear and unequivocal message
to the courts beginning at the summary judgment proceedings. In their
friend-of-the-court brief to the supreme court, the message remained the
same: "This appeal is, in essence, simply a repeat of the constitutional
challenge to the school finance system raised in Kukor v. Grover," and
"[u]nder the current equalization formula, funds are distributed as
equitably or more equitably than under the formula addressed in
663. Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 438; Interview with Micheal Butera, supra note
572.
664. Id.
665. Brief of Amici Curiae Institute for Wisconsin's Future, Inc., et al. at 3-6, Vincent v. Voight,
614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000) (No. 97-3714).
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previous constitutional challenges." 666 "The issue of school funding
presents enormous challenges in balancing competing social interests.




FAC was simply more comfortable in the Legislature than in the
courts. Not only are their suburban districts strongholds for Republicans,
but they also had a powerful lobbyist in Martin Schreiber. And unlike
the Alliance for Adequate School Funding, Ohio's coalition of wealthy
districts, FAC took a definitive position against WEAC and AEF.
Milwaukee: The 8oo-Pound Gorilla. Milwaukee's participation, both
political and financial, was essential to the plaintiffs' efforts. Not only
were the District's concerns represented by Haselow's lobbying efforts,
they helped shape the plaintiffs' remedial theory. At the outset, AEF's
"equal access" principle was directed primarily at ensuring that all state
aids were run through the eualization formula and to achieve fiscal
equity to the extent possible. As noted above, however, Milwaukee's
needs were not so simple. Even if it was able to access the same tax base
as other districts in the state, it would still not be able to address its
severe educational and municipal overburden, the very problems that
were the target of Kukor. The "compromise" between fiscal neutrality
and some recognition of student and municipal needs was a modification
to the distribution formula that would provide greater "weight" for
students with special needs.669 Under the current system, students are
considered fungible as a uniform amount of aid is distributed based on
ADM. AEF's ultimate proposal would create an equalized aid weighting
for special education, economically disadvantaged, and limited English
proficiency students by which those students would count for a higher
dollar figure that would be equalized through the formula.67° Thus,
districts with higher numbers of special needs students would receive
proportionately more through the formula. Though this would not
address directly the municipal overburden problem, it was a sensible
compromise on which the small, low-property wealth districts with fewer
special needs children could agree with Milwaukee.6"'
Milwaukee also brought itself closer to the "equal access" theory
through an amicus brief filed by Mayor John Norquist in which he
666. Brief Amicus Curiae by Fair Aid Coalition at i, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis.
2000) (No. 97-3174).
667. Id.
668. Interview with Douglas Haselow, supra note 437.
669. See id.
670. See id.
671. It should be noted that WEAC did not formally support a weighting system, while advocates
for children with disabilities opposed the proposal. Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 437;
Interview with Douglas Haselow, supra note 437.
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argued that, even if Milwaukee's tax base is similar to many "out-state"
districts, the relevant comparison for Milwaukee are the City's
metropolitan suburbs. 67 In that regard, "[t]he school funding system
encourages higher spending on wealthy suburban students, rewarding
suburban communities with lower property taxes, and penalizing poorer
urban and rural students and communities in which they live."667 With the
increased mobility of middle-class students, these suburban "tax islands"
(twelve of the thirty-four zero-aid districts in the state) siphon off
students who do not suffer the challenges of poverty and limited English
proficiency.6 4 The thrust of the argument, though not explicit, is that
Milwaukee should be put on an equal tax-base footing as its neighbors in
the FAC.675
5. THE VINCENT V. VOIGHTDECISION
The fundamental arguments that each party made at the trial and
appellate levels remained mostly intact in the briefing before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Relying heavily on their statistical analyses
and deposition statements made by Superintendent Benson and
Assistant Superintendent Dold, AEF continued to argue that property-
poor districts did not have equal access to educational dollars and that
many of the provisions of the school finance system had a
"disequalizing" effect.6, 6 WEAC directly asked the court to set an
articulable and enforceable standard for the Uniformity Clause that
recognized student needs, and to strike down the revenue limits. And, for
the first time, WEAC itself laid out the broad principles that should
guide a new uniformity standard:
At a minimum, that standard will require a funding system that allows
every school district to provide a substantially similar educational
opportunity regardless of property wealth or student demographics.
The standard should provide approximate equality, while permitting a
school district to spend more if its taxpayers decide to spend more for
public education, in basic educational quality;
At a minimum, public education must prepare students to be
productive and active citizens;
672. Brief Amicus Curiae of Mayor John Norquist at i, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis.
20) (No. 97-3174).
673. Id. at I.
674- Id.
675. It is worth noting that Mayor Norquist was a supporter of the Milwaukee voucher program,
which AEF and WEAC opposed. See Joe Williams, 3 on MPS Board Ask Court to Uphold School
Choice, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 18, 1997, at i.
676. Brief of Plaintiffs/Co-Appellants/Petitioners, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000)
(No. 97-3174).
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At a minimum, public education must provide for students with special
needs and, accordingly, those aspects of the funding system should be
eliminated that discriminate against school districts with a significant
population of those students.67
This standard clearly embraced Bablitch's dissent in Kukor and the
recent decisions in courts in Kentucky, Wyoming, and Massachusetts. 67'
But it also suffered from the fuzziness of the "adequacy" standards. The
State, for its part, continued to cite Kukor as controlling and urged the
court that determining the substance of the phrase "as uniform as
practicable" was a matter for the legislature.
679
a. Justice Crooks's Opinion
On July 1I, 2000, speaking through Justice Crooks, the court handed
down what some characterized as a "split" opinion and others called a
victory for the State.68° What is certain is that a majority of the justices
refused to strike down the state's educational finance system, while a
different majority set a better-articulated standard for uniformity. Justice
Crooks was in both majorities.
Dutifully (re-)exploring the constitutional history of the Education
Article's Uniformity Clause and regurgitating Wisconsin's caselaw on the
Clause-including Zilisch, Bus6, and Kukor-Crooks then drew heavily
from the "adequacy" decisions of the Massachusetts, Kentucky, and
West Virginia supreme courts, as well as a "third-wave" law review
article by Peter Enrich.6' Crooks wrote,
Courts have turned toward adequacy as an alternative way to analyze
school finance systems because previous decisions centered on equality
have not lessened the disparity between school districts. Focusing on
adequacy, it is claimed, has a number of benefits. Among other
benefits, the adequacy approach is 'grounded in broadly shared
societal values concerning the importance of education and the
obligation to provide for the basic needs of society's least
advantaged... The adequacy approach also may be appealing because
it does not threaten to lower the level of achievement in some districts
in an effort to create equality. 6
Then, drawing from Kentucky's Rose decision, Massachusetts's McDuffy
decision, and Justice Bablitch's Kukor dissent,6s3 Crooks established the
677. Brief of Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners at 32, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d
388 (Wis. 2000) (No. 97-3174).
678. See id. at 26-27.
679. Brief of Defendants-Respondents, Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2ooo) (No. 97-
3174).
68o. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000).
68i. Id. at 406.
682. Id. at 4o6-07.
683. In a January 2o02 address to the AEF general membership, Justice Bablitch told the "real"
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standard as "one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and
enable them to succeed economically and personally. '' 6 4 Justices
Abrahamson, Bradley, and Bablitch joined in the holding.68'
But Crooks went on to find that the plaintiffs had failed to provide
enough evidence that the State had failed to meet this standard.
The Petitioners' evidence, however meticulously gathered, fails to
demonstrate that any children lack a basic education in any school
district. Merely showing disparity of the financial resources among
school districts is not enough in this state to prove a lack of equal
opportunity for a sound basic education. As we discussed above,
Wisconsin requires districts to fulfill a constitutional minimum
educational offering, not a maximum.... We also strongly agree with
the circuit court that the evidence fails to show that the actual basic
education being received by the students attending these school
districts is inferior to that of the students in the "property rich" school
districts. There is no evidence, as the circuit court noted, of poor
standardized test scores, college entrance rates, or the like.
Crooks dismissed the equal protection claim, noting that plaintiffs had
not established a denial of the "fundamental right" to a sound basic
education. 68' Justices Wilcox, Prosser, and Sykes joined in these limited
conclusions by Crooks.6s
story behind Vincent as follows:
I knew that the (decision) was going to be four to three. I could read the tea leaves even
before the argument was made. And when we got back in the conference, we voted-and
sure enough, it was four to three.
After the vote was done, and Justice Pat (Crooks) had gotten (the job of writing the
majority opinion for) the case, I didn't wait a day. I went immediately into Pat's office, sat
down and gave him the materials that I had on adequacy in funding and equity in funding
and talked a little bit about the problem of having a standard without a definition.
Pat liked my (state educational) standard, my definition from the Kukor case of eleven
years back. A lot of cases in other states had developed it and taken it beyond that, so we
eventually got to the point where Pat had the definition that you see today. He tried to sell
it to the members on the court that made up the majority. And so out came the definition of
public education.
The REAL Story Behind Vincent. EQurrY NEWS, Winter 2002, at 3-4.
684. Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 407.
685. Id. at 415, 421.
686. Id. at 633-34.
687. Id. at 413.
688. Id. at 415. From a procedural standpoint, Crooks' opinion can be criticized for its refusal to
give the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their case at trial. Having received a standard from the
state high court, plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to offer evidence demonstrating the
state's failure to meet that standard. Such was the result in other cases, including those in New York,
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 66I (N.Y. 1994), Idaho, Idaho Sch. For Equal Educ.
Opp. v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993), later proceedings, 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998), and North
Carolina, Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). Crooks's decision effectively meant that
plaintiffs had not even raised an issue of triable fact and could not establish their case at trial. This




b. The Clarifications of Other Justices
Five of the remaining six justices wrote separately to further express
their opinions. The separate opinions are discussed below.
Justice Wilcox. Justice Wilcox wrote separately merely to emphasize
his refusal to join in the new constitutional standard and to remind the
court that legislative determinations in the area of school finance are
entitled to great deference. 89 He did not go so far as to say that the court
had absolutely no role in reviewing state school finance policy nor did he
join the opinions of Justices Prosser and Sykes, which flatly stated that
the court has no business meddling in school finance policy.
Justice Abrahamson. Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote to express her
opinion that the case ought to be remanded for trial and that the
plaintiffs should be afforded an opportunity to further develop the
record so that the circuit court can apply the better-articulated standard
to the facts.69 Abrahamson then went on at length to describe how the
plaintiffs had provided some evidence of unequal educational resources
and to suggest alternative findings that could be made by a trial court
with a better-developed record.6 ' For instance, she wrote, the trial court
would not have to strike down the entire school finance system, but
rather could declare it constitutionally unacceptable for only certain
districts. This seems to be a reaffirmation of the principle that the test for
constitutionality is not equality or fiscal neutrality, but rather basic
minimum adequacy. She also suggested that any remedy in the case
would be designed by the legislature.
692
Justice Bablitch. Justice Bablitch wrote to lament the educational
failure of many Wisconsin students and the failure of the legislature to
ensure that students were provided with basic educational resources.69'
The opinion is written less like a judicial opinion and more like a policy
briefing for his former legislative colleagues. He identifies systemic
problems and makes a plea to the legislature to address the problem.
"Unquestionably," Bablitch contends, "the cost to fix the system is high.
The cost of not fixing it will be much higher: Uneducated citizens will
extract extremely high social costs in the future."
' 694
Justice Prosser. True to his restraintist views, Justice Prosser
chastises Crooks and the liberal justices for their adoption of a "legal
standard that did not exist before this decision," and the likelihood that
689. Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 45 (Wilcox, J., concurring).
690. Id. at 416 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
691. Id. at 416-21.
692. Id.
693. Id. at 423-25 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
694. Id. at 425.
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this standard will "encourage[] future litigation and will plunge the
judiciary into the legislature's domain." 69 Prosser further criticizes the
Crooks standard as being "distinctly legislative in character," in that it
not only calls for equality, but also consideration of special needs.
696
Justice Sykes. Finally, Justice Sykes would have refused to consider
the case at all by concluding that the case presented a non-justiciable
political question.69 "What constitutes an 'adequate' or 'sound' or even
'basic' education is most emphatically not a question of constitutional
law for this or any other court.698
6. The Aftermath of Vincent v. Voight
The immediate reaction to the Vincent opinion was remarkably
subdued. Claiming victory, Governor Thompson issued a matter-of-fact
written statement in which he interpreted the court's opinion as meaning
that the finance system was "fair and equitable." "The court specifically
recognized that we have successfully worked over the last fourteen years
to make sure that every Wisconsin student has access to the best
educational system in the country."699 Although Attorney General Doyle
also expressed pleasure with the outcome, he was equally pleased that
the court had set a constitutional standard. "It's very, very important that
everyone understands that this is a decision by the Supreme Court that
does not say that this is the right formula," he was quoted as saying.'
Finally, Benson mouthed his respect for the court's decision, but said
that "Neither this finance system nor any other can overcome the
crippling effect of revenue caps."70'
Speaking on behalf of AEF, David Hase expressed his
disappointment with the court's ruling, while both he and Doug Haselow
claimed partial victory. "Although the court did not strike down the
current system," Haselow reportedly said, "it is clearly apparent that the
Legislature must re-examine what has become a terribly inequitable
situation.'7" WEAC President Terry Craney and counsel Bruce
Meredith were pleased that the court finally set a standard for
educational uniformity and Craney emphasized that "the current system
695. Id. (Prosser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
696. Id. at 427.
697. Id. at 429 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
698. Id. at 674.
699. Steven Waiters, School Aid System Passes Court Test, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINAL, July 12, 2000,
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survived by the skin of its teeth, and any deterioration will make it
fail."
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Beyond the parties and very limited press coverage, the Vincent
decision generated little immediate controversy or action. In the longer
term, however, AEF and WEAC hope that the standard drafted by
Justice Crooks can be used in the legislature to leverage a more adequate
and equitable finance scheme. 4 AEF has since developed legislative
proposals based on the language, while the public policy organization,
Institute for Wisconsin's Future, has tied its "adequacy" proposal to the
court's language.0 5
The tensions between AEF's and WEAC's interpretations of the
Uniformity Clause may make for interesting discussion in law journals,
but it is entirely unclear how, if at all, the divergence in theories affected
the supreme court. After all, WEAC largely secured the definition of
uniformity it sought, but the three-tiered formula, revenue caps and all,
still stood. Nor is it clear that the new standard has any meaningful teeth.
What the court did do, however, was keep the door open for judicial
intervention for a time when the factors that affect judicial decision-
making align themselves in favor of challengers to the status quo.
IV. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME
COURTS IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY REFORM
What affects state supreme court decision-making in educational
finance reform litigation? From a formal legal viewpoint, judicial
decision-making in school finance reform cases, like all judicial decision-
making, should be based on a straightforward application of the law to
the facts of the case. But the law is hardly determinative in educational
finance reform cases. Many of these cases are cases of first impression in
which a state's high court is interpreting vague and century-old state
constitutional language. Law and legal precedent being of limited
explanatory value, this study looks outside the law for influences on
judicial decision-making.
This section uses the conceptual framework proposed in Part Two in
comparing Ohio's DeRolph litigation to Wisconsin's Vincent litigation to
provide observations regarding the influence of judicial role orientation,
judicial ideology, and the potential for institutional conflict.
703. Id.
704. See Interview with Bruce Meredith, supra note 438; Interview with Douglas Haselow, supra
note 437.
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A. THE INFLUENCE OF JUDICIAL ATrITUDES ON DECISION-MAKING IN THE
OHIO AND WISCONSIN EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LITIGATIONS
The law and facts of the case, the political environment, judicial
attitudes, and institutional forces-any of these may influence decision-
making in educational policy reform cases such as the DeRolph and
Vincent litigations. Remarkable from the outset are the number of these
"independent" variables that are the same or very similar in both cases:
(I) In terms of the law, the study was designed to control for legal
precedent. Accordingly, both courts had law on the books that
disfavored plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Indeed, Walter in Ohio went
so far as to refuse to recognize education as a fundamental right.
(2) In both cases, the plaintiffs garnered the support of the issue-
oriented and ideological interest groups such as the ACLU. Plaintiffs
also attracted the support of the powerful teachers unions in each state.
That said, Ohio's coalition of interest group support was broader and
deeper, including the large majority of the state's school districts
(compared to Wisconsin's significant minority), the undivided
cooperation of the teachers union (compared to the subtly conflicting
positions between the AEF districts and WEAC in Wisconsin), and the
statewide education organizations such as the school boards and
administrators (compared to Wisconsin's failure to gather that support).
(3) The plaintiffs' coalitions in both cases cut across racial and
geographic lines.
(4) Perhaps most significant, judicial intervention in both cases was
opposed by a strong and vocal governor who had his own education
agenda that, if not conflicting with plaintiffs' litigation agenda, was
certainly not furthered by plaintiffs' agenda. Moreover, the governors in
both cases had significant influence on judicial selection and campaign
finance in both cases. Finally, in both cases the superintendents of public
instruction and their organizations acknowledged on the record the
alleged inequity and inadequacy of funding, but neither carried much
political clout.
If the legal variables, the inter-institutional variables, and interest
group variables were similar in both cases, what explains the difference
in outcomes in the two third-wave litigations? In a nutshell: judicial
attitudes. While there is some evidence to suggest that the DeRolph
plaintiffs had a stronger case on the facts and a stronger coalition of
interest groups, there is significant evidence demonstrating that the
"working majority" on the Ohio Supreme Court (Resnick, Sweeney,
Pfeifer, and Douglas) was both liberal on economic issues and activist. In
contrast, a four-person majority on the Wisconsin Supreme Court
(Wilcox, Prosser, Sykes, and Crooks) is conservative and restraintist. The
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analysis of the backgrounds of the justices, the significant cases decided
by each court, and the workers' compensation/employment law and
criminal justice voting records in each court provide strong evidence that
the two courts are divided into two camps, the majority of which are
liberal on economic issues in Ohio and conservative in Wisconsin. There
is thus substantial evidence to support the notion that liberal attitudes
among the working majority in Ohio, facilitated by a slight activism,
resulted in the liberal decision to overturn the educational finance
scheme. Conversely, conservative and restraintist attitudes may well have
resulted in a validation of the state's policy in Wisconsin.
B. TOWARD A NEW JURISPRUDENCE FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY REFORM
LITIGATION
Attitudes alone, however, do not provide a complete explanation of
judicial behavior in educational policy reform litigations, as those
attitudes may be tempered by the potential for conflict or cooperation
with the courts' sister branches. Indeed, this Article argues, state
supreme courts engage in an overtly political analysis in educational
finance cases.
On the one hand, the political elites in the state, particularly the
leadership in the governor's office and legislature, may privately support
educational reform, but be unable to initiate such reform in the face of
constituency and electoral pressures. In such an instance, the state
supreme court may choose to intervene to provide the "cover" for such
elites to take action. Although such institutional cooperation was not
evident in these case studies, the Kentucky example suggests this
possibility.
But what if such a consensus in favor of reform does not exist? In
the face of opposition to educational policy reform by the political
branches, courts may be unwilling to intervene in educational policy-
making. This unwillingness to intervene may take one of several different
forms. Some courts may employ formal avoidance mechanisms such as
the political question doctrine or theories of separation of power to
remain on the sidelines of the policy debate. Others may nominally get to
the merits of the case, but place a heavy thumb on the state's side of the
scale by citing deference to legislative decision-making in the arena of
educational finance policy. Finally, and perhaps most strategically, some
courts may wish to maintain their institutional authority on the issue of
educational policy by getting to the merits of the case, but still avoid
institutional conflict by finding that the plaintiffs have not proven their




Yet not all courts will refuse to intervene simply because they may
receive resistance from the political branches. Obviously the Ohio
Supreme Court defied Governor Voinovich and the legislative leadership
by striking down the state's school finance system in DeRolph L That
court was apparently not dissuaded by the potential for institutional
conflict. Notably, however, the aftermath of DeRolph suggests that the
court's decision-making was ultimately shaped by inter-institutional
conflict, as the court later rendered a watered down compromise with the
legislature in the guise of an enforcement decision, and even later
dismissed the case without enforcing a remedy. But it would be
uncharitable to say that the Ohio Supreme Court has not contributed to
educational policy reform in the state. The court can well view itself as a
catalyst for reform, engaging in a constitutional dialogue with the
political branches and keeping equity-minded school reform on the
legislative agenda.
This judicial intervention is always grounded in constitutional
principle. Without such principled intervention, the court may reason,
the political branches may be apt to compromise the state's
constitutional values in the face of constituent, interest group, and
electoral pressures. Through give-and-take with legislatures and
governors, courts like the Ohio high court are, in effect, constructing a
constitutional educational system and providing a working definition for
inherently fuzzy constitutional provisions. Although imprecise terms
such as "equality of educational opportunity," "adequacy," "thorough
and efficient," and "uniform" may not be fully defined in the process, an
inter-institutional agreement as to what is a constitutional educational
funding system may ultimately be reached.
The risk, of course, is that the court's legitimacy is compromised in
this process, as it may be viewed as nothing more than a third political
branch in the legislative process. The result, in turn, may be a
diminishing respect for the legal pronouncements of the court. This is the
line that activist courts must walk.
CONCLUSION
No matter the analytical gymnastics performed by modern state
supreme courts, the framers of our state constitutions probably never
thought that courts would be playing such an integral role in the affairs
of educational policy and practice. Indeed, most probably never
imagined state capitals playing such a role in local educational policy and
practice. But as we move toward greater centralization in education
policy, statewide accountability, and standards for what all children
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should know and be able to do, the 19th Century views of the framers
seem mostly inapposite.
In response, state supreme courts over the last three decades have
taken tentative steps toward crafting a new role for themselves in the
state governance of education. If the Madisons and Columbuses of the
country are going to be affecting the lives of children in the Perry and
Dunn counties of the country, courts may be more willing to police state
policy for its fairness. Moreover, as K-I6 education becomes the
hallmark for social and economic success in the country, courts may be
more interested in ensuring that access and opportunity are open to all
children to achieve such success.
Having learned the lessons institutional reform litigation, however,
courts are crafting a new and potentially effective role for themselves in
the governance of education in the state. They are crafting legal doctrine
that provides them with the flexibility to intervene as the conditions
warrant and their policy preferences dictate. They are keeping a wary
eye on the political branches to determine the limits of their institutional
effectiveness and what role they might play in creating a more equitable
and adequate educational system. And, when they choose to intervene,
they do so by exercising the "veto" of judicial review, thus beginning a
constitutional dialogue with the governor and state legislature. This is
hardly the type of jurisprudence we see in commercial disputes or
criminal law, in which the courts boldly act to protect the public, the
accused, shareholders, or employees.
In short, state high courts are crafting a modest new jurisprudence
for educational policy reform-a pragmatic jurisprudence in which courts
inject constitutional values into an ongoing dialogue with the legislature
and executive branch.What remains to be seen is whether the price they
pay in institutional legitimacy outweighs or even eliminates the benefits




A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
Understanding why state supreme court justices decide as they do in
educational finance reform cases is an extremely complex proposition
due to the many factors that may influence such decision-making. Even if
it were theoretically possible to construct rough, quantifiable measures
for each of the many variables that may influence judicial decision-
making in these cases and construct a model that accounts for all of the
interactions among those variables, such a quantitative inquiry is fatally
hampered by the fact that there are simply too many independent
variables and too few state supreme court school finance cases for which
statistical methods may appropriately be used.
Given this limitation on quantitative methods, yet still recognizing
the need to capture as much of the complexity and richness of judicial
decision-making in these cases as possible, comparative case studies of
two educational finance reform litigations in each of Ohio and Wisconsin
were conducted. These case studies not only attempt to understand the
environmental and institutional influences on judicial decision-making,
but also build a profile of each of the state supreme courts and their
justices to assist in analyzing the attitudinal influences on judicial
decision-making in school finance reform cases.
Data for the case studies were gathered from several diverse sources
which provided evidence addressing the various theoretical influences on
judicial decision-making. First, as in traditional case study research,7 6 in-
depth, semi-structured interviews of key participants in the school
finance litigations in both of the states were conducted. All told, sixteen
persons were interviewed in the Ohio case and twenty were interviewed
in the Wisconsin case. All of the interviews were guided by the study's
conceptual framework, transcribed, and coded into categories aligned
with the framework.
Second, certain key documents were gathered in each of the cases.
Those documents included: (i) all opinions of the supreme courts,
intermediate appellate courts, and trial courts; (2) all archived briefs and
other supporting materials filed by the parties and by friends of the court
in the supreme court (in Ohio's DeRolph litigation, twenty two party and
amicus briefs were filed; in Wisconsin's Vincent v. Voight litigation,
eleven party and amicus briefs were filed); (3) press accounts of the
litigation from a systematic review of the major newspapers in both
706. See ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (1994).
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states; and (4) expert witness reports. In addition, policy documents
prepared by the parties or interest groups in the litigation, scholarly legal
articles pertaining to the litigations were collected whenever available.
To better address the influence of judicial attitudes on the outcome
of the school finance cases, this study constructed a profile of each state
supreme court and its justices who participated in the school finance
reform decision by gathering data from written materials published by
and about the courts and justices and, more importantly, from the courts'
published opinions. Specifically, the legal, political science, and historical
literature were searched for descriptions of the role and reputation of
each of the state supreme courts within state government. Then, the legal
and popular literature were searched for materials written by the justices
themselves. The purpose of that search was to unearth any avowed
political, ideological, or role-orientation stances of each of the justices.
To add to the published writings of the justices, brief biographical
sketches of each of the justices were constructed from published
information and my interviews, which biographical sketches provided
some evidence as to the political party affiliation, prior legal experience,
and other potentially relevant information. The biographical profiles
developed from these data provide evidence as to whether each of the
justices tended toward a restraintist or activist role orientation, or a
liberal or conservative ideology.
The final component of the supreme court and supreme court justice
profiles is a description and analysis of the judicial opinions and voting
records of each of the courts and justices. First, all of the significant
opinions issued by each of the courts in at least the three years preceding
and the year following the decision in the school finance reform case
were gathered. A "significant" decision for purposes of this study is one
in which the court had an opportunity to make an "activist" or a
"restraintist" decision and in which a clear "liberal" or "conservative"
position could be taken. Because the typical state supreme court renders
hundreds of decisions in any year, this population of cases yielded a
sufficient sample of the courts' significant decision-making. Each of those
opinions was then analyzed and summarized to create a descriptive
profile of the court's role orientation and ideology in significant cases.7
707. One might criticize an analysis of "significant" decisions on two grounds. First, such decisions
may not reflect the attitudes of the court across the court's entire docket. Such a criticism argues too
much, however. It is precisely because attitudinal leanings come out in the high profile, cutting edge
case that they provide useful evidence as to how a court might approach a novel issue like school
finance reform. Second, significant decisions may be deemed "significant" because they make new law
and are therefore activist. This is well taken, but the problem was addressed, as discussed below, by a
systematic review of all decisions in certain substantive areas. Moreover, attitudinal differences
between state supreme courts or among justices on a single state supreme court can still be detected
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Then, this study systematically analyzed all of the courts' decisions
over a three-year time period in two substantive areas: (i) workers'
compensation in Ohio and employment law in Wisconsin, and (2)
criminal law and procedure in both states to construct a scale and
ranking of each justice's role orientation and ideology. Workers'
compensation and employment law cases were chosen because those
cases present the classic division between a conservative, free-market
party and a liberal party seeking compensation for losses suffered in the
labor market. Criminal law and procedure cases were selected because
they reflect the conservative, regulation-of-deviant-behavior position of
the state and the rights and liberties of an unpopular class of persons
(criminal defendants). For each case, the following data were collected
for the court as a whole and for each individual justice's vote (if
applicable): (I) the date of the decision, (2) whether the decision or vote
was liberal or conservative, (3) whether there was an opportunity for
activism (i.e., an opportunity to overrule precedent, or strike down the
policies of the executive or legislative branches), (4) if the opportunity
existed, whether the decision or vote was activist or restraintist, (5) the
winner at the trial court level or, for workers' compensation cases,
whether the state's industrial commission supported the
employer/business litigant or the worker/claimant litigant; or (6) whether
any justice dissented from the majority opinion. From these
systematically collected data, the study was able to determine for the
individual justices and the court as a whole the percentage of cases in
which the decision was liberal and the percentage of cases in which the
decision was activist. Justices were rank-ordered in terms of their liberal
and activist decision output to discern whether the decision-making
patterns among the justices significantly differed."0
with an analysis of significant decisions.
708. In addition to the standard limitations on qualitative research such as reliability and
generalizability, the methods of this study are limited a couple ways. First, it is impossible with these
methods to discern the relative influence of the various independent variables that affect judicial
decision-making. Such decision-making is complex with various influences affecting each other and the
ultimate decision. No qualitative study, nor any quantitative study with so few cases, is able to
determine the weights of these diverse and interactive variables.
Second, there are a number of institutional, environmental, and attitudinal factors that cannot be
discerned from the methods employed here. Specifically, the effects of social networks among the
justices and others; the effects of privately held attitudes toward specific issues that somehow differ
from the justices' general attitudinal profile cannot be determined (e.g., it is entirely plausible that an
otherwise conservative and restraintist judge values the education so dearly that she might strike down
an appallingly unequal school finance scheme); and the effects of mass public opinion all cannot be
determined through this study. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, this study is clearly more
ambitious in terms of the variety of factors it considers than any study reviewed here.
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